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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Many recently developed decision tools are being

used in the petroleum refining industry.

Specifically,

the

industry's major firms have competent staffs studying
alternate applications of quantitative techniques.

The

entire refining operations of some of these firms have been
simulated with computer models.

The mathematical models

thus developed predict the output of each of a large number
of different types of refining processes with practical

accuracy.

The actual outputs of the refinery units can now

be changed by reprocessing to produce the end products
desired by management.

This recycling creates a flexibility

within the refinery unit.

The refining operation has

therefore become more of a manufacturing (as compared to a

processing) activity than heretofore envisioned by the

general public.

A discussion of this new "manufacturing"

characteristic of the refining industry was included in a

dissertation entitled "Accounting and Management Control

Practices in Petroleum Refining.”1

1William F. Schmeltz, "Accounting and Management
Control Practices in Petroleum Refining" (unpublished
Doctor's dissertation, Western Reserve University, 1966)
Distributed by Standard Oil Co. of Ohio.
1

2
The study of refinery-related problems was made more
complex,

for at least two reasons.

therefore,

Improvements

in refining technology have allowed an expansion of refinery
products where an intricate joint production problem already
existed.

In addition,

the magnitude of the production

alternatives in modern refineries has made the application
of computer simulations and quantitative techniques

advantageous for total revenue total cost studies.

These

simulations have added their own complexities.

THE PROBLEM

Joint cost allocation has remained an "insolvable"

problem with respect to an exacting,
defensible solution.

carefully studied;

to all valid logic.

accurate,

and

Many solutions have been proposed and

however,

not one has proved invulnerable

The most practical and theoretically

sound method advanced by accountants was the generally

accepted allocation of joint cost based upon the relative

market value of the products.

Implicit

in this theory was

the assumption that prices of the various products are

flexible and represent an interaction of supply and demand.

Some authors of accounting principles textbooks have
suggested the price-relative solution to joint cost

allocations as the best method available.
usually list refining, meat processing,

These authors

and real-estate

division as appropriate applications of this method.
Simultaneously, authors of management accounting textbooks

3

have emphatically stated that joint cost allocations were

inappropriate for decision making purposes.

The primary

reason given was the arbitrary selection of relative prices

The net result of the difference of

as the cost allocator.

opinion has been the use of the price-relative method for

inventory purposes and the use of no allocation at all for
managerial decision making purposes.

There is evidence that cost allocations have long

been questioned by operating personnel as shown by the
following quotation:

"I also have generally concluded from

reviewing the literature that refinery managers tend to view

all calculated refinery cost with suspicion."2

This doubt

coupled with the newer characteristics of modern refineries

suggests the following questions:
1.

Was the price-relative joint-cost-allocation method
included in the decision models used to determine
new internal refinery investment?

2.

If the traditional joint-cost-allocation method was
appropriate, how could accountants obtain more
acceptance for this method in the decision model?

3.

If traditional joint cost allocation was not
appropriate, was a study then necessary to determine
more appropriate input into the decision model?
The possibility of semirigid prices for petroleum

products adds an additional complexity to the problem.

If

prices are found to be semirigid and costs are related to
prices,

then costs are also semirigid.

2Ibid,.

p.

105.

This possibility
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suggests several additional questions such as:

1.

Are supply and demand interactions the exclusive
determinants of refined-product prices during
the period under study?

2.

Are artificial price rigidities in evidence?

3.

Do accounting techniques or economic interpretations
contribute to the price rigidities?

4.

Are joint cost allocations based upon relative
market values as undesirable as suggested in
management accounting literature?

5.

What effects do price rigidities have on the price
relative joint-cost allocation?

6.

What effects do price rigidities have on refinery
investment decisions?

Statement
The multifaceted purpose of this study is to
investigate activities and policies which appeared to create

artificial restraints on prices from 1963 to 1972,

to

determine the effect of rigidities in price on refinery
investment decisions,

and to consider the accounting and

economic implications of price rigidities.

Another possibility is also explored in this study.
The implicit assumption of price flexibility necessary for

the price-relative joint-cost allocator to have managerial
significance may not have been possible in the petroleum

refining industry during the period under observation due
to artificial or external constraints on price.

Importance
Regardless of the method used to decide among

5
investment alternatives when allocating resources within any

particular organization,

both the expected revenue and the

attendant costs from a potential investment must be

estimated.

The prominent methods deal with the difference

between the total revenue flow and the cash costs of that
flow.

Some reasonably accurate approximation of this

difference is required whether the method be discounted cash

flow,

years to pay out,

or return on investment.

Refinery investment decisions are more complex than
most other decisions but they are not basically different.
The decision to build a completely new facility is usually

determined by the total projected revenue less total
projected cost;

however,

difficult forecast.

the product mix is a much more

Without a reliable indicator of

individual product cost there is no accurate way to

determine the excess of projected revenue over projected
cost for each product.

A Lead Indicator of Change

In the past, technological progress was slower and
the dollar investment in refineries was smaller.

Under

these conditions, the potential distortion of the investment
decisions affecting the component parts of the refinery was
not so critical because alternative processing techniques

were not available.

Mistakes were corrected by time

without severe repercussions.

During the last century a major but gradual

6
transition in refinery output

from kerosine to high-octane

gasoline has occurred without extreme financial disaster.
If a major technological breakthrough or severe environ

mental restriction were suddenly to occur,
would be dealt a severe financial blow.
would be millions of dollars of

obsolescence.

the industry

The potential loss

investment due to

A reasonably gradual

change in demand among

the various products could be met with minimal loss if some
indicator in the

change would denote the need for a shift

within the refinery.

investment

If prices were semirigid and

that any such indicator would be present

model.

in

accounting methods were followed,

traditional

This

investment model were to change.

it

is doubtful

in the investment

New refinery investment would be continuously

allocated on the old basis until an emergency was reached.

Shortage of Capacity
A national
apparent

shortage of

refinery capacity became

informed observers in 1973.

to

Many people only

recognized a gasoline shortage and were unaware of the

refinery-capacity problem.
industry’s major
trained in

the

With most of the petroleum

firms possessing competent staffs, well

latest quantitative techniques,

seems to require an explanation.

this fact

The first conclusion one

might reach is that the oligopoly structure has acted to
artificially
structure.

limit available products and raise the price

7
Additional facts must be considered.

Alleged

shortages of fuel oil and alleged overproduction of higheroctane products have occurred within the same year.

Prices

of higher-octane products have long been depressed even
while petroleum resources were dwindling as attested by a

constant reduction of proven domestic reserves.

This more

complete picture of the situation in the petroleum refining
industry may seem a strange paradox to even the casual

observer.
run,

If petroleum resources were scarce in the long

then the price of petroleum products should have

demonstrated a long-term upward trend under normal
circumstances.

There was no "absolute" shortage of fuel oil,

but

there was a domestic shortage of fuel oil at the existing

low prices.

Facts have been presented in Chapter 4 which

lead to the conclusion that forces other than supply and
demand for petroleum products in the United States were
operating to establish prices.

One should not necessarily

infer from this statement that a conspiracy existed or that

the price policies established by a few firms were the

exclusive determinants of price within the industry.
However,

if only free-market forces were at work,

one would

have expected the fuel-oil price to rise and the gasoline

price to lower until the increased fuel-oil price attracted
some of the surplus refinery capacity devoted to higheroctane fuels.

Both prices would then tend toward a higher

long-run price expectation.

8

Wasted Resources

Given the existing circumstances,

to see a waste of natural resources.
indicators continue to

one might expect

The best investment

induce an oversupply of higher-octane

products because of analytical methods to be discussed
This temporary oversupply was reflected in the

later.

depressed gasoline prices which may have induced marginal
consumers to purchase additional products.

One would expect

most gasoline consumers to behave in a manner similar to

that explained in Duesenberry's relative-income hypothesis.3
There

is,

however,

another facet to the problem.

If

price-relative joint cost allocations are inappropriate and

this

fact

is recognized by operating personnel before it

recognized by the accounting profession,
may

(in an attempt to

model)

improve input

is

operating personnel

into their investment

experiment with other cost allocators more

detrimental

to the investment model's output than the

traditional price-relative joint cost allocation.

intricacies of

In the

today's complex quantitative models some

decisions could be reached and seemingly justified.

However,

if these decisions were studied in a less-complex

setting,

or from a more-theoretical point of view,

they

might prove unacceptable.

3James S. Duesenberry, "Income-Consumption Relations
and Their Implications," an essay in Income, Employment and
Public Policy, ed. Lloyd A. Metzler (New York: W. W. Norton
& Co. , Inc., 1948), pp. 54-81.
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THE APPROACH OF THIS EVALUATION

Methodology
A careful review was made of the accounting
literature to determine whether this problem had been

previously investigated.

After finding no such research,

a

pilot study was conducted at a medium-sized oil company to

This pilot

determine the best approach to the problem.

project and an accounting-literature review suggested some

of the problems associated with rigid prices.
The investigation necessarily encompassed some
sensitive data in pricing and price expectations.

The

anticipated reluctance of company executives to provide this
kind of information almost proved to be a serious barrier to
the study.

However,

other data dependent upon,

revealing price structure,

were obtained.

but not

General state

ments concerning price expectations when coupled with post
completion audit evaluations provided sufficient verifiable

evidence to proceed with the study without current detailed

price figures.
Two primary research methods involving empirical

data have been used.

Because of the confidential nature of

much of the information,

personal

interviews were sought

with a significant portion of the firms responsible for
United States refinery-investment decisions.

In the larger

oil companies those individuals contacted were usually

located in a forward-planning division or in an economic

10
group responsible for forward planning.

The interviews were

unstructured to allow participants to speak more freely
about potentially confidential material.

An attempt was

made to obtain information from a significant portion of the

firms and to examine a few older investment decisions
(either conducting a postcompletion audit evaluation or

examining the results of one) on each of three decision
size levels - small, medium and large.
Because of the confidential nature of much of the
material,

no firm has been identified although trends have

been revealed.

The firms,

fictitious names.

if referred to,

were given

In addition to the empirical evidence

obtained from the firms contacted,

considerable empirical

data concerning the oil industry as a whole were available

from several published sources and these data have been

included in the study where appropriate.

Organization of the Evaluation

The evaluation of traditional joint cost accounting
as it relates to internal

investment decisions within the

petroleum-refining industry has been described in detail

under the following headings:

Chapter 2:

Cost Accounting Within the Refinery

Segment of the Petroleum Industry.

The historic

development and theoretical justification of joint cost

accounting methods are presented to provide a background for
the analysis.

Special emphasis is placed upon methodology

11
in joint costing and the implicit assumptions of different
methods.

In addition,

characteristics of the refining industry have

processing,

been examined.
reviewed,

the manufacturing, as opposed to

Current practices in the industry have been

and available existing research on costing

practices has been analyzed.

Chapter 3:

Prices In the Petroleum Industry.

Economic theory underlying the industry's pricing was

briefly reviewed and compared to current practices.

Observations on why oligopoly pricing might not have been
possible in the petroleum industry during the period under

study are presented.

Chapter 4:

Factors Affecting Price Flexibility of

Joint Products in the Refinery Segment of the Petroleum

Regulatory agencies and congressional actions

Industry.

have a definite effect on price flexibility in certain

portions of the joint product mix.

Another influence has

been the unusual competition monopolies exerted upon areas
of the product mix.

The United States crude oil import

program and related defense considerations definitely

affected pricing within the industry and have been

considered.
subjects,

In addition, one of the most currently volatile

the impact of ecological factors,

has been

considered together with some effects of policy fixation
(the reluctance to change a proven policy despite changing
conditions).
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Chapter 5:

Decision Processes Examined.

The

extent to which traditional joint cost accounting was used
in the investment decision process has been briefly
examined.

The results of selected postcompletion audits of

refinery investment decisions have been summarized.

Interviews have been conducted with the management of a
significant portion of total refinery capacity in existence

on January 1,

1973.

Chapter 6:

Summary and Conclusions:

The

foundational materials and the empirical research developed

and presented in prior chapters have been reviewed and
analyzed.

The conclusions and opinions reached as a result

of this analysis have been presented together with

recommendations either for action to be taken or further
research to be considered.

Chapter 2

COST ACCOUNTING WITHIN THE REFINING SEGMENT
OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION
Accounting literature contains few references in

which the theoretical alternatives available for the

allocation of joint-production costs are examined.
According to John Dearden,

"Joint production occurs

whenever two or more products must result

production process."1
produced

from the same

When the choice of products to be

is assumed to be fixed in the short run,

the

traditional price-relative accounting approach to the
problem of joint-cost allocation appears logical.

this assumption of

Although

fixed short-run production options seems

to permeate the accounting literature available,

it

is not

often specifically stated.
General accounting aspects of joint cost allocations
are reviewed in

In addition, specific problems

this chapter.

associated with the petroleum-refining industry are

considered.

Since in-depth coverage of joint-production-

1John Dearden, Cost and Budget Analysis
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962). p. 46.
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(New Jersey:
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cost allocation
following

in accounting literature is so scarce,

the

framework will be followed:

1.

The early development of joint cost allocations

2.

Cautions against and modifications to price-relative
joint production cost allocations suggested in the
literature

3.

The manufacturing nature of refining

4.

Current accounting practices in the industry

5.

The quandary in the application of theory

6.

Existing research on costing practices

7.

A more precise statement of the current problem.
This review of the available accounting literature

on joint-production-cost allocation should provide needed

background

for the material to be presented in later

chapters, while the attempts of authors to modify and
caution against the generally accepted treatment should
emphasize the difficulty of the subject.

THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT

COST ALLOCATIONS
Early accountants were so occupied with recording

and verifying data that

little study was devoted to new

areas of managerial assistance.

were

Cost accounting procedures

first widely publicized around the turn of this

century.

The first published study of costs as a separate

topic in the United States was by Henry Metcalf,
Ordnance captain.

In

an Army

1885 he wrote "Cost of Manufactures,"
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and thus broke a period of silence.2

Silence existed

because cost accounting had long been considered

confidential.

Costs were used almost exclusively to

establish price and any disclosure of cost disclosed price.
Since the Army was not competing with other manufacturers,
cost disclosures did not offer a competitive advantage that

would cause concern.

Apparently few early writers even considered the
subject of joint production cost allocation.

Alexander Hamilton Church,

As an example,

a recognized cost authority who

was particularly interested in overhead allocations,
only a small

devoted

portion of his writing to by-product

accounting.3

were thorough,

His observations on this phase of accounting

but did not embrace true joint-production

cost allocation.

Church recommended that by-products either

be credited at the sales price,

manufacturing account,

less cost of recovery

in the

or that the original cost be divided

on the basis of the relative weight of the by-products to

the main products,

if

these figures were available.

A specific time for the introduction of the price
relative approach to the solution of the joint-cost

allocation problem was not readily apparent.

The approach

2Captain Henry Metcalf, The Cost of Manufactures
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1885).
3 A. Hamilton Church, Manufacturing Costs and
Accounts (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1929), p.

106.

16
was mentioned as early as 1903 by Stanley Garry.4

Establishing this time does not appear essential to the

discussion since more recent accounting principles authors
have traditionally described the price-relative approach

with little if any discussion of potential problems or
alternate views.

For example,

Pyle and White state in their

sixth edition of Fundamental Accounting Principles,

A joint cost may be, but is not commonly,
allocated on some physical basis.
... The
usual method of allocating a joint cost is in
the ratio of the market values of the joint
products at the point of separation.5

Niswonger and Fess in their eleventh edition of Accounting
Principles mention only one allocation method,

"the market

(sales) value method."6
A study of

the persons

involved with cost concerns

during the early period provides the basis for a logical

observation.
managers,

They were not accountants,

consultants,

was with efficiency,

and engineers.

but

Their real concern

efficiency was hard to measure

objectively and report on successfully.
stated

but rather

As one engineer

it:

4H. Stan ley Garry, "Factory Costs," The Accountant,
(July 25, 1903), pp. 955-7.

5William W. Pyle and John Arch White, Fundamental
Accounting Principles (6th ed.; Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1972), p. 606.

6C. Rollin Niswonger and Philip E. Fess, Accounting
Principles (11th ed.: Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western
Publishing Company, 1973), p. 521.
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... one of the tasks of modern scientific
management, ... is to convert efficiency records
into cost records since the language of cost is
understood by all, the language of efficiency
only by a few.7

The method advocated almost exclusively by current
accounting principles textbook writers has not changed

appreciably from that method introduced by earlier writers.
This method (price-relative) allocates the cost of a joint
product by multiplying the total cost by a different

fraction for each of the component products produced.

Each

fraction is determined by placing the market value of the
individual product to be costed in the numerator and the

total market value of all products produced in the

denominator.

Although the selection of this method has been

labeled arbitrary by most management accounting writers,

it

remains the most widely accepted accounting method.
CAUTIONS AGAINST AND SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS

TO PRICE-RELATIVE JOINT-PRODUCTION 
COST ALLOCATION

Harold G.

Avery and numerous other authors in

management-accounting textbooks have cautioned against the

arbitrary nature of the price-relative approach.8
criticism is well phrased by John Dearden,

”...

all

Their
cost

7Harrington Emerson, The Twelve Principles of
Elficiency (New York: The Engineering Magazine, 1913), P.

8Harold G. Avery, "Accounting for Joint Costs."
The Accounting Review, XXVI (April, 1951), 232.

215.
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allocations among joint products are entirely arbitrary."9

Again he states:

If part of the joint production cost is
assigned to one of the products, it is a
meaningless allocation.
This is the most
important thing to remember about joint cost
accounting because it is this characteristic
that makes it necessary to modify traditional
cost accounting techniques.10 ... Remember
that the cardinal rule in joint cost accounting
is: 'never show product-line profits.'11
Accountants have long considered accounting the
language of business.

Is the accountant going to be mute

regarding communications needed by managers
of product mix?

in their control

Accountants in this age seem to be

forcing engineers and consultants to educate management in
engineering efficiency by refusing to effectively convert

the petroleum engineer's product

improvements into the

g
lanuage of cost accounting to the satisfaction of either
the engineers or management.

Dearden makes a further

point:

Where some control can be exercised over the
mix of products that result from a joint production
process, the accountant has additional responsi
bilities.
He must give management information that
will help in making decisions to maximize the
profitability of the joint products.
... the
products to produce are those with greatest
contribution over unique costs.12
Dearden has rejected as arbitrary the price-relative

method of cost allocation.

His solution to the problem is

9John Dearden, Cost and Budget Analysis (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 47.
10Ibid.

11Ibid.,

p.

52.

12ibid.
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to deduct unique processing costs from the revenue realized
on the sale of

finished products.

As pointed out by Lorig,

this solution assumes

... that all the profits reflected in the latter
sales values are earned prior to split-off.
It
assumes that the investment in the separate
processing costs contributes nothing to the
profits.
Such an assumption is clearly illogical.13

Another assumption that could be drawn is that the
investment

in the separate processing is equally profitable

with the original processing.

That

is,

the gross profit

margin on all special processing and normal processing is

the same.

The implications of this latter assumption can be

disproved.14

In his article Lorig attempted to provide an aid to
management by analyzing joint-production costs.
postulated that

He

in some circumstances management must make a

decision regarding further processing of a joint-cost

product beyond the "split-off" point.

When this is true,

he

suggested that special processing costs should be compared
to a cost calculated on the relative-market-value method.
Wherever the special processing costs would exceed the

allocated cost,

a decision to process further would be

unwise since more profit could be obtained in some other

area.

13Arthur N. Lorig, "Joint Cost Analysis as an Aid
to Management,”
The Accounting Review, XXX (October, 1955),
634-37.

14See Company M in Appendix E,

p.

236.
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This article is one of the few available in

accounting literature on Joint costs,

and points up the

controversial nature of the subject.

In essence,

Lorig

theorized that whenever further processing costs exceed the

gross profit margin at the existing level,

a marketable

semifinished product should be sold rather than processed
Capital expenditures thus avoided should go into

further.

the more profitable processing areas.
Lorig immediately drew criticism from two sources.

T.

M.

Hill contested the ability to demonstrate any

inequality of profitability on special processing of joint
products.15

Further,

he misunderstood Lorig's purpose in

proposing a planning tool

to determine whether or not to

invest and raised the question of the transferability of

committed capital
H.

Lawson

from the old to the new projects.

(an economic research student

quickly entered the battle.16

in England)

Gerald

also

Lawson raised the theoretical

question of any allocation at all,

thus challenging Lorig

for using a price-relative allocator.

He stated:

Implicit in this method is the assumption
that every dollar invested in the production of
the joint process is equally profitable.
Whether
or not one considers such assumption logical
one cannot deny that it is highly arbitrary.

15T. M. Hill, "Criticism of 'Joint Cost Analysis as
an Aid to Management,’"
The Accounting Review, XXXI (April,
1956), 204-5.

16Gerald II. Lawson, "Joint Cost Analysis as an Aid
to Management ... Rejoinder,” The Accounting Review, XXXI
(July, 1956), 439-43.
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How can one rely upon figures which are derived
from such an arbitrary basis?
The element of
arbitrariness having entered a calculation at
the outset, it follows that the final answer will
be arbitrary to some degree.17

Lawson also attacked Lorig's method of backing into a
He asked how total cost could be

particular negative value.

$400,000 less than the special processing cost.

Lorig

replied to both men explaining more clearly his position.

Following this,

Lawson had a rejoinder,

which Lorig again

answered.

This lively exchange occurred because one dared to
suggest the beginning of a real problem.

The value of

Lorig's article was to point out the unequal processing that

takes place beyond the "split-out” point which most authors

had previously

ignored.

respect to joint

Lorig did,

process;

he stated,

however,

err with

"Furthermore,

the

chance to vary their relative quantities in the short run is

practically nonexistent.”18
correct at one time,

flexible,

While this observation was

relative quantities are now reasonably

within constraints.

This flexibility

is provided

by the decision to apply or not to apply techniques which
have been developed to upgrade refined products by altering
their atomic structure (see the next section,
Engineers,

managers,

17Ibid.
18Lorig,

loc.

cit.

page 23).

and consultants have made
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significant contributions in the field of managerial

Early original

accounting.

contributions to the cost

accounting field were almost exclusively made by

nonaccountants.19
What are consultants saying today about

operating costs relating to joint cost accounting?
W.

Editor of

L.

Nelson,

Petroleum Consultant and Technical

the Oil and Gas Journal,

had these comments on

operating costs.
Our committee ... has been able to unearth only
the most meager published information.
... the
problem of allocating refinery operating cost to
the many petroleum products is so complicated that
a completely satisfactory method will probably
never be available. ... accordingly, little is
available in the literature and the staff of the
Oil and Gas Journal is unable to come up with a
single truly useful reference.20

Dr.

Nelson went on to suggest

a "complexity factor” which

produces a partial volume allocation,
sideration the operating-cost

but

takes

into con

differences of the different

refining processes.
If the refinery process could be simplified,

and all

processing beyond the original split-off point were done by

different companies,

be simplified.

the joint-cost-allocation problem would

This division of activity would clearly

segregate the processing activity from the manufacturing

19Robert E. Feller, "Early Contributions to Cost
Accounting.”
Management Accounting, LV (December, 1973),
27.
W. L.
20
Each Product,"
108 .

Nelson, "How to Allocate Operating Costs to
Oil and Gas Journal, LXI (August 5, 1963),
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Two distinct problems would be apparent

activity.
of one if

instead

it were possible for the processing and the

manufacturing activity to be segregated.
.is impractical

if not

impossible,

This segregation

given existing facilities

The first joint-cost-allocation problem would be concerned
with the division of the costs associated with the
acquisition and simple processing of a barrel of oil.

The

second joint-cost-allocation problem would be specifically

concerned with manufacturing (further processing) costs and
their division among the resultant products.
THE MANUFACTURING NATURE OF REFINING

From the birth of the petroleum industry in 1859

the refining of crude oil was a process.

The only

significant changes which occurred during most of this time
were changes

in vessel

(still) size and changes in the

methods of providing heat.

Historically nothing could be

done to significantly alter the yield from the process.
Attempts at

cost accounting under these circumstances

produced considerable

frustration because of the joint

process-cost-allocation problem.

period passed,

obtained,

When the early by-product

and more than one desirable product was

cost allocation with certainty was impossible.

Astute accountants reached the conclusion,
that circumstance,

cautioned against

appropriate for

that any allocation was arbitrary and
it.

More practical observers suggested price-relative

24
allocations as a solution

problem.

to a pressing

(although imperfect)

How did this situation change;

to what extent

the refining industry a manufacturing activity?
Schmeltz reviewed the historical

is

William F.

developments in the

refining industry which caused the change.21

A frenzy of

activity has taken place since the discovery of the Burton

Process in 1909 (patented in 1913) which has as

its guiding

thrust the extraction of greater quantities of high-revenue

products from the barrel of crude oil.
have been

Various processes

introduced and patented which give refiners

greater and greater

flexibility in product yield.

Since the

lighter fractions of the crude-oil barrel have traditionally
produced the highest

research and development

revenues,

have

focused on the production of these lighter fractions.

Although research has been highly successful
refinery to upgrade products,

it

in enabling the

is not now possible to

downgrade products heavier than the gasolines on an absolute

basis.

Flexibility does exist,

can discontinue at will

the more natural
fairly small;

since the manager

the upgrading process and return to

yields.

however,

however,

The percentage of upgrading is

the tremendous volumes put through

the large refineries allow substantial quantities of
alternate products to be considered for production.

This

21William F. Schmeltz, "Accounting and Management
Control Practices in Petroleum Refining" (unpublished
Doctor's dissertation, Western Reserve University, 1966)
Distributed by Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, pp. 3-5.
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flexibility creates the need for decisions.

In turn the

decision process generates a requirement for accounting
information.
cost

Historically,

(in other manufacturing areas)

accounting with its managerial

applications has

provided the information needed to consider manufacturing
alternatives.

The introduction of special processes to upgrade
Dr.

products led to differentials in processing costs.

Nelson has clearly stated the fact that a price-relative
cost allocator which completely ignores the processing-cost

differences seems

ill advised.22

Figure 4.4,

page 87,

indicates the complexity of the product-mix problem.
When crude oil and refining capacity existed in

abundance,
products

the normal decision was to continuously upgrade

Tor higher-revenue production.

appears to have been
An

This decision

followed by the industry until 1973.

interruption on the supply side of the equation,

produced a new result.

at all

When there was a shortage of supply

levels of production,

price should have become the

adjustment mechanism in an uncontrolled economy.
supply was scarce,
product with the

Costs?"

22W.
Oil

When

resources should have been shifted to the

increasing price

relative to other products).

direct government

however,

(increased demand

This solution was prevented by

control.

L. Nelson, "Again - How to Allocate Operating
and Gas Journal, LXIII (May 3, 1965), 123.
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The true flexibility of the refinery was not
demonstrated to the public until 1973 when the government

ordered a change in the product mix.

An increase in

intermediate-product prices was allowed by the government to

avoid the penalty associated with not upgrading product to
one which produced higher revenues.

The problems related to

limited domestic-refining capacity and the curtailment of

United States imports of refined products by some foreign
powers ushered

in a dual pricing scheme for domestic crude

and a separate set of prices for foreign crude.

These

multiple prices coupled with the retention of petroleum

products under Phase IV Government controls have presented

the industry with a most demanding need for timely,

cost data.
when

accurate

One accounting and planning executive indicated

interviewed that his entire cost accounting and

reporting system had to be changed to satisfy the reporting

requirements of the government .23

The refinery is in

reality a manufacturing plant with considerable flexibility

in the short run and accounting systems have not always kept
up with the rapidly changing external and internal reporting

requirements.

Any system which would meet today’s complex

requirements must be

flexible.

Professor Schmeltz clearly

points out the need for a segregation of fixed and variable
costs and one might be tempted to embark on a discussion
of direct costing versus absorption costing if one tended

23Name withheld by request.
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toward rigid accounting views.24

In this writer's opinion,

the long-run solution to the extreme flexibility required of

today's accounting system will demand modular construction
in the accounting system.

The modular technique has been used to construct
mobile homes,

prefabricated houses,

where flexibility was a requirement.

and other products
If used, the modular

unit must be kept small and designed so that combinations
The accounting code used by most

are quickly possible.
large

firms would adapt to such a modular construction if,

in addition to the regular code,

a trailer code indicating

the fixed or variable nature of a particular cost was added.
In this way one could elect

the cost

(i.e.,

to sort either on the nature of

fixed or variable) or on the nature of the

account.
Regardless of the accounting methods used,

there is

flexibility

in the output of today's refinery in the

short run.

Therefore,

processing operation,

activity with all

refining,

once exclusively a

has now become a manufacturing

the attendant cost-accounting and

management-information requirements.

While accountants in

the past have generally adopted an "incapable-of-solution

attitude” and consequently relied heavily on

relative allocation,

other members of the firms have been

experimenting with different approaches.

24Schmeltz.

the price

op.

cit. ,

p.

96.

Some of these
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approaches will be briefly discussed in the following
section.
CURRENT ACCOUNTING PRACTICES IN THE INDUSTRY

Two clearly separate areas require accounting
information.

Persons envisioning the financial reporting

requirements have often pursued a fairly consistent approach

inventory.

to the valuation of

This approach has generally

taken the price-relative cost-allocation form.
time there is a need for

internal

making purposes and for planning.

At the same

information for decision
In this area some

accountants have cooperated fully and tried to assist the
decision makers.

traditional

Others have resisted departure from their

approach and have become ineffective in providing

management with timely

chosen to pursue.

to find.

in areas management has

Other specialists

accounting training)
with meaningful

information

(without advanced

have attempted to provide management

information.

Reliable techniques seem hard

Several methods have been adopted and abandoned

within the last decade but one

in particular seems to be

gaining prominence.
William F.

Schmeltz in an unpublished dissertation

strongly suggested the development of a financial costing
model

to solve the complexities of this accounting problem .25

25 Ibid.,

pp.

242-3.

29
He cautioned that

it would be an expensive process but that

existing technology was available and that such a computer
model could be developed.

This recommendation was sound,

but the expense of such a model did not justify its creation
merely for accounting purposes.

Extremely sophisticated

computer models had already been developed which would
predict the output of each of many refinery operations with

acceptable accuracy.

There was a tendency

firms to use the existing model

developing the accounting model.

for industry

to the extent possible when

These operational models

used volume predictions and consequently most refineries,
when forced by government

product

line,

agencies to report costs by

have adopted a heavy bias in favor of cost

allocations based on volume.

The theoretical problems

associated with volume allocations are presented later in
While volumes appear to be a logical basis

this chapter.

for allocating operating costs,they become quite illogical
for allocating input costs.
The problem has been further compounded by Phase IV
price controls.

relative cost

While a few companies suggested a price

allocator,

most companies favored a volume-

oriented cost allocator and this view has prevailed.

In

essence the volume-oriented cost allocator will have a

price-equalizing effect

among the various products since the

new prices will be based on allocated costs and the

allocated costs are based on volumes rather than the
relative values of the products.

The higher-priced products

30

will

have a slight tendency to reduce

lower-priced products to increase

in price and the
Although the

in price.

price tendency can be briefly explained,

for implementation are anything but

the methods applied
An indication

simple.

of the complexities of the reporting requirements under

Phase IV controls can be observed if one examines Appendix D
beginning on page 204.

These complexities and governmental

requirements will undoubtedly affect
the cost of

future accounting for

refined products and will also

weight to the volume-oriented joint cost
A QUANDARY

lend additional

allocations.

IN THE APPLICATION

OF THEORY

Direct questioning of personnel occupying management

planning positions (economic planning departments or
presidential,

vice presidential levels)

in the refining

industry disclosed opposition to the use of a price-relative
cost

allocator

for any management-decision purposes.26

Those contacted were unanimous in expressing opposition to

this method even for the allocation of the input barrel of

crude which

(in the opinion of those interviewed) represents

approximately 80 to 90 percent of the cost of the refined
products

included in this study.

Most of the executives

interviewed preferred a total revenue to total cost compari
son for decision purposes.

number of

If they were forced to give

description of selection techniques and the
A
26
firms contacted are presented on pp. 132-35.
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profit by product line, most indicated a preference for a

cost allocation based either wholly or primarily on volume
as opposed to price.

The volume allocator was never

but was either identified as a

suggested by the interviewer,

crucial part of a computer program's allocation technique or

was directly stated by the industry executive.

All persons

interviewed indicated knowledge of many alternate costing
techniques,

and a

few indicated that their firms had

specifically experimented with several
department studies.

holding the Ph.D.

in planning

Those interviewed included persons

in economics and authors of industry

papers on the subject of cost allocation.

The implicit assumption in the price-relative cost
allocation method that every dollar invested in the
production of

the joint process is equally profitable

appears to be the most objectionable feature of the method.

Processing costs are clearly not related to selling price

since identical

costs have been identified for products
Rapid and severe price changes

with different revenues.27

among the product mix defeats temporarily the logic of the
price relative cost

allocator.

Rapid Market Value Changes and the Price-Relative Allocator

Recent
removed some of

increases in the price of
the rigidity

27See Company "M",

p.

foreign crude have

in the petroleum refining

236.
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For years the refining industry in the United

industry.

States has,

with few exceptions,

The reasons will be detailed in

of residual fuel oil.28

Chapter 4.

Basically,

residual-fuel-oil production was

uneconomical at the time.
fuel oil ,

residual

avoided domestic production

However,

increased demand for

coupled with a critical shortage in the

supply of the product,

produced contract negotiations

in

which the 1973 residual-fuel-oi1 prices were almost double

the previous price.

The most expensive equipment and

processes used in the industry have as their purpose the

upgrading of refined products to lighter fractions which
were previously more valuable.

Suddenly,

does not require and cannot benefit

the product which

from all this further

special processing becomes more valuable.

Should it then

automatically acquire a "cost" approximately twice what
was originally?

Until the price of crude oil rises,

it

it

cannot be argued that the purchaser of the barrel of oil
envisioned the end result of the sale at

purchase.

the time of

This timing difference between the purchase and

use of the barrel of oil

invalidates the primary logic of

the price-relative approach.

This problem becomes even more complex if techno

logical

advance,

constraint,

rather than ecological or political

causes the change.

A detailed discussion of

28Texaco Inc. is the only major exception,
consistently produced residual fuel oil.

having
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such a change is presented in the section on page 39.

Other Allocation Methods

One of the simplest alternatives to the price
relative allocator is an allocation based on volume (total
cost divided by total units).

This method seems to be

gaining acceptance over more complex methods.

Although

well-suited to the allocation of processing costs,

this

method's use is questionable when one considers the cost of
the barrel of

input crude.

Can it be logically argued that

the purchaser of a barrel of oil

is willing to pay the same

price for the lowest revenue potential in the barrel as for

If the components could be purchased

the highest?

separately,

would any knowledgeable purchaser pay more for

the residual-fuel-oil

after processing?

portion than

it could be sold for

This method creates conflicts greater

than the ones presented in the previous section.

Management-accounting authors have cautioned against
the arbitrary nature of the price-relative cost allocator.

Emphatic statements have been made denying any managerial

input quality to profit
basis.

figures reported on a product mix

Accountants have presented an argument against the

product of their own logic.

With the acceptance of these

comments there remains

little value to the price-relative

method of allocation.

Inventory valuation

exception.

At

their search.

is the one small

this point most accountants have finished
Schmeltz has compared inventory
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for a "model" refinery,

valuation

methods,

under eight different

in a study which has been widely circulated within

the industry.
Inventory valuations range from a high of
$5,711,880.79 under the Barrel Gravity Method
to a low of $4,957,182.10 under the Replacement
Cost Method.
Expressed as a percentage, the
respective figures would be 87.48 percent and
75.92 percent of the market value of the ending
inventory.
... No matter what method is used,
the dollar amount of the possible error is small
in comparison.

This study

included the joint-products method (with and

without blending),
cost method,

method,

the by-products method,

the product-analysis method,

the replacement
the barrel-gravity

the crude/gravity and process/gallonage method,

and

the crude/BTU and process gallonage methods.

EXISTING RESEARCH ON COSTING PRACTICES

Most of the methods analyzed by Schmeltz were used
or had been suggested as possible solutions to the

allocation problem.

been discarded,
reluctance.

However,

most of these methods have now

are not used extensively,

or are used with

New volume-oriented or differential cost

techniques seem to be more acceptable to operating

personnel.
use.

No one is entirely satisfied with the methods in

Instead,

the search continues for the least-objection-

able method which bears some correlation to actual operating

conditions.

The study of the eight cost-allocation

29Schmeltz,

op.

cit.,

p.

96.
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techniques by Schmeltz appears to be dated to such an extent

as to make the current usefulness of the study questionable.
The age of this study leaves a void in the literature which

will be difficult,

if not

impossible, to fill.

Phase IV price controls have made costs a direct

determinant of price;
of cost data at

consequently,

any careful scrutiny

this time would arm competitors with

pricing information and would undoubtedly be resisted by the
oil companies.

Some data could be obtained from the reports

filed with the government but this information by

which are

itself would be of extremely limited value.

Methods other than those mentioned above have been

considered by operating personnel and rejected (for example

one company considered an allocation based upon atomic

The heavy use of computer models has introduced a

weight).

trend toward the use of a volume or a modified volume
How can one state the problem more precisely?

method.

A MORE PRECISE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Is it possible to evaluate quantitatively the
logical quandary
traditional

in which we find ourselves?

The

accounting justification for the price-relative

allocation regards the barrel of oil as a bundle of
products.
that

(See Figure 2.1.)

Accountants effectively argue

the knowledgeable purchaser of a barrel

envisions the use of
therefore,

the barrel at

of oil

the time of acquisition;

the maximum price one is willing to pay for the
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The Cost Barrel

The Revenue Barrel

R1

C1

R2

C2

R3

C3

4

C4

R5

C5

Rn

Cn

r

Total Revenue

C Total Cost

Figure 2.1

The Envisioned Barrel
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barrel is the sum of the values of the imagined component
Since the buyer thinks he knows the selling prices

parts.

of the various potential products,

familiar

with

and since he is quite

his own operating costs,

he would not choose

to pay more for the barrel than the sum of the amounts each
portion was worth,

i.e.,

a sum which would allow a

The

"reasonable" markup on each of the component products.

allocated cost of each component product would thus become

price relative.

The ratio of each component's revenue (Ri)

to total revenue (

cost

(C)

n
E Rj) would be multiplied times total
j=1

to arrive at that component's cost.

Expressed

quantitatively (refer to Figure 2.1 and Formula 2.1),

cost

becomes:

(2.1)

Any change in the revenue barrel either in total or

in product mix would cause a change in all costs under this
accounting method.

For example,

engineers were successful

assume that refinery

in converting product C5 into a

totally new product with much higher revenue,
as revenue R5').

(referred to

How is the cost barrel now envisioned?

All cost allocated to the component parts have changed by
recomputing formula 2.1.

In the illustration two important variables,

technology and
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time lags,

have thus far been ignored.

variables becomes apparent

The need for these

if the problem is considered from

the engineer's point of view.

Petroleum engineers are

assumed to be successful in the development of a new product
by modifying an existing component.
longer produced,

One old component is no

and the portion of the barrel of oil that

used to go to that component is now used to produce the new
component.

No change has occurred in the cost of the

barrel of oil.

The engineer is successful

in producing more

revenue from the same crude-oil portion by incurring slight

additional processing cost.

Instead of reporting the

additional revenue and cost associated with one component's
conversion,

the accounting method reallocates all costs and

produces a new but equal profit margin on all products.

Engineers argue that a new formula (2.2)
for cost allocation.

is needed

With such a view the revised cost

should be
(2.2)

Ci' = Ci + AC

where AC is the addition to cost due to product modification.
This addition to cost would include both the additional
processing cost and depreciation of the additional

processing equipment required.

Several different but actual

refinery modifications which were approved by refinery

management were described by industry representatives.
Perhaps accounting reports should be capable of reflecting

these potentially profitable events by reporting (internally)

a profit

from the engineering conversion.
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TIME AND TECHNICAL CHANGE
The illustration is clearer if reference is made to
Figures 2.2,

page 40,

and 2.3,

possible situations exist.

page 42.

At least two

The newly produced product could

be produced for an existing market or for a new market
(i.e.,

although the product

is new to our refinery,

it may

or may not be new to the consuming public).

A New Product

Figure 2.2 attempts a graphic illustration of a
product which is new to the consuming public.

These figures hold constant

and cost C5 exist at time to.

during time period a.

Revenue R5

A technological

innovation is

implemented in production by only one firm at time t1,

creating a new use for input barrel component 5 with cost

C5 (refer back to Figure 2.1).
point

t1

The decline in revenue from

to t2 represents competition from other companies

who have successfully copied the process before news of it
is published.
account

As discussed,

the engineer attempts to

for the change by using only time period b on

Figure 2.2,

while the accountant considers only time periods

a and c.
New entrants

into this new market area may be

discouraged if the initial producer restricts revenue to
R5'''.

This pricing policy would eliminate a rapidly

declining revenue in the early portion of time period b.

General dissemination of the technology takes place

40

Revenue and
Allocated Cost
in Dollars

Time in
Months

Figure 2.2
Technological Innovation Implemented by
a Single Firm with a New Product
Sold in a New Market
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in trade journals at point t2.

that the price of crude oil will

At this time it is assumed
increase to the maximum

possible as a reflection of the increased value of the

products.

However,

during time period b there is no change

in crude-oil cost due to the technological advance because

the firms posting the price are unaware of the technology.
It

is therefore theoretically impossible for the accounting

cost

reallocation to be valid in the short-short run,

since

that reallocation does not take period b facts into

consideration.

An Existing Product

Assuming that the engineers have created a process
to upgrade low-revenue products to existing higher-revenue
products with existing prices rather than an entirely new

product, Figure 2.3 attempts to portray the time sequence.
When production of the upgraded product was started at point
t1,

the higher-revenue R5'

be sought.

existing

(equal to the going rate) would

The firm must be cautious with volumes if the

favorable price is to be maintained.

Unless the

existing market

is experiencing supply shortages,

introduction of

large volumes of product would depress

price.

the

If a few other firms discovered the process and

introduced greater volumes into the market, the lowering of
price that would ensue would indicate to the developer of
the process that other firms had knowledge of the process.
This knowledge would encourage publication

in technical

42

Revenue and
Allocated Cost
in Dollars

Time in
months

Figure 2.3

Technological Innovation Implemented by
a Single Firm with a New product
Sold in an Existing Market
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journals.

After publication in the technical journals,

the

price of crude oil would rise to reflect the increased

revenue potential,

and the price-relative cost-allocation

logic would again be valid in time period c.

Time Period b

In effect,

then,

two problems exist.

How does one

account for change in refinery production both in the short
run and also in the short-short run?

apparently exists in any of

No similar problem

the other well-known areas in

which price-relative joint-cost allocation is used.

There

is no time period b in the cost allocation of a side of
beef or a parcel of

activity to allow an

land since there is no manufacturing

innovation.

In these two illustrations

the short run and the short-short run situations previously

described do not exist simultaneously.
of time

There is no period

(b) when the seller is not aware of the full range

of products obtainable

from the raw material.

The presence of time period b has caused difficulty

in accounting for petroleum-refining operations.

Most firms

of any size are now using computer models to simulate

refinery operations and to assist them in obtaining

information for decision-making purposes.

The outputs of

the models are expressed in volumes of production.

These

two factors have combined to produce a strong bias in favor

of a volume allocation of joint cost either directly or in

some modified form.

Once this accounting procedure is
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adopted,

the short time period b is accounted for with

meaning,

but the longer time frames a and c are handled in a

logically inconsistent manner.
In addition to this accounting framework it

is also

desirable to review economic theory relating to the refining
industry before considering the factors causing price to

have semirigidity.
Chapter 3.

Such an economic review follows in

Chapter 3

WHOLESALE PRICES IN THE PETROLEUM

REFINING INDUSTRY
The petroleum refining industry has all the outward

appearance of the classical oligopoly structure

(refer to

Appendix A which lists refiners by their 1973 capacity).
The top eight companies each controlled more than 750,000
barrels per day of refining capacity.

The next seven

companies each controlled more than 200,000 barrels per day
of refining capacity and together these two groups
companies)

(fifteen

represented 75 percent of the total industry

capacity at the beginning of

1973.

Only seventeen more

companies have the capacity to produce over 50,000 barrels
per day.

The production activities of the many small

companies which remain should have little effect on price
under most theories of oligopoly.

Bain has labeled the

control of 50 to 80 percent of total refinery volume a

concentrated oligopoly.What

is the current nature of

oligopolistic competition in petroleum refining?

A brief review of economic theory related to
oligopoly structures is essential before an answer to this

1Joe S. Bain, The Economics of the Pacific Coast
Petroleum Industry Part I: Market Structure (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1944), p. 211.
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question can be attempted.

Several

theories have been

advanced which attempt to explain the oligopoly market.
These theories fall

into two basic categories,

the kinked-

and multiple-cause approaches.

demand-curve approach,

Criteria for the acceptance of economic models are

often disputed.

Some persons insist that to be valid a

model must be merely a reasonable representation of historic

activity so that this activity is "explained" by the model.

(The multiple cause approaches often fall

in this category).

Others would insist that to be practical an economic model
must be primarily capable of predicting the logical

anticipated actions of the firm if the inputs to the model
are available

approach).

(for example,the kinked-demand-curve

Although the current study

covering the activities in the refining

is historical,

industry which have

produced alarming "energy crisis" headlines,
will be considered.

Do

both approaches

industry activities leading up to

this emergency closely follow the suggested patterns for

oligopolies?

If not,

do any components of the economic

theories advanced explain the activities of the industry
over this time period?

The single-model approach will be

considered first.

A SINGLE-MODEL APPROACH

The "kinked" demand curve attempts to explain in a
single model the actions of all oligopoly markets.

Proponents of this approach have generally used the
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Hall-Hitch or the Sweezy2 solution which introduced the
kinked demand curve with its accompanying "imaginary”

demand curves.

The price elasticity of demand,

formula 3.1,

is used to evaluate competitor response.

3.1
The kink in the curve is produced because competitors in the

oligopoly market view demand as elastic when they consider
price increases (the price elasticity of demand

(n)>l,

i.e.,

a percentage increase in price will cause a greater
percentage loss

in quantity),

decreases, demand is viewed as
elasticity of demand (n)<1,

but when they consider price

inelastic

i.e.,

(the price

a percentage decrease in

price will cause a smaller percentage increase in quantity

demanded).

This dual view of demand leads to the

conclusion that competitors would not

"follow” price

increases and the relative elasticity of the demand would

significantly decrease sales volume.
however, meet price decreases,

Competitors would,

thus reducing total industry

revenue with little or no gain in market

share to the firm

initiating the price change.
As illustrated in Figure 3.1,

price increases is dd'
decreases

is DD'.

the demand curve for

and the demand curve for price

This difference of attitude between price

increases and decreases causes the demand curve to be dWD'

2Paul Sweezy, "Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly,"
Journal of Political Economy, XLVII (August, 1939), 568-73.

P r ic e

and C o s t

( D o lla r s )
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Quantity
Figure 3.1
Kinked Demand Curve
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and introduces a vertical section in the marginal revenue

curve,

This model does

represented by line segments dXYZ.

not explain why a price is set where it is,

demonstrates the tendency

but merely

for a common price throughout the

vertical portion of the marginal revenue curve.
Ferguson's words,

"The Sweezy thesis,

In

accordingly, must be

regarded as an ex-post rationalization rather than as an
ex-ante explanation of market equilibrium”.3

The

in price which can be observed by examination

fluctuations

of Figure 4.1,

page 79,

appeared contrary to the price

stability suggested by the Sweezy model.

Figures 4.1,

3.1,

and 3.3 were therefore presented to refinery-industry repre
sentatives to obtain their explanations or responses.

The

responses of the executives interviewed suggested that

either a modification must be made in the kinked curve model
or the model

existing in

is not appropriate to the oligopoly structure
the refining industry during the period under

observation.

Their responses also support the observation

that the behavior of the

firms

for the decade 1962-1972

indicates a growing conviction on the part of cut-rate

distributors of refined products that price competition is
in their best

market

interest and is effective in wresting a larger

share from major oil companies.

Those companies

interviewed which utilized cut-rate pricing policies were

3C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory
(Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), p. 315.
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quite certain of a positive effect of price reduction on
market share, and consequently

it was neccessary to modify or

discard the sharp difference in the two imaginary demand

curves.

(See Figure 3.1.)

The following material

demonstrates this change in attitude utilizing the Sweezy

model.
Assuming that the demand curves are only modified,
in Figure 3.2.

they might appear as represented
figure the inelastic portion of

the model

more elastic than in Figure 3.1.

In this

is considerably

The effect is to narrow

the vertical portion of the marginal-revenue curve.
Sweezy has proposed,

If,

as

the pricing of the oligopoly structure

is related to short-run marginal-cost

curves which lie

within this vertical portion of the marginal revenue curve,
and if one

further assumes that an attempt is made to

prohibit entry

in a manner consistent with Bain's suggested

entry restricting pricing scheme,

one could logically expec

to find the short-run marginal-cost curve relatively low in
the short segment between X and Y.4

stances,

Under these circum

if the independent refiners miscalculate their

short-run marginal cost,

well estimated,

or if

the demand schedule is not

they may erroneously believe this cost to

fall somewhere on the line segment YZ.
definitely

This error would

lead them to the conclusion that price

4Joe S. Bain, "A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and
Oligopoly,"
American Economic Review, XXXIX (March, 1949),
454-64.

P r ic e

and C o st

( D o lla r s )
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Quantity

Figure 3.2

Kinked Demand Curve
Modified
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competition would be effective.
The possibility exists that even a properly

calculated marginal cost could fall

in this region.

If the

long-run average cost curve of refineries is U-shaped,

the

economies of scale for the large refiners might not be as
great as anticipated by the United States Government.

The

possibility of marginal cost falling on line segment YZ is

more plausible if one also considers the possibility that
independent refiners frequently do not have exactly the
same product mix as major refiners.

The smaller independent refinery,

inefficient in terms of

although

"Best-Practices Production

Techniques" as suggested by Salter,5 may be reasonably

efficient

in terms of the product mix for which the refinery

Many of the technical improvements

was originally designed.

in refinery configuration have as their primary thrust the

ability to produce a higher percentage of higher revenue

products.

Salter's study was primarily directed toward

improved productivity,

i.e.,

improved capital equipment

the efficient substitution of

for labor so that more product

could be produced with fewer man-hours and less capital.

Since the conversion of low-revenue products to high-revenue

products could reduce the volume of low-revenue products
for a given geographical

area,

an existing refinery with the

5W. E. G. Salter, Productivity and Technical Change
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 13.
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ability to produce this product may find its relative

position on this range of products strengthened by the new

Concurrently the smaller refinery will probably

refinery.

find the higher-revenue products in greater competition

with the output from the new refinery.

Several areas where

small refineries may have compensating advantages were
reported by an informed representative of Company "U" and are

presented on page 222.

Salter acknowledged that trade-union

restrictions or severe shortages of natural resources may

both be valid reasons

for refuting his contention that

curves representing alternate best-practice techniques never
If these observations are valid and the United

cross.

States Government attempts to equate the economies of the

large and small refineries,

any miscalculation on the part

of the United States Government may temporarily give the
small

refiners an actual marginal cost advantage.

event

(whether real or imagined) an

considered himself
marginal

In either

independent refiner who

to be operating in the portion of the

revenue curve between Y and Z of Figure 3.2 would

definitely adopt policies of price competition.

In fact a

refiner in this circumstance could conceivably envision

himself a price leader in a rather limited,

segmented,

geographically

market.
THE MULTIPLE-CAUSE APPROACH

Other writers have suggested that there may not be

one model which can accurately describe the complex
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interworkings of today's oligopoly markets.

Lanzillotti,

after extensive interviews with corporate executives,

has

suggested four major pricing objectives as an alternative to

a single model with one profit maximizing objective.

Lanzillotti's four objectives are 6
1.
2.
3.
4.

to
to
to
to

achieve a target return on investment
stabilize prices and margins
meet competition
achieve a target market share.

Constraints

The Lanzillotti pricing objectives were integrated

with several others in a paper entitled,
Business,"

by White,

Market,

"Pricing in Big

and Taylor.7

In essence,

these writers present a feasible area for the solution of

oligopoly pricing problems
feasible area

(refer to Figure 3.3).

is constrained by management-determined

minimum (QL) and maximum (QI) market share,
(d),

The

and the lowest acceptable profit level

a demand curve
(π L).

The

authors suggest that the pricing policy adopted by the firm

be the one that will maximize profits within the feasible

region.

The point of tangency between the highest possible

isoprofit curve ( π
1)

and the feasible area determines the

6Robert F. Lanzillotti, "Pricing Objectives in Large
Corporations," American Economic Review, XLVII (December,
1958), 921-40.

7Leonard White, Donald Market, and Phillip Taylor,
"Pricing in Big Business," (paper presented at the
Southwestern Economics Association meeting, April, 1972,
San Antonio, Texas).
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Figure 3.3

Feasible Area Solution
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normal mathematical solution to price and quantity.

Figure 3.3,

problem.

In

point A is the mathematical solution to this

This model is useful,

may be in order,

even though caution in use

since it allows the introduction of

additional constraints.

Discussions with representatives in

the industry disclosed an apparent bias on the part of

industry personnel in favor of operating at what they
considered to be an optimum level of capacity despite the
effect on price.

63.)

(See the marginal cost discussion on page

This policy represents an additional constraint and

would cause the mathematical solution to move to point B so

that the refinery could maintain optimum levels of capacity
whenever physically possible.

If Qi is that optimum level,

then additional output Qe would be pursued even if the

product had to be sold at a lower price (P1).
A combination of activities which tended to suppress

price and establish artificially low prices over a period of
time are presented in the next chapter,

but these actions

have an

Among other price

impact on this economic model.

depressors,

a major change in consumer attitude toward off-

brand and cut-rate operations appears to have shifted demand

for major refiners'
3.4.

branded products as illustrated in Figure

Original demand represented by line segment d is

replaced by demand curve d'

which produces an economic

solution for the firm at point Y.

The loss in output at

point Y is not acceptable since refiners prefer to operate

at more efficient

levels.

(See the marginal cost

section of
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Figure

3.4

Feasible Area Solution With
Government Constraint
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this chapter on page 63.)

Product dumping follows and

causes price to further decline toward point Z.

This

economically unstable situation is described in greater

later in this chapter.

detail

To reach point Z might

require several cycles of demand loss.
General

inflationary pressures and increased

specific costs combined to prevent prices from going below

P2;

however,

curve

it should be noted that at this level

π0 does not appear to be attainable.

isoprofit

This curve

represents the lowest profit which will provide for the

generation of the future capital requirement for totally new
refinery facilities.

When prices reached point Z the United States

Government used the news media to force price rollbacks by

threatening the removal of oil-import controls.

This

action effectively prevented the industry from raising
prices.

Thus a new external constraint was introduced

which held return on completely new refinery investment to
an effective minimum.

be seen

This

investment-retarding effect can

if the actual United States refinery capacity is

examined in Figure 4.5 on page 124.

This model

has introduced company policies or

objectives as constraints and is a useful tool because
empirical evidence supports the position that external
forces have introduced additional constraints in the

petroleum-refining pricing scheme.
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Entry
Bain lists three necessary conditions for easy entry

into an oligopoly structure.8
One,

established firms should

have no absolute cost advantage over new firms.

economies of scale should be negligible.

Two,

And three,

no

product differentiation advantage should be held by

established firms.
exist

The absolute cost advantages which

in the refining industry appear to be partially offset

by United States Government activity.
Although an "absolute cost advantage" usually refers
to input prices

(or costs)

the established firm,

that are appreciably lower for

an extreme example would be a complete

lack of availability of input

When raw materials were

to new entrants at any price.

in short supply,

major oil companies

attempted to control production and reserve their crude-oil
production for their own refinery operations.

These efforts

were partially overcome when the United States Government

insisted on taking its royalty in kind and delivering it to

the small companies.

For a short time during the 1973

crisis, regulations required that all refineries operate at

the same percentage of capacity.

Those with the foresight to

provide for their own crude needs were thus penalized for
that management skill by being forced to sell crude oil to

independents at fixed prices while their own refineries

8 Joe S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956),

p.

12.
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could have been operated at more efficient

levels

(normal)

had they been permitted to retain their own crude oil.
Knowledgeable persons in the industry (those

capable of operating a refinery)

stated that production

techniques are well known and do not deter entry.9

Product differentiation,

however,

was a significant

factor

until economic advantages given to small refineries allowed

them to supply independent marketers with low-cost product.
The upset of the delicate balance started an unstable chain

reaction,

which will be described under the marginal-cost

section of this chapter
upset,

(on page 63).

Once the balance was

a fairly continuous supply of cut-rate products was

available at a price difference that substantially negated

the accumulated preference of many buyers for established
brand names.
The third major obstacle to entry (economies of

scale) was rather extensively offset for sustained periods
by import advantages given to small refiners.
the form of low-cost crude oil.

These took

The crude-oil input has

constituted 80 to 90 percent of the total finished-product
cost.

Although large-scale economies have necessitated

consistent

increases

in plant size over the years,

cost has remained the most significant cost,

crude-oil

factor in the

refining operation.

9For an example see comments of a representative
from Company "U” page 222.
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PRICE LEADERSHIP
Price leadership in petroleum refining seems to have

undergone rather drastic changes during the decade 1962-

1972.

Little effective leadership was manifested by the

major oil companies although attempts were made.

Price

increases were announced and then rolled back due to direct
United States Government pressure.

Unofficial price wars

seemed to be the order of the day.
A review of the important market features required

for price leadership in an oligopoly sheds light on the

confusion of this era.

As suggested by Markham,

the

requirements for price leadership are:10

1.
2.
3.
4.

There must be relatively few firms in the industry.
Entry into the industry must be restricted.
The industry product must be fairly homogeneous.
The elasticity of demand for the product should
either be close to or less than unity.

In addition, Dean states that to qualify as a price leader

the following circumstances are required:11
1.
2.
3.

a substantial share of the market
a strong reputation for sound pricing decisions
a demonstration of initiative in pricing policies.
There are relatively few firms in the refining

industry.

Its products are fairly homogeneous.

Government

regulatory agencies have attempted to remove restrictions on

10Jesse W. Markham, "The Nature and Significance of
Price Leadership,"
American Economic Review, XLI (December,
1951), 901-2.
Cliffs:

11Joel Dean, Managerial Economics
Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 433.

(Englewood
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entry.

With the exception of market share,

which has been

carefully controlled by antitrust policy so that no one firm
has succeeded in obtaining even 10 percent of the market,
the other prerequisites

seem to exist

listed by Dean for price leadership

in the industry.

Historically,

one of several dominant firms

(those

with over one million barrels of productive capacity in
1973)

has set prices until

was reached.

the period covered by this study

During the last decade there is evidence that

effective price leadership by the dominant firms was
attempted but

failed.

The primary reason for this appears

to be the usurping or controlling of price leadership in the

industry by the United States Government.

Several companies

rolled back price increases because of thinly veiled threats

by members of the United States Senate to eliminate the

protected price of crude oil

in the United States by

removing the oil-import program.

with the direct

This activity,

coupled

savings by smaller refineries made possible

under the import allocation program,

reduced costs enough

for some independent marketers to adopt pricing policies

contrary to those policies adopted by major oil companies.

Significantly,

these independent marketers survived the

ensuing price wars.

economist,

Paolo Sylos-Labini,

an Italian

suggested that

Although there is not a unique equilibrium
situation, we can indicate the general price
tendency; the price tends to settle at a level
immediately above the entry-preventing price of
the least-efficient firms which it is to the
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advantage of the largest and most efficient firm
to let live.12

Clearly, government

intervention has rendered this

observation invalid in the petroleum industry for the

period under examination.

Firms existed which were in

effect an irritant to the sensitive pricing structure but

which could not be removed by the major refining firms.

MARGINAL COSTS
The history of economic thought provides us with an
early

indication of the nature of marginal cost.

One

classic explanation of rent explained rent as a premium paid
for productive land when the expansion of the economy

required marginal

land to be put

into production.

adequate return to exist on the marginal

For an

land a rather

Land

generous return existed on the more productive land.
owners,

keenly aware of this difference,

charged high rents

to absorb the difference and to make production equally

profitable for the laborers on all
classical quotation by Ricardo,
rent

is paid,

rent

lands involved.

"Corn is not high because

is paid because corn is high," was the

embodiment of this marginal-cost principle.
come a long way

however,

The

Economics has

from the subsistence wage of that era;

a grain of truth exists that does not seem to be

12Paolo Sylos-Labini, Oligopoly and Technical
Progress, Elizabeth Henderson (trans), (Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 50.
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fully emphasized when discussing marginal costs.

If a

decision is made to allow inefficient refiners to exist
marginal land),

(the

then without arbitrary discrimination,

higher returns (rents)

should be expected from major

refiners since they are more efficient.

General Considerations
Most economic literature suggests that
discrimination can be maintained,

if product

price policy should

provide for reduced prices until marginal costs are equal to

marginal revenue.

At this point no further discrimination

is required and no lower price will be effective in

maximizing profits.

Usually foreign markets and new

distribution channels using little-known names as opposed to

the recognized or branded products are suggested as
effective means for price discrimination.
For a number of years major refineries have promoted

product differentiation quite successfully and have built up

in the minds of customers the image of heterogeneous products
in a homogeneous market.

As long as price differentials

remained relatively small

in the mind of the purchaser he

preferred the imagined superior product even at a higher

price.

Off-brand marketers,

products,

succeeded

however,

fortified with low-cost

in passing the point of mental equality

in this pricing scheme.

Their prices were low enough to

induce a significant portion of the branded market to try

their products because of the price advantage.

All of the
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firms questioned agreed that the illusion of the superior

product was broken in the minds of a significant portion of

the consuming public.

Thereafter,

customers switched to new

suppliers any time price was low enough to offset
veniences caused by new marketing forms.

incon

Operating economies

were available to cut-rate marketers because their facilities

were designed for minimal service and self-service operation,
which eliminated substantial overhead and operating cost.
The only other problem to be surmounted in order to

consistently better major oil companies' price structures was
the need to ensure an adequate supply of low-cost product.

In this area the majors assisted their competitors.
What

is the marginal cost of operating a modern

refinery of average size at

opposed to 87 percent?
(although flexible in

In essence the refining operation
its output potential and therefore

similar to manufacturing)
pressure.

97 percent of capacity as

is the processing of fluids under

Refinery configuration usually requires fairly

extensive use of fixed plant and operating personnel

throughout normal production ranges.

Therefore it follows

that once the basic crew is available and the refinery is on

stream,

relatively minor cost

in output.

increases accompany increases

For this reason as capacity is approached,

marginal cost of additional output

the

is extremely low when

measured by the absolute additional cash outlay required.
This fact has prompted major oil companies to "dump"
significant quantities of refined product at low prices
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whenever their individual supply-demand situation produced a

reduction of their "normal" sales.

The action was justified

on the grounds of marginal cost (incremental-barrel)

pricing.

Discontinuities
Careful inspection of the situation discloses a

misunderstanding of marginal-cost principles.

Marginal cost

is the cost generated by adding one additional unit in the
production process.

The misunderstanding takes place in the

definition of the unit.

James R. Nelson has edited a

collection of essays pertaining to economic analysis for
practical application of marginal-cost prices.13

Gabriel Dessus,

in his essay, "The General Principles

of Rate-fixing in Public Utilities," presents a classic
example that bears directly on the refinery problem.14
example involves a French train.

His

However, destinations

within the United States are easier to visualize.

that a passenger train runs from Tulsa to Chicago.

Assume
With the

present energy shortages, more and more people may decide to

use the means of travel that appears more certain, and

therefore move from automotive travel to the passenger train.
The director of Amtrak requests a marginal cost study to

13J. R. Nelson, Marginal Cost Pricing in Practice
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1964).

14Ibid., p.

42.
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determine the additional cost involved in carrying these
added passengers.

Assuming a coach on the Amtrak system

will accommodate ninety persons and the last available coach

is half full,

compute the marginal cost for the next fifty

passengers.
The approach that is most tempting to the

uninitiated is to determine the cost of the additional
diesel

fuel to be consumed by the engine when required to

pull the weight of an average person down the track at the

required speed.
This approach appears to work well until the

forty-sixth additional passenger is reached at which time
there is a discontinuity and a whole new coach must be

added.

Obviously, one would never add an entire coach to

provide service for one person (although the rail industry

has repeatedly contended that the government has not been
adequately concerned with the diseconomies involved in
carrying only a few passengers).

However,

rational

individuals outside government control have added new
coaches when relatively few passengers were guaranteed at
the inception of the service.

stances,

Clearly,

in these circum

ultimate utilization of the new facilities at

optimum levels was envisioned from the outset.

What is the

marginal cost of the forty-sixth through the fiftieth
passenger,

and what was the marginal cost of the ninetieth

passenger on the previous coach?

The problem is immediately

simplified if one remembers that one is adding and computing
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marginal costs on units of added capacity,

passengers.

not on individual

The marginal cost of adding another coach may,

therefore, be easily calculated.

To obtain the marginal

cost for an individual passenger, Dessus carefully explains
that one has to use the average marginal cost for a new
coach plus the operating costs of transporting the
passenger.
Dessus is not alone in his observation.

Marcel

Boiteux presents three general conclusions which relate to

similar situations in an essay entitled "Marginal Cost
Pricing":

1.

Sale at marginal cost involves deficits when
the firm is overequipped relative to demand
but it is profitable when the enterprise is
very underequipped.15

2.

When capacity is optimum, sale at marginal
cost of the service rendered by the marginal
plant exactly covers the costs of this
marginal equipment.16

3.

Sales tariffs based on marginal costs should
be established with reference to continuously
optimum plant sizes, regardless of the actual
successive phases of over- and under-capacity
through which the enterprise passes.17

It is quite clear that these writers believe that whenever

discontinuities in productive capacity exist, the marginal
cost associated with the last unit of existing capacity

produced is the average marginal cost for the existing plant

size;

and the marginal cost of the first unit of production

15lbid.,

p.

55.

17Ibid.,

p.

57.

16ibid., p.

56.

69

Had refinery managers been willing to

from a new facility.

accept this theory,

product dumping might have been avoided

or reduced during periods when a major oil company's
refining volume and normal refinery sales were out of

balance even though domestic demand exceeded domestic
refinery output.
Financial Implications

What are the financial consequences of not under
standing this concept?

The approach to marginal costing

based on a fraction of an additional productive unit when
discontinuities exist will erode capital

of losses).

(through a series

If one concludes by his analysis that the cost

for the forty-sixth additional passenger from Tulsa to
Chicago is.

for example,

tickets accordingly,

0.1 cent per mile and prices his

he might soon fill the coach;

however,

he would have extreme difficulty showing a long run profit.

Financiers, observing his actions, would be reluctant to
lend him additional capital for his next coach.

the refining industry be different?

Why should

Some financial people

feel it is not.

Why then do so many cling to the belief that somehow
they can have their essential needs satisfied
without paying all the associated costs?
There is
also the companion belief that at least part of the
burden of costs can be avoided by shifting it to
others. ... To a major degree, beliefs such as
these have contributed to the critical shortage of
energy now existing in the United States.
They
have effectively restricted both the generation and
the investment of capital funds needed to provide
an adequate supply of energy.
... It ought to be
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obvious that the energy industries can't invest
enough if the money isn't available and the money
won't be available if profits aren't adequate.
Profits, of course, can't possibly be adequate if
the price paid for energy by consumers is too low.18
The oil companies' economic lesson was not accepted.
Independent marketers made substantial inroads in the major

oil companies' markets using available low-cost product from

independent refineries.

The accompanying reduction of

"branded sales" caused the refineries to have momentary
surpluses despite the fact that there were no great

surpluses for the economy as a whole.

Normal distribution

channels being full, the refiners proceeded to dispose of

this temporary surplus in the only areas where excess demand
existed (the cut-rate market).

These sales were at low

prices and provided cut-rate marketers with additional "fuel
for the fire" to again invade the major marketing area and
capture even more branded sales.
temporary surplus situation,

This shift again created a

and the process which created

the economic instability for any one individual major oil
company continued.

Had the major oil companies realized the

true marginal cost of the products dumped, they undoubtedly

would have considered reducing production whenever they lost
branded sales volume.

18John G. Winger, "Something For Nothing" The
Petroleum Situation, November 30, 1973, p. 2.
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SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

The refining industry, although structured as an

oligopoly, does not appear (during the period studied) to
conform in detail to any of the theoretical models advanced

for oligopolies.

This lack of conformity seems to be due

to United States Government interference in the market
picture, and a lack of acceptance by refinery executives
of marginal cost principles as they relate to firms with

discontinuities in productive capacity.

The United States

Government's concerted effort to ensure survival of
marginal refineries has taken several forms as further

detailed in Chapter 4.

These forms include an outright

gift which reduced input costs (import allowables),

noncompetitive bidding practices (back in options available

to small refiners on jet-fuel contracts), and a semi

guaranteed crude supply (government takes royalty oil in
kind and delivers to small refineries).

The government-

protected position of small refiners has enabled some of

them to supply cut-rate marketers with the initial potential
for invading major marketing territory.
inroads were successful,

After the first

supply was maintained by the majors

themselves due to a misapplication of marginal cost pricing.

Modified views of the economic structure of the

industry were presented.

The first followed the Sweezy

model but severely reduced the slope of the inelastic demand
curve to reflect an attitude change as discussed on page 49.
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This attitude change, coupled with government reduction of

small refinery costs, could have induced some refiners to

believe that their marginal costs were below the vertical
portion of the marginal revenue curve and thus induced them
to continue price-cutting activity.

The second modification

was an attempt to explain industry activity in general,
rather than industry activity from the view of the cut-rate
refiner.

For a time the government succeeded in controlling

price leadership.

The government effectively used the

import program to hold existing prices and to foster price

competition by independents,

thus imposing upward rigidities

on price and at the same time removing "natural” downward
rigidities of the oligopoly structure in the industry.
In reaction to this government involvement, prices

appeared to have a fluctuating downward movement during the
early 1960's as indicated on page 79, Figure 4.1.

however,

Costs,

have continued to rise and seem to have imposed a

floor under prices in the mid to latter portion of the
1960's.

A modification of a model presented by White,

Market, and Taylor, which itself is a modification of a
Lanzillotti model,

seems to explain in an ex post fashion

the activity of the industry during this period of intense

government intervention in the marketing process.

The new

model (modified by the author, but agreed with by economists
in the companies contacted), demonstrates the suppressive

price associated with the major oil companies'
product discrimination,

loss of

the government's assistance of
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independent refiners, and artificial competitive prices in

certain areas.

Price suppression was intensified by the

refiners' desire to operate at fairly constant volumes.
This desire was fortified by erroneous marginal cost

Low price then became a constraint in the model

studies.

due to the activity of congressional investigating
committees and government pronouncements concerning
potential elimination of the crude-oil import program.
Recent large increases in the cost of crude oil
associated with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries' cartel has effectively removed most of the
government market-interfering mechanisms previously
mentioned and thus provides the terminal date for this

research.

It is interesting to note that the regulatory

policies since that time have accomplished similar purposes.
The price-control program established different prices for

"new" and "old" oil.

Realizing that different firms have

different combinations of new and old oil, cost differences
again reflect themselves in price differences at the pump.
The author does not attempt a current analysis in this
paper but rather limits his work to a historical review of

cause and effect.
The basic refining operation and the economic

structure of the industry are both complex.

The accounting

and economic frameworks which explain cost allocation and
firm behavior are also reasonably complex.

Determining the

best sequence for the presentation of material was made
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difficult by these complexities since all areas really

should be considered together to obtain the best view of

refinery operations.

For this reason the last two chapters

which contain the accounting and economic frameworks should
be referred to when considering the competitive forces in

the petroleum-refining industry and the price restraints

presented in the next chapter.

Chapter 4
FACTORS AFFECTING PRICE FLEXIBILITY
IN THE REFINING INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION
The complex structure of competitive forces in the

petroleum-refining industry is examined in this chapter.
Prices of petroleum products are analyzed to determine
whether the price trends suggest the presence of excessive

restraints on price structure.

A brief review of the

"competitive products" which vie with components of the
product mix is also presented.

Several indirect competitive forces are examined

separately to explore the extent of apparent artificial
restraints affecting price.

Preliminary study by the author

appeared to support the hypothesis that prices of standard
refined products were semirigid (lacking upward flexibility)
for a period.

Observable direct restrictions of price are

also studied.

The following research questions are being probed in
this chapter.

1.

Do empirical data indicate the presence of price
suppressive activity in the price structure of the
petroleum-refining industry?

2.

What are the competitive forces in the petroleum75

76

refining industry?

3.

What role has the rigidity of policy played in price
structure?

4.

Has the government's involvement in the refinedproducts marketing process produced upward rigidity
in the price structure?

5.

What effect has monopoly pricing practice had on
refined-product prices?

6.

Did the petroleum-refining policies or practices
add to the upward rigidity of product pricing?

7.

What was the short-run effect of ecological
considerations?

8.

Have the price rigidities demonstrated in this
chapter retarded financial investment?
These questions present a framework for logical

inquiry into the complex question of price rigidities. Each

question was designed to explore a potential price
suppressive activity or influence.
REFINERY PRICE TRENDS
Oklahoma refinery prices are examined in this study

for two reasons.

First, oil-producing areas historically

had more flexible price structures than nonproducing areas

due to the ease of entry afforded independent refiners by

the close proximity of raw materials.

In addition, smaller

firms were available within the Oklahoma area.

Although

prices from a limited geographical area (the Oklahoma

pricing area) were used,

the remainder of the study included

representation from all domestic areas and the conclusions
are not restricted to the Oklahoma pricing area.

77
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 present the average

Oklahoma refinery prices of regular-grade gasoline from
January 1953 to December 1972.

A brief glance at the raw

price data allows several observations.

Prices of regular

gasoline exhibited a gradual upward trend from 1954 to early

1959.

Seasonal fluctuations occurred from early 1959 to

late 1964.

A period of stable but lower prices ensued.

No

evidence of the seasonal cycle can be observed from October
1965 to October 1967.

Prices were lowered even further

during 1968 and 1969.

A 92-octane product stabilized at the

approximate price of the 89-octane product when this latter

product was first introduced; then, the higher-octane product

was further lowered in price.

A detailed analysis of the

data should shed further light on these prices.
The inflationary trend of the period under obser
vation is common knowledge,

but the wholesale refined-

products prices do not seem to follow this trend.

A

statistical test (t) was applied to the price data to obtain
an indication of the significance of this observation.

The average Oklahoma refinery prices of regular
grade gasoline and the wholesale price index (all

commodities) are presented in Table 4.1 and 4.2
respectively.

The null hypothesis states that the

difference in slope between the least-squares regression
lines computed from "common size” or comparable percentage
data for both gasoline prices and the wholesale price index

is equal to zero.

This hypothesis is tested in Appendix B
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Table 4.1
Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices
of Regular Grade Gasoline
1953 - 1972

Year

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr .

1953
1954

10.50
11.22

10.50
11.10

10.50
11.06

10.50
11.06

1955
1956

10.81
11.25

10.81
11.25

10.81
11.33

1957
1958

12.27
12.38

12.63
12.28

1959
1960

12.48
11.15

1961
1962

June

July

Aug .

10.50
/ 11.06

10.93
11.06

11.50
10.88

11.50
10.81

10.87
11.38

11.00
11.73

11.00
11.88

11.03
11.88

12.63
12.15

12.63
12.00

12.63
12.00

12.41
12.25

12.38
11.34

12.57
11.82

12.75
12.00

12.63
11.60

13.38
12.34

13.38
11.26

13.38
10.84

13.38
12.64

1963
1964

12.10
11.63

11.64
11.63

12.00
11.51

1965
1966

12.25
12.25

12.25
12.25

1967
1968

12.25
11.33

1969
1970
1971
1972

May

Sept ,

Oct .

Nov .

Dec.

Average

11.50
10,81

11.50
10.81

11.47
10.81

11.36
10.81

11.02
10.96

11.25
11.88

11.25
11.88

11.25
11.76

11.25
11.63

11.25
11.63

11.05
11.62

12.01
12.57

12.00
12.88

12.11
12 .88

12.13
12.76

12.13
12.50

12 j 13
12,50

12.31
12.43

12.32
12.17

12.08
12.73

12.62
13.30

12.55
13.38

12.00
13.38

11.86
13.38

13.38

12.32
12.47

12.99
12.91

13.13
13.00

13.13
13.00

12.92
13.00

11.88
13.00

11.88
13.00

12.00
13.00

12.22
12.77

12.80
12.56

12.48
11.41

12.75
11.63

13.06
11.63

12.94
11.63

12.19
11.63

11.80
10.83

12.23
11.31

11.00
12.04

11.57
12.25

12.15
11.59

12.25
12.25

12.25
12.25

12.25
12.25

12.25
12.25

12.25
12.25

12.08
12.25

11.95
12.25

12.25
12.25

12.25
12.25

12.25
12.25

12.21
12.25

12.37
11.59

12.38
11.90

12.38
11.99

12.38
11.62

12.38
11.88

12.38
11.88

12.38
11.88

12.38
11,88

12.38
11.69

12.38
11.63

12.52
11.64

12.38
11.73

11.77
12.10

11.75
12.09

12.48
12.00

12.44
12.69

12.29
12.67

12.22
12.54

12.09
12.70

12.28
12.71

12.18
12.66

12.17
12.66

12.25
12.73

12.29
13.24

12.18
12.56

13.16
12.73

12.95
12.62

12.80
12.67

12.49
12.88

13.13
12.88

12.98
12.88

12.88
12.88

12.88
12.88

12.81
12.88

12.75
12.88

12.75
12.88

12.75
12.88

12.86
12.82

Source:

Minerals Yearbook, United States Department of Interior,

Platt's Oil Price Handbook,

1953 to 1972.

1953 to 1972.

11.56
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Figure 4.1
Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices and Octane Ratings
for Regular-Grade Gasoline

Source:

Table 4.1
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Table 4.2
Wholesale Prices United States
Department of Labor Indexes
All Commodities
1953 - 1972
Year

Jan.

1953
1954

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

109.9*
110.2

109.6
110.5

110.0
110.5

109.4
111 . 0

1955
1956

110.1
111.9

110.4
112.4

110.0
112.8

1957
1958

116.9
118.9

117.0
119.0

1959
1960

119.5
119.3

1961
1962

May

June

July

Aug .

109.8
110.9

109.5
110.0

110.9
110.4

110.6
110.5

110.5
113.6

109.9
114.4

110.3
114.2

110.5
114.0

116.9
119.7

117.2
119.3

117.1
119.5

117.4
119.2

119.5
119.3

119.6
120.0

120.0
120.0

119.9
119.7

119.9
100.8

101.0+
100.7

101.0
100.7

100.5
100.4

100.0
100.2

1963
1964

100.5
101.0

100.2
100.5

99.9
100.4

99.7
100.3

1965
1966

101.0
104.6

101.2
105.4

101.3
105.4

1967
1968

106.2
107.2

106.0
108.0

1969
1970

110.7
109.3

1971
1972

111. 8
116.3

*1947 -

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

111.0
110.0

110.2
109.7

109.8
110.0

110.1
109.5

110.9
114.7

111.7
115.5

111.6
115.6

111 . 2
115.9

111.3
116.3

118.2
119.2

118.4
119.1

118.0
119.1

117.8
119.0

118.1
119.2

118.5
119.2

119.7
119.5

119.5
119.7

119.1
119.2

119.7
119.2

119.1
119.6

118.9
119.6

118.9
119.5

99.5

100.1

100.5

100.1
101.2

100.0
100.6

100.0

100.0

99.9
100.4

100.7

100.4
100.4

100.0
100.1

100.3
100.0

100.6
100.4

100.4
100.3

100.3
100.7

100.5
100.8

100.7
100.7

100.3
100.7

101.7
105.5

102.1
105.6

102.8
105.7

102.9
106.4

102.9
106.8

103.0
106.8

103.1
106.2

103.5
105.9

104.1
105.9

105.7
108.2

105.3
108.3

105.8
108.5

106.3
108.7

106.5
109.1

106.1
108.7

106.2
109.1

106.1
109.1

106.2
109.6

106.8
109.8

111. 1
109.7

111.7
109.9

111. 9
109.9

112.8
110.1

113.2
110.3

113.3
110.9

113.4
110.5

113.6
111. 0

114.0
111.0

114.7
110.9

108.5Δ
111.0

112.8
117.3

113.0
117.4

113.3
117.5

113.8
118.2

114.3
118.8

114.6
119.7

114.5
119.9

114.4
120.2

114.4
120.0

114.5
120.7

115.4
122.9

1949 = 100%

+1957 - 1959 = 100%
Δ1967 = 100%

Source:
Survey of Current Business-monthly issues from 1953 to 1972.

i
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using a t test (see page 171).
A graphic portrayal of the comparable data is given

in Figure 4.2.

This graph depicts average Oklahoma whole

sale prices for regular-grade gasoline as a percentage of
the first month's reported prices, as well as the Bureau of

Labor Statistics wholesale price index (all commodities) as
a percentage of the first month's reported index value.

A period of fairly stable wholesale price levels was
indicated from early 1958 to the end of 1964 when the
current inflationary trend appears to have begun.

For this

reason the data were divided into two groups, pre-1965 and
post-1964.

This division also closely approximates the

point in time when the average gasoline prices no longer
exceeded the wholesale price index, when each is considered

as a percentage of its respective base month value.
In Figure 4.3,

least-squares regression lines were

superimposed on the data originally represented in Figure

4.2.

Two separate t tests of regression-line slopes were

calculated and presented in Appendix B to determine whether
price-level adjustments were appropriate.

The results of

the first test indicated that price-level adjustments may
have been appropriate for the pre-1965 period (the null

hypothesis could not be rejected).

However,

the second

test indicated that the null hypothesis should be rejected

at the 99 percent confidence level for the post-1965 period.

Therefore, price-level adjustments were made for neither
period since a partial use of price-level adjustments would
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Percent of Base
Month Value

Figure 4.2

A Common Size Comparison of Regular Oklahoma Gasoline Prices
with the Wholesale Price Index (Each Expressed as a
Percentage of its Relative Base Month Value)

Source:
Data taken from Tables 4.1,

4.2, B.2,

B.3,

B.8,

B.9.
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Percent of Base
Month Value

Figure 4.3

A Comparison of Least-Squares Regression—Line Slopes
Fitted to Common-Size Gasoline Prices
and Wholesale Price Index Values
Source:

Data taken from Tables 4.1,

4.2,

B.2,

B.3,

B.8,

B.9.
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be inconsistent.

Hesitancy in using price level adjustments

in the pre-1965 time period also seemed appropriate because

the wide fluctuations in gasoline prices produced an
extremely low coefficient of correlation for that regression

A search for the cause for the change which

line (.110752).

occurred in the relationship between wholesale gasoline
prices and the wholesale price-level index seemed desirable

to the author.
An observation of the original wholesale gasoline

prices suggested the introduction of a seasonal price
depressor in 1959.

Significantly the oil-import program was

adjusted by Presidential Proclamation 3279 on March 10,
1959,

and subsequently contained price-depressive factors
Another t test of

which are detailed on page 100.

regression line slopes was applied to the price trend for
regular grade gasoline prices before and after this change

in import policy.

Allowing for a delay in reaction to the

announcement of March 10,
trend,

1959,

to reflect its seasonal

the one-year period eliminated runs from September,

1959 to August,

Although this period was

1960 inclusively.

eliminated for the reasons given,

an examination of Figure

4.1 will reveal the fact that the first severe seasonal
depression of price occurred in this period.
period was omitted for two reasons;

first,

This one-year

to eliminate the

uncertain period of transition associated with the policy
change,

and in addition,

to avoid any seasonal difference

by ensuring that the two time periods cover the same months
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of the year.
The t test of regression-line slopes clearly
indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 99
percent confidence level (see Appendix B beginning on page

171).

This fact would strongly imply that the two sets of

data were not taken from the same population; yet the

participants in the Oklahoma market for wholesale gasoline
prices did not change materially over the nine-year period

encompassed by the test.

The conclusion must be reached

that there has been a significant change in market
conditions.

Since total demand was increasing over this

time frame and the reduced prices were not in the best

interest of the oligopoly structure within the industry,

the

primary cause appears to be external to the petroleum
refining industry.

March,

The oil-import program initiated in

1959, provides a logical explanation of the price

trend change.

Prior to this change, prices were increasing,

but after the program was initiated an abrupt reversal took
place and prices decreased.

The fact that octane increased

during this period makes the price-trend reversal even more

significant.

The effects of the import program on wholesale

gasoline prices are discussed in detail on page 100.

COMPETITIVE FORCES IN THE
PETROLEUM-REFINING
INDUSTRY
Many forces help to shape the price structure for

the refining industry.

Before it is possible to appreciate
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these competitive forces,

a brief look at the products

produced by a refinery is required.

A relatively complete technical breakdown of

refinery products is presented in Figure 4.4; however, the
analysis of competitive forces in this study is confined to

the standard products normally produced in volume.

Only

completed products normally sold outside the industry will
be considered.

The inclusion of gas oils and petrochemicals

could add to the complexity of the analysis without
contributing significantly to the conclusions.
The basic refinery process in its simplest form is

the heating of crude oil in a still, and the recovery of the
gases and oils that result at different temperatures.

The

lighter fractions evaporate at lower temperatures, the

heavier fractions at higher temperatures.

There are three

natural groupings of these products; the residues, the

distillates, and the gasolines.
The Residues
The residues are,

in essence,

the portion of the

barrel that remains in the "bottom" when the distillation

process is completed.

Traditionally three major products

have been made from the bottom of the barrel.

Residual fuel

oil is the most natural of the three; however, with

additional processing, asphalt or coke can be made from the
same residue material.

The ability to make the two latter

products is primarily dependent upon refinery configuration.

N
A
T
U
R
A
L

Natural gas

Gas oil

G
A
S

Hydrogen
Light hydrocarbons
Carbon black

Noncondensable

Refinery gases

Liquefied
Processed
derivatives

Light naphthas

Gasoline

C
R
U
D
E

O
I
L

Intermediate
naphthas

Light distillates
Refined oils

Middle distillates

Heavy naphthas
Kerosine
Signal oil

Gas oils

Absorber oils
Technical oils

White oils

Medicinal oils

Saturating oils
Emulsifying oils
Electrical oils
Saturating and
insulating waxes

Paraffin Waxes

Heavy distillates
Light lubricating
oils
Intermediate
lubricating oils

Fatty acids
Fatty alcohols
and sulfates

Heavy lubricating
oils
Medicinal

Petrolatum

Technical

Residual
fuel oils

Residues

Liquid asphalts,
binders, and
fluxes
Steam-reduced
asphalts
Oxidized asphalts

Asphalts

Coke

Refinery sludges

Acid coke
Sulfonic acids
Heavy fuel oils

Domestic and industrial fuels
Crude oil production stimulus
Raw materials for synthetic hydrocarbon chemicals
Production of carbon black
Component of automotive and aviation fuels
Liquefied gases, domestic and industrial fuels,
ana illuminants
Raw material for synthetic hydrocarbon chemicals
Metal cutting and glass manufacture
Welding, refinery fuel, and regrigerant
Rubber tires, inks and paints
Cooking and heating
Synthetic motor fuels
Synthetic rubbers
Lubricating-oil additives
Aviation gasoline blending agents
Antifreeze, fat, lacquer, ana drug solvents
Gas-machine gasoline
Automobile gasoline
Aviation gasoline
Commerical solvents
Explosives
Blending naphthas
Raw material for synthetic hydrocarbon chemicals
Varnishmaker's and painter's naptha
Dyer's and cleaner's naphtha
Turpentine substitutes
Cattle and insect sprays
Jet, stove, lamp, and tractor fuels
Railroad signals, lighthouse oil, and ship illuminants
Lubricating-oil additives
Carburetor oils
Soaps
Naphthenic acids
Metallurgical, domestic heating, Diesel-engine
and light industrial fuels
Gasoline recovery oil and benzol recovery oil
Insecticides and tree sprays
Bakers, fruit packers, candy makers, egg packer's
and slab oils
Recoil oils and hydraulic oils
Salves, ointments, and creams
Cosmetics
Internal lubricants
Wood, leather, and twine oils
Cutting, paper, leather, and textile oils
Switch, transformer, and metal-recovery oils
Candy and chewing gum wax
Candle, laundry, sealing, and etcher's wax
Paper, match, and cardboard wax
Medicinal wax
Canning wax
Synthetic lubricants and their derivatives
Grease and soap
Lubricants
Rubber compounding
Household detergents and wetting agents
Spindle, turbine, transformer, and compressor oils
Household lubricating oils
Ice-machine, meter, dust-laying, and tempering oils
Journal, motor, Diesel-engine, aircraft, and
railroad oils
Steam-cylinder, valve, transmission, and printing
ink oils
Black oils
Tempering oils
Cup, switch, automotive, industrial, and cable grease
Cosmetics
Salves, creams, ointments, and petroleum jelly
Rust preventatives, rubber softeners, lubricants,
and cable coating compounds
Wood preservation and gas manufacturing oils
Metallurgical oils
Marine boiler fuel
Railroad boiler fuel
Roofing and shoe material
Shingle and paper saturants
Road oils
Emulsion bases
Briquetting and paving asphalts
Paint bases
Flooring saturants
Roof coatings and waterproofings
Rubber substitutes
Insulating asphalts
Carbon electrodes
Carbon brushes
Fuel coke
Metallurgical coke
Fuel
Saponification agents
Fat splitting agents
Emulsifying agents
Demulsifying agents
Refinery fuel

Figure 4.4

Petroleum-Refinery Products
Source:
Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 18, 1972, p. 632.

87

88
The economics of residual production must therefore be

considered before the refinery is built.

For many years residual fuel oil was placed in

competition with a very inexpensive coal in the European

market.

Since Europeans used substantial quantities of

residual fuel, the low price of coal acted as a natural

competitive ceiling for the price of residual fuel in world
The production of residual fuel in the United

markets.

States was comparatively uneconomical at this low price, and
few companies produced it.

Most United States companies,

when faced with the original-investment problem, designed
their refineries to produce asphalt or coke.1

introduction,

Since their

the revenue from the latter two products has

traditionally exceeded the revenue from the production of
residual fuel oil.

One of the primary reasons for this was

the government's policy regarding fuel-oil importation.

Whenever surges in residual fuel-oil consumption
tended to increase price, the government traditionally
intervened.

Import barriers were lifted and enough

additional fuel oil was imported to maintain the previous

low price.

Large and repeated demands for additional fuel

oil have occurred within recent years.

Standards imposed to

control sulfur emissions had, temporarily, directed public

1One major oil company did not follow this trend
because of a heavy utilization of thermal crackers rather
than catalytic crackers.
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utilities away from the use of most domestic coal and

toward either residual fuel oil or gas during the latter

part of the period under observation.
If the supply of input factors is held constant for
any reason,

then, under normal circumstances (regular market

forces at work) large increases in consumption would be

reflected in gradually increasing prices.

These price

increases would generate economic profit and would normally
attract additional investment to produce products in short

supply.

Existing refineries,

designed to produce coke or

asphalt, would undoubtedly continue to follow their design
configuration and produce those products.

The increased

demand would create a more difficult choice among the

residue products that could be produced by new refineries.

If demand persisted, and prices continued to rise, more and

more new refineries would decide to produce residual fuel
oil.

This sustained increase in demand and production would

cause the price of the other two competing products to go up

only slightly while the fuel-oil price would stabilize at a
considerably higher level.

The government's activity

prevented such a solution to the problem,

the prices presented in Table 4.3.

as indicated by

The price of residual

fuel from 1953 through 1972 has remained a relatively low

percentage of the price of a barrel of crude.

This low

price is particularly significant when viewed from the
engineer's volume-oriented viewpoint.

Operating personnel

frequently speak of selling a barrel of residual fuel oil
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Table 4.3
Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices
of Residual No. 6 Fuel Oil
1953 - 1972

Year

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

1953
1954

1.03
1.54

1.01
1.51

1.00
1.39

1.00
1.27

1.00
1.21

1.10
1.12

1.19
1.08

1.20
1.15

1.21
1.20

1.26
1.34

1.37
1.42

1.49
1.47

1.15
1.31

1955
1956

1.57
2.14

1.58
2.15

1.59
2.12

1.65
2.10

1.79
2.10

1.83
2.10

1.83
2.10

1.83
2.10

1.83
2.10

1.83
2.10

1.83
2.14

1.96
2.39

1.74
2.14

1957
1958

2.60
2.03

2.64
1.88

2.52
1.68

2.48
1.71

2.48
1.73

2.41
1.73

2.26
1.64

2.10
1.59

2.03
1.60

1.90
1.13

1.80
1.73

1.80
1.83

2.25
1.73

1959
1960

2.02
1.93

2.18
1.99

2.15
1.83

1.94
1.75

1.88
1.75

1.88
1.87

1.88
1.95

1.88
1.95

1.88
1.95

1.88
1.95

1.88
1.95

1.93
1.95

1.97
1.89

1961
1962

1.95
1.86

1.95
1.90

1.95
1.90

1.89
1.90

1.85
1.90

1.85
1.90

1.85
1.90

1.85
1.90

1.85
1.90

1.85
1.90

1.85
1.90

1.85
1.90

1.88
1.90

1963
1964

1.90
1.95

1.90
1.95

1.90
1.95

1.90
1.95

1.90
1.95

1.90
1.95

1.90
1.95

1.90
1.95

1.90
1.95

1.90
1.95

1.90
1.95

1.90
2.03

1.90
1.96

1965
1966

2.05
2.15

2.05
2.15

2.05
2.15

2.05
2.15

2.05
2.15

2.05
2.15

2.05
2.15

2.05
2.15

2.06
2.15

2.15
2.15

2.15
2.15

2.15
2.15

2.08
2.15

1967
1968

2.15
1.70

2.15
1.70

2.15
1.70

2.15
1.70

2.15
1.70

2.15
1.68

2.15
1.65

2.15
1.65

2.15
1.65

2.15
1.65

2.15
1.65

2.15
1.65

2.15
1.67

1969
1970

1.74
1.83

1.78
2.00

1.70
2.00

1.70
2.00

1.70
2.00

1.70
2.26

1.70
2.55

1.70
2.71

1.70
2.73

1.70
2.73

1.70
2.73

1.70
2.73

1.71
2.35

1971
1972

2.68
2.60

2.60
2.60

2.60
2.60

2.60
2.60

2.60
2.60

2.60
2.60

2.60
2.60

2.60
2.60

2.60
2.60

2.60
2.60

2.60
2.60

2.60
2.60

2.61
2.60

Sources:

Minerals Yearbook, U.S.

Department of Interior, 1953 to 1972.

Platt's Oil Price Handbook,

1953 to 1972.

Average

'
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for less than what was paid for it (i.e.,
cost of the barrel of crude),

for less than the

although this concept is

inaccurate from an economic or an accounting view.
A sudden shift in consumption would require sudden

and drastic changes in refinery output even if "free" market

forces were at work.

With government intervention (an

attempt to maintain a low-cost energy policy) the
adjustment becomes even more severe.

The adjustment from

almost total dependence upon foreign sources (95 percent of
eastern requirements) to self-sufficiency would be a

violent one.

The author indicated in Chapter 1 that if the

basic hypothesis were true and there were rigidities in the

price structure,

sudden violent adjustments would be

expected since normal market forces, which have a tendency
to smooth adjustments by giving lead indicators in the form

of price changes, would be absent.

Without this lead

indicator the industry must perforce read minds.

No

difficulty exists in the observation of increases in demand;

but,

since prices under controlled conditions do not reflect

increased demand,

policy changes.

it is necessary to anticipate or predict

Whether these changes in policy are made

by our own government or by foreign powers,

severe,

they may cause

abrupt changes in the refinery-product mix

requirements or refinery-operating levels, or both.
Lack of capcity,

coupled with a lack of input

crude, caused the government to announce an abrupt policy
change.

The clear-air regulations were relaxed so that
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electric utilities converting from coal to residual fuel oil

and gas were to stop the conversion, or possibly reverse it,
and to operate with coal.

Again, the serious difficulty

observable in sudden policy change was the lack of a lead
indicator.

Coal companies had been closing down their

operations over a period of years due to the restrictive

high sulfur content of their product and the relatively low

price of natural gas and residual fuel oil.

They were not

prepared to handle this sudden large increase in volume.

Both industries will probably exert great efforts to meet
the emergency, but an easy,

long-run solution is not

expected.

Newspaper headlines in the winter of 1970-1971

concerning shortages of residual oil first aroused the
writer's interest in this topic.

A careful discussion with

refiners at that time disclosed no real shortage.
only a shortage at the existing price.

There was

Refiners could have

supplied additional fuel oil then, had there been an

economic incentive.

The government,

however,

following its

regular policy, met this first public indication of a

serious problem by increasing fuel-oil-import quotas.
The United States oil industry is producing

substantial quantities of fuel oil.

However,

the majority

of the companies are producing fuel oil at their foreign

refineries.

These refineries, although often owned and

operated by domestic oil companies, are under the control of
the governments of the countries in which the physical
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facilities exist.

This foreign control of residual fuel oil

became critical when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries exerted extreme pressure on Canada, Japan, and
most of the countries in Europe and Asia (by threatening to
withhold all crude oil deliveries to prevent petroleum

products refined in their countries from entering the United
States).

The low price previously prevailing in the residual
fuel-market also controlled the selection of refinery

location for residual-fuel-oil production.

Relatively low

labor costs had to be obtained in order for production of
residual fuel to be economically attractive.

The ability to

import foreign crude also entered into the decisions, as
will be discussed more fully in conjunction with the

gasoline section of this chapter (beginning on page 99).
simplest terms,

In

the crude-oil import policies basically

allowed the importation of crude oil as a percentage of
existing refinery capacity,

and consequently, discouraged

any attempt to increase refinery size where the total
refinery input depended upon imported crude.
Discussions with industry personnel revealed that
tentative contract proposals were made during 1973 which

were more than double the government's normalized residual
fuel-oil prices of prior years.

As indicated in Chapter 2,

such a move causes violent cost adjustments under the price
relative accounting allocation method.

In addition,

it

should induce new construction to prepare for fuel-oil

94

production.

However,

for reasons to be discussed under the

financial-incentives section of this chapter (beginning on

page 120),

refineries were not built to meet this fuel oil

requirement.
The Distillates

The middle-range group of products (called
distillates) include kerosine, jet fuel,

(number 2 fuel oil),

and diesel fuel.

furnace distillate

Due to the flexi

bility of the manufacturing operation within this range of

products, an overriding consideration at each level is the

cost of recycling to upgrade the product.

This recycling

and upgrading potential is particularly prevalent in the

inferior distillates (number 2 and number 3 fuel oil).
Kerosine is in competition with jet fuel because of their
similar composition.

Furnace distillate competes with

natural gas and electricity because of their similarity of
use.

These inferior distillates also compete with jet fuel,

but to a lesser degree.

Jet fuel.

A little-known policy adopted by the

government affects the allocation of military jet-fuel
contracts.

The "small-business set-aside program" enables

small refiners to compete in the production of jet fuel.2

2Armed Services Procurement Regulation, Paragraph
1-706.1 issued to conform to Title 10, Chapter 1137 Armed Forces Procurement Generally, Section 2301 Declaration of Policy.
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Under this program a small refinery submits a bid along with
the majors for a given volume of fuel at the small refiner's
best price.

When the bids are opened,

if any major company

has submitted a lower price, the small refiner is offered
an opportunity to deliver the gallonage submitted in his

bid at the major refiner's price.

The major refiner is

then allowed to supply only the remaining requirement.

This

set-aside program potentially involves up to 40 percent of

the jet fuel delivered under any contract.

This program

is additional evidence that the government is keenly

interested in providing artificial economies to the small

refiners in an attempt to negate the effect of economies of
scale and to promote price competition in the industry.

Furnace Distillate.

The price of the furnace

distillate has been held to an artificial low for two
reasons.

First and most important is that the price of

natural gas has been held to an artificial low by the

Federal Power Commission since 1954.

Petroleum industry

observers compare natural-gas inventory replacement cost to

selling price and conclude that regulated prices are too
low.

This severe restriction of natural-gas price has been

decried by the industry almost from its inception.

logical argument,

Despite

the regulatory agency has persisted with

the low-cost energy policy to the point that imported,

liquefied products commanded a significantly higher price

over a long period of time than the natural gas produced
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domestically.

This low price has discouraged search for additional

gas reserves and has indirectly increased further the demand
placed on refined products.

The lack of available natural

gas has caused utilities to increase their utilization of
residual fuel.

The lower price of the distillates has also

caused refiners to search both for new methods to upgrade

products and also new products to produce.

This search for

new products (which do not fall under the price restrictions
covered in this section) has created a small crisis of its

own.

The raw material for the production of plastics was

developed and rapidly grew in volume.

With the recent

shortage of total crude supply and refinery capacity,

plastics industry experienced critical shortages.

the

The price

of its raw material input had increased appreciably due to
the scarcity of crude oil.

Further elaboration on this phase of the distillate

rigidity problem is probably unnecessary since the price of

natural gas has received such widespread publicity.

portion of the problem,

however,

This

is grave and brevity of

coverage should not diminish its significance.

Most

government officials will admit the impact of the low
natural gas price upon available energy, and therefore, have
agreed indirectly with the premise that this low price also

has strong impact on furnace distillate prices.
Furnace distillates also compete with electrical

energy in a lesser but significant way.

Electrical
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utilities have successfully discriminated in their pricing
scheme to produce at least four different price structures.

Three of these are rather natural divisions of their sales.
Reported statistics break down the sales to ultimate
consumers into four catagories:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Industrial users.
Commercial users.
Residential users.
Other users.

For the purpose of this discussion, the "other users"

category is disregarded since it is a catch-all and repre
sents no clearly distinguishable segment of the electric
utilities'marketing activity.

Residential sales must be

analyzed further and broken down into two clearly differ
entiated segments in order to obtain the four price
structures referred to above.

Residential users with

permanent electrical heating (total electric homes) and
residential users without permanent electrical heating

compose the two segments.

Once this breakdown is complete

we have three areas of discriminatory prices over the normal
residential rates.

Justification for price discrimination is twofold.
First,

large industrial users are given a favored price

structure because of the basic economies achieved by

delivering large quantities of electrical energy to a single
location,

and also as an inducement to provide jobs and

attract residential and commercial users into an area to

achieve economies of scale and enlarge the rate base.
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Expressed in another way the distribution system is quite
simple and direct and requires much smaller capital

investment in the form of poles,

logic is difficult to fault.

lines, and the like.

This

Court cases have upheld the

justification of a price differential based upon reduced
cost of distribution.

There is no attempt in this

discussion to debate that point.

The second justification

for price discrimination is more subtle and may contain an

error in logic when considered with the first.

This

justification states in essence that there is a marginal
efficiency associated with the utilization of off-season

productive capacity.

If a facility is being used

extensively during a particular season of the year and is
partially idle at another season of the year,

the cost of

delivering electrical energy during the slack period is a
marginal cost.

Therefore, a marginal price which is lower

than other prices during the same period may be justified.
The production reducing effect of this attempt by
the electric utilities to equalize the peak between summer

and winter and to expand the rate base has been an
artificial low winter heating rate which has effectively

competed with the furnace-distillate rate.

This low winter

rate has helped to hold the price of this segment of the
refined products to an artificial low.

Empirical evidence

to support this view is presented in Appendix C,

beginning on page 191.
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Gasolines

Since gasoline is the only product which does not

have a "competitive" substitute, all external pressure
exerted against the price of gasoline must be created by

providing an arbitrary artificial cost advantage to some

firms.

The pressure mounted against the oligopoly price

structure in the gasoline market was both direct and

indirect.

The primary tool was the government import
Prior to the late 1950's the United States had

program.

surplus crude production compared to domestic consumption.

This situation allowed many small refineries to operate with
a relatively low input crude cost.

The major refiners,

being integrated oil companies and having excess crude
available,

allowed independents to fulfill part of their

refining requirements.

During the 1950's, exploration and

development of foreign crude sources created a worldwide
surplus of crude.

At the time the domestic crude surplus

was fading into history,

the relatively inexpensive oil

had been found and produced.

At a time when leasing and drilling operations were

becoming more expensive,

forces were set in motion which

tended to reduce the incentive for exploratory drilling.
The low cost of natural gas allowed it to be a ready

substitute for some petroleum products.
conservation provisions,

Under the guise of

the producing states adopted strict

regulations relating to the production of crude oil.

These

regulations would have been a conservation tool had they
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conformed more closely to engineering requirements for

Unfortunately, they also were used to

optimum output.

assist in maintaining a high domestic crude-oil price by

frequent adjustment in the production rates.

These

adjustments often had more to do with price than with the
maintenance of reservoir pressures.
In March,

1959, the government adopted a mandatory

import quota system which prevented the domestic price from

falling to the world price and established a dual pricing

structure for the industry.

Immediately, benefit accrued to

any organization that could obtain the cheaper imported
crude (refer to Table 4.4).

If all refineries had been

treated equally, this problem would not have been too

formidable; however,

such was not the case.

The bill

establishing the import quota system provided for exceptions
and immediately exceptions came into being.

A number of

companies were successful in establishing refineries in the

Carribean area which depended almost totally on imported
crude and which were exempt from the import quotas.

When

this activity was attempted in the New England States (with
great promise of local political reward from a trust fund to
be established out of the crude cost difference), the

procedure was finally defeated and no further exceptions

were granted.

A differential treatment among the oil

companies was established as an integral part of the import
program.

Several classifications of refinery size were

identified and the smaller refiners were allowed a greater
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Table 4.4

Value of the Crude Oil Import Quota
(The difference between the
domestic and foreign price
of crude oil per barrel)

Year

Margin per
Barrel
$

1963

.87

1964

.78

1965

.85

1966

1.25

1967

1.25

1968

1.25

1969

1.25

1970

1.36

1971

.518

1972

.764

Source:
Withheld by request.
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percentage of import relative to their total crude demand
than the larger refiners based upon a step-scale reducing-

percentage of import allocations (see Table 4.5).

With the implementation of this program, two

artificial noncompetitive levers came into existence and
affected the gasoline-pricing system.

The more direct of

the two was the use of implication and threat by political
groups and administrations.

These groups suggested complete

elimination of the artificially created domestic price by

removal of all import restrictions.

This threat was used to

force industry leaders or potential leaders to roll back
price advances which had already been announced.

In

addition, Senate investigative committees were busy probing
the possibility of returning to a true world price by

eliminating both the import program and the state regulation
of allowables.

This lever, when applied, was quite

effective and several price advances were rolled back during

the last decade.

The procedure received very little

publicity as a tool to control price, but received
substantial publicity in the form of political attacks on
the industry.
The second lever was even more effective.

There is

strong indication that the petroleum industry can become
inherently unstable with respect to its refinery pricing
operations,

as was discussed previously in Chapter 3.

Any

force which tends to upset the delicate balance between
refining and major-brand marketing causes major companies to

Table 4.5

Oil Import Quota Allocation
As a Percent of Input
Increment

Increment of
Prior Year
Average B/D
Refinery Input

1965
First
Half

1965
Second
Half

1966

1967

0 - 10,000

17.0

18.0

18.0

10 - 30,000

11.6

11.9

30 -100,000

9.2
5.53

100,000+

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

20.0

19.5

19.5

19.5

21.7

21.9

11.4

11.4

11.0

11.0

11.0

13.0

13.0

9.4

8.9

8.0

7.0

7.0

7.0

7.6

7.6

5.64

5.26

4.28

3.0

3.0

3.0

3.8

3.8

1968*

*This data is not available from local sources.
Source:

Code of Federal Regulations, 32A, Chapter X, sections 10-11.
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dump quantities of refined product on the discount market in
an attempt to preserve the operating efficiency of the

refinery.

This situation is a distinct characteristic of

refining and is not associated with other joint production
operations.

The second lever moved to create the initial upset

of otherwise carefully planned refining and marketing
operations.

In a true oligopoly rather stable prices

usually exist among alternate suppliers.

Many economic

reasons are suggested for the stable price and one common

economic analysis is that there is a kink in the demand
curve.

Under this theory, potential price discounters are

dissuaded.

They reason that any price reduction would be

met by the competition, rendered virtually ineffective,
all parties would suffer from the lower prices.

and

The

economies of scale associated with the large refiners'
operations would enable them to prevail in the long run and

to virtually eliminate any price rebel they felt was not

good for the industry.

The inequality of imports relative

to total operations between the small refiners and the
majors under the import program is a carefully calculated

plan which attempts to equate in part the economies of scale
between the small firm and the large firm.

In effect, this

allows a marginal refiner to continue his otherwise
unprofitable operation.

Some small refineries have

virtually existed on the import allocation margin.

more specific,

To be

their total reported income during periods of
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intense price competition was from that source.3

The practical effect is to permit the independent
refinery to initiate pricing practices which can be
detrimental to the entire industry.

Distribution of cut-

rate gasoline to cut-rate dealers can be perpetuated far

beyond the productive capacity of the independent refinery
in a very competitive market.

One should remember that it

does not take much to upset any major oil company's

refining-marketing balance.

In addition, the diversification

within the industry is so great that no single firm truly
leads in industry pricing;

collusion is extremely difficult

because of the ever-watchful eye of government antitrust

activity, and mistakes in judgment do exist from time to
time both in potential demand and optimum refinery size for
a short-run situation.
price.

All these factors tend to suppress

Apparently, government economists, well aware of the

oligopoly's barriers to competition, have taken a significant
step to eliminate some of the barriers within the refining

industry.

The effect can be observed by examining the

average price data during the early 1960's and toward the

end of that decade as presented in Table 4.1, page 78.

A study entitled "Oil Supply and Tax Incentives,"
published by the Brookings Institution, provides additional

support for these observations from a different viewpoint.

request.

3More than one direct source.

Names withheld by
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The authors reach the following conclusions about two
hypotheses advanced by the Federal Trade Commission:

Over the period 1951-1972 the real price
of gasoline (excluding tax) fell by 25 percent
and the ratio of the real price per gallon of
gasoline to the real price per barrel of crude
oil fell from 9.4 percent to 6.8 percent, a
drop of 27.7 percent. ...
If the real price of
gasoline fell because the majors were
aggressively expanding refining capacity and
competing for incremental shares of the
gasoline market, the cooperative-behavior
hypothesis falls.
If the majors were
cooperatively restraining expansions of refining
capacity and the real price of gasoline fell
because of expansions of refining capacity by
nonmajors, the hypothesis of barriers to entry
falls.
In our view of the evidence, the real
price of gasoline, refinery margins, and longrun profit rates declined both the FTC hypotheses
- about barriers to entry and about cooperative
behavior - are wide of the mark.
Government activity seems indeed strange when this

activity set up in the same mechanism the ability to

artificially raise crude-oil price by adhering to domestic

supplies of crude and at the same time to lower refinedproduct price in a rather deliberate attempt to eliminate

the price advantages of the oligopoly structure.
RIGID POLICIES
Target fixation is an expression used by United

States Air Force personnel to refer to the tendency of some

4Edward W. Erickson, Stephen W. Millsapps, and
Robert M. Spann, "Oil Supply and Tax Incentives,” ed. Arthur
M. Okum and George L. Perry, Brookings Papers on Economic
Activities 2
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974).
pp. 449-78.
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pilots to get so absorbed in the pursuit of their target and

so oblivious to their surroundings that they kill themselves

and destroy their aircraft just before, during, or just
after they attack their target.

Success in destroying the

target is of questionable value if the concentration
required causes one's aircraft to strike the side of a cliff.
This phenomenons of target fixation is important to the pilot
because of the speeds at which he is moving and the changes
in environment that are taking place around him as he
pursues his target.

Similar things seem to be happening in

the business world.

Today's business is conducted at a

frenzied pace amid rapidly changing circumstances and
environment.

Are those charged with the responsibility for

the determination and maintenance of policy equipped with
enough peripheral vision to avoid becoming locked in on a

target to the exclusion of rather obvious danger signals?
A look at some persisting policies should shed further

light on the problem.
Each policy presented is included in quotation marks

since it has been paraphrased by the author.
"Low-cost energy is in the best interest of the
United States consuming public."

This policy or one

similarly worded appears to have long been the guiding force
of many government regulatory agencies.

At this policy's

inception the policy was probably sound, and the public in
both the industrial and private sectors greatly benefited

from it.

There is ample current evidence to indicate that
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the policy is either in need of a change or requires less
rigid interpretation.

Perhaps the policy should read

"relatively low-cost energy is in the best interest of the

United States public."
"Big business is inherently evil, and must be

continuously and carefully watched to prevent growth,
excessive profits, and collusion."

There are existing

antitrust laws to enforce a portion of this policy.
Politicians and reporters assume that it is their civic

responsibility to watch other areas.

The net result has

been to successfully retard profit in the very capital
intense petroleum industry.

These actions have reduced

return on investment to a figure below the national average

despite favored tax treatment for the industry.

Improved

profits are compared to these abnormally low figures and the

general cry is raised that additional safeguards are

necessary to prevent profiteering.,
"The American consumer desires a large luxury

automobile and is not really interested in an economy car."
Some automobile-industry executives in the United States

could not be convinced that they did not have the proper

production policy.

These executives followed their

previously conceived policy concerning the size and the

economy desired by the United States motorist until foreign-

car manufacturers captured a significant portion of their
sales.

Even then they turned their attention more to sporty

models rather than economy-oriented small cars.

The
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immediate result of this policy fixation was to produce
automobiles which consumed large quantities of gasoline.
The eventual result was a major shutdown of large automobile

plants and their conversion to the manufacture of smaller

cars only after better than thirty million automobiles with
high fuel consumption were already on the road.

This high

fuel consumption added significantly to the total energy

problem.
"The type of service station which is most desirable
is a large multibay full-service station of modern decor."
After several years of this type of construction,

it was

discovered that the overhead costs would not allow
competitive pricing when the cut-rate dealers began to

construct minimal service and self-service operations.
"Profit may be maximized by producing additional

units whenever marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost."

This economic truth may prove dangerous if adopted as a
policy without a very clear definition of marginal cost.

As

suggested in Chapter 3 there is the danger of misconception
concerning what constitutes marginal cost in any industry
where product ion is discontinuous (economies of scale

require a large plant size and additional units can not be
processed when capacity is approached without the
construction of a very large plant).

An attempt to adopt

marginal pricing as it is generally understood under these

circumstances can cause a real loss in both capital
invested and the ability to attract additional capital.
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Policies which appear innocent when considered by
one company may develop into mutually exclusive policies

when the industry is considered as a whole.

For example,

if

a major oil company decides as a policy not to be undersold
by more than one cent while discount competitors adopt a

policy of always being two cents under the major ptice, such
a mutually exclusive set of policies exists.

There will be,

then, no end to the price reductions until one of the firms

changes its policy.
The problems existing within the industry which
have tended to make prices depressive have been those

involving a persistent use of obsolete, poorly defined, or
mutually exclusive policies.

Most of the pressure exerted

against price increases by agencies outside the industry
have also been generated due to a rigid adherence to

potentially or partially antiquated policies.

GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
The government's involvement in the market place is
clearly referenced and quite carefully stated in a policy
background paper prepared for a Senate committee.

Excerpts

from that paper are enlightening:
OPEC'S [*] success in raising landed prices of
imports to the U.S. level would mean an end to
the 'cheap imported oil' yardstick against which
domestic energy prices have been measured, and
the government would be deprived of the

*The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
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leverage of increased imports that is now used
to stabilize the prices of domestic oil and
other fuels.5
The policy background paper quotes a cabinet task force on

oil-import control

The present system has spawned a host of
special arrangements and exceptions for purposes
essentially unrelated to the national security
... and had led to undue Government intervention
in the market and consequently competitive
distort ions.6

The policy paper further states "The import control program
is now principally a price stabilization device and a means

of allocating the benefits of import among refiners."7
This allocation is done in a biased manner as indicated in

the policy paper "...

refineries.”8

the

'sliding scale'

favoring small

The sliding scale referred to is presented

in Table 4.5, page 103, and the benefit of the import quota

is presented in Table 4.4 on page 101.
The absence of clear legislative authority and
guidelines for oil import policy, the general
practice of deciding import matters on an ad hoc
basis, and the drift in administration of the
existing program, constitute uncertainties that
deter investment in several sectors of the energy
economy.
Among these sectors are ... refinery
location and construction.9

Many of the areas of government involvement have

5U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Insular
Affairs, Toward a Rational Policy for Oil and Gas Import A Policy background paper, 1973 (Washington: Government
Printing Office), pp. 9-10.

6Ibid., p.

14.

9Ibid., p.

16.

7Ibid., p.

15.

8Ibid.
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been mentioned in previous sections of this chapter.

In

addition to those mentioned, President Truman requested and

received from the industry cooperation toward a million
barrel reserve capacity which suppressed prices in the early
fifties (prior to the adoption of the oil-import program).

PROBLEMS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY

The balance between refining and marketing for major
oil companies is a precarious one with extremely unstable
characteristics.

This lack of stability is caused by the

application of marginal pricing in a questionable manner.
Thorstein Veblen has a rather clear exposition of

the price system in a free-market economy in his book, The

Engineers and the Price System.10

He illustrates the effect

of overproduction on prices by referring to the capacity of

the United States during times of war to mobilize production
facilities and turn out tremendous volumes of any selected
product (tanks,

trucks,

aircraft and the like).

He

suggests that this extensive production volume could also be
accomplished during times of peace;

however,

it would

suppress prices by creating hugh surpluses of any given
product.

These lower prices would be self-defeating from a

profit oriented viewpoint.

Veblen therefore concludes that

it is essential under our economy to control production.

10Thorstein Veblen, The Engineers and the Price
System (New York: Viking Press, 1954).
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This premise is accepted in almost every major manufacturing

area.

Business personnel produce and utilize carefully

calculated inventory control programs.

A manager in today's

business world would be remiss and subject to open criticism

if he allowed inventories to run rampant, to absorb

excessive quantities of working capital, and eventually to
become obsolete.

Despite this fact there is general

presumption that any attempt to control production in the
refining industry has to be blatant conspiracy.
There were several causes for the lack of stability

within the industry.

The government's intervention in the

market place was of major importance since this external

disruption of the market economy appeared to be an internal

disruption of the market economy.

The independent refiner,

given a protective blanket under the import program, had on

occasion used that protection to engage in practices he
would have hesitated to attempt if such windfall profits

were not rather uniquely available.

Despite the fact that

there was encouragement, the extent of price competition in
the industry appears excessive.

Outside influences,

although responsible for the initial thrust, were not fully
responsible for the magnitude of price-suppressive activity.

A combination of misapplied marginal cost principles
and self-serving purchase timing has greatly amplified the

problem.

To illustrate the effect of the combination of

these two forces, consider a situation in which a major oil

company has carefully calculated its total requirement for
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heating fuels for the winter season.

Although there is

considerable manufacturing flexibility within the refinery,

a hypothetical company has concluded that it cannot produce
all the requirements during the peak season without getting

an early start.

The company commences the production of

normal requirements considerably ahead of the season and
stores the output pending sale to independent jobbers.

The

jobbers, well aware of the total storage capacity at a given
refinery location, purposefully delay the acquisition of

heating fuel.

During this interim period they almost

totally deplete their inventory of product.

At the point

where the major refinery has exhausted its storage capacity

and is considering negotiations for extensive transportation
costs, not normally incurred,
with the major refinery.

the jobber begins to bargain

Due to the pressures of sheer

volume and absence of storage capacity,

the major refiner is

caught in a weak bargaining position and sells at low
prices.

One available recourse which would avoid such

disastrous results, when the bargaining position of the

independent is strong,

is to purposefully delay the changing

of the product mix so as to produce less than the

anticipated demand for the product and to thus avoid

exhausting storage capacity.

The major companies have

repeatedly been unwilling to do this.
Another alternative which could be effectively used

to avoid depressed prices would be to purposefully curtail
production volume whenever a significant segment of the
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product mix is in oversupply.

In this area the lack of

acceptance of marginal cost in its application to the unique
aspects of the refinery industry has caused the major oil
companies to adopt policies promoting heavy utilization of

plant capacity at the expense of price.

Independent

marketers of gasoline, well aware of the policies adopted

by the major oil companies, utilize products obtained from
independent refiners to gain a foothold in the market place.
Drastic discounting policies are adopted and can be main

tained because the independent refiner's price is below the
major's price.

the marketing costs of these

In addition,

service stations which provide almost no service other than

the delivery of gasoline are considerably below the costs
involved in a full-service station because of the great

difference in fixed costs.

After obtaining a small foothold

the marketing policies of the independent attract a portion

of the major refiner's sales.

This sales-volume loss

creates a chain reaction since a loss of sales volume places
the major refiner in an excess-capacity situation.

This

temporary oversupply of product has been "created" by brand

name and does not exist when total supply and demand are
considered.

The policy to maintain production volume causes

the major refiner to sell his excess product at attractive
rates to the independent marketer.

An attractive rate is

one which is lower than the rate supplied by the independent

refiner.

This low rate enables the independent marketer

to again reduce his price and the cycle repeats itself.
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In addition to the reasons previously mentioned,
there have also been some instances where poorly worded

contracts have created a price-suppressing effect.

These

contracts take the form of a guaranteed profit margin or

express the price in relative rather than absolute terms,
such as some relative price below the normal tank-wagon
price.

In these instances there is no sharing of

responsibility in the pricing scheme.

Regardless of how low

the price goes, one party to the contract is still assured

his normal markup.

On occasion one party to such a contract

has been known to initiate the price-suppressive activity
thereby automatically lowering his cost and attempting to
stockpile product at a low cost.

Inequities of this sort

are usually of short duration because the injured party is

not again interested in entering into such an arrangement.

ECOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Any attempt to segment the various facets of the
problem associated with refining is subject to criticism.

Most of the effects of any one portion of the industry are
interwoven with the circumstances in other segments.

This

interlocking relationship is especially true of the effect

of concern for the environment upon the industry.
There can be little dispute with the fact that

environmental concerns are a real and timely problem and

that the refining industry should make reasonable efforts to
minimize atmospheric pollutants.

The primary problem in the
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interaction of ecological and refining needs has been one of

timing.

Environmentalists were interested in halting known

pollutants and preventing further abuses to the environment.
Strength for the cause was received from the Environmental
Protection Agency.

Although it is reasonable to assume that

individuals would react emotionally to challenges to the

environment, it seems also reasonable to assume that the
Environmental Protection Agency should react more calmly and
on known facts rather than emotions.

does not appear to have been the case.

In some instances this

There are three

major areas where environmental concerns have seriously
affected the normal operation of petroleum refining, and a
fourth area which has resulted in tremendously increased

demand for petroleum products.
Removal of Lead

The first area of concern was caused by the
legislation requiring elimination of certain emissions from

car exhaust.

Because of the approach that the United States

automotive industry followed to meet its emission require
ments (namely, the use of catalysts), the refining industry
was forced to prepare for low-lead and eventually no-lead

gasoline.

This preparation was essential to prevent a

fouling of the catalyst by the lead which would render the

catalyst useless.

In addition to the no-lead requirement,

United States auto makers had to severely reduce the

performance of their engines by reducing compression ratios.
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These lower compression ratios increased the demand for lowoctane gasoline rather than premium gasolines.

At the same

time the technology associated with producing reasonably

high-octane gasoline containing no lead required additional

processing using equipment whose function was to increase
the octane.

Refiners thus had the capability of delivering

a leaded gasoline with high octane ratings when the short
short-run demand was for gasoline with relatively low

octane.

In this instance, the political body which

established the mandatory policy provided lead time.
However,

in view of the technical requirements, the lead

time was quite short.

Following their usual policy,

the

government regulations provided favored treatment to small

refiners.

The major refiners have only until 1975 to

accomplish the conversion; however, the small refiners have

until 1977.

The short time period for the implementation of

the emissions standards, which was cut even shorter by some

of the states,

has created a doubt in the minds of some

industry leaders as to the need for the strict measures
required.

There is some evidence to support the claim that

eliminating the lead was an unnecessary requirement.

the same crude stocks,

Given

refineries will be unable to produce

the same volume of gasolines containing no lead that was

previously produced utilizing the lead.

The automobiles

will of course consume more product since the compression

ratios have been reduced.
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Refinery Emissions

A second impact of environmental concerns on the
refining industry was the requirement that the refinery

clean up their own emissions.

Substantial earnings of the

companies have been diverted from other sound investment
proposals to accomplish this objective.

Despite these

efforts and disregarding the fact that entirely new

refinery facilities were being constructed to meet emission

standards, politicians on the eastern seaboard (primarily
in the Northeastern United States) were successful in
defeating proposed refinery construction sites in that
sector.

They have also vigorously and successfully opposed

the construction of superports to handle large tankers

transporting foreign crudes.

One result of this action

(which created large deficits in refinery capacity for the
PAD11 district) has been a hostile attitude on the part of

some state and local officials toward the exportation from
their producing areas of refined products to areas that had

deliberately blocked refinery expansion.

Alaskan Crude
The third impact of major significance directed

against the petroleum industry by environmentalists was the

blocking of the efforts to construct the Alaskan pipeline
which would transport Alaskan crude from the North Slope to

11Petroleum Administration for Defense.
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an open seaport.

The ability to transport this volume of

crude does not begin to reach the magnitude of the current

domestic crude deficit,

although Alaskan crude provides a

potential for a significant temporary relief from extreme
hardship when transportation problems are solved.

Generation of Electricity

A less-direct area of ecological impact which must

be considered is the environmentalist's successful attempts
to halt construction of new facilities for hydroelectric and

atomic generation of electricity.

This deferred

construction has a significant bearing on the petroleum
industry.

The sulfur emissions requirements outlawed the

use of most coal as a power source causing the producers of

electrical energy to convert

from coal to residual fuel oil

or gas which drastically increased demand for both refined
products and natural gas.

The timing of these problems was

critical because it introduced uncertainty into the
decision model at a time when return on investment was low,

as noted in the following section.

EFFECT ON FINANCIAL INVESTMENT
Refinery capacity in the United States has grown
from 9,916,165 barrels per calendar day in 1963 to

13,382,955 barrels per calendar day in 1973 (see Appendix A

beginning on page 161).

During this same period of time the

Oil and Gas Journal forecast demand for domestic consumption
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and exports increased from 10,656,000 barrels per day in
1963 to 17,460,000 barrels per day in 1973 (see Table 4.6).
Forecast demand exceeded refinery capacity in 1963 by

approximately 740,000 barrels.

However in 1973, forecast

demand exceeded capacity by more than 4,000,000 barrels.

What produced the tremendous lag in refinery investment?
Governmental policy decisions are apparently

responsible for most of this difference.

In 1963 the

forecast of United States import of refined products and

By

unfinished feed stock totaled 940,000 barrels per day.
1973 the forecast indicated 2,901,000 barrels per day of

finished-product imports (see Table 4.7 on page 123).

What

appears then to be a constantly increasing gap between
forecast demand and domestic capacity is in reality a

planned difference -- planned by persons in United States
Government agencies.
facing refiners,

To appreciate the real situation

it is necessary to remove the forecast

imports from total forecast demand to obtain the "real

demand" envisioned by the industry.

Figure 4.5 and Table

4.8 both depict this comparison of refinery capacity to the

more realistic forecast of domestic production requirements.
There was a slight excess of capacity in 1963 and

1964 which apparently caused refiners to stabilize
investment from 1964 to 1967 as there are only very slight

increases during that time.

Except for 1967 and 1968, the

sizable increases in demand beginning in 1965 and

continuing in 1973 prompted refiners to commence
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Table 4.6

Forecast of Demand for Domestic Consumption
of Refined Products and Exports
with a Constant One Year
Lead Time
(Thousands of Barrels Daily)

Year

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

4,476

4,588

4,827

4,847

5,074

5,140

5,445

5,740

6,074

6,247

6,682

. . .

. . .

89

86

...

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

Domestic Demand
Gasoline
Naphtha
261

254

254

267

269

260

278

280

255

252

231

Distillate

2,024

2,061

2,107

2,159

2,233

2,330

2,355

2,560

2,677

2,822

3,051

Residual

1,485

1,514

1,526

1,633

1,754

1,800

1,878

2,050

2,447

2.360

2,781

323

330

339

376

453

580

677

790

784

801

849

Jet Fuel - Commercial

201

233

253

284

283

315

371

300

209

236

247

Lubricants and Naphtha

121

121

127

. . .

140

. . .

...

. . .

. . .

...

• • ♦

L P Gas

747

684

718

762

933

1,015

1,115

1,280

1,334

1,329

1,446

Asphalt and Road Oil

347

355

362

374

399

. . .

. . .

. . .

• • •

♦ • •

Other

690

618

632

1,076

656

1,615

1,659

1,775

1,762

1,802

1,947

-178

-208

. . .

. • •

. . .

-315

-314

-387

...

• • •

• . .

259

303

• • •

223

...

. . .

...

. . .

. . ♦

• • •

10,497

10,809

11,448

11,867

12,503

12,740

13,464

14,450

15,161

15,849

17,234

159

179

189

189

196

225

244

230

245

241

226

10,656

10,982

11,637

12,054

12,699

12,965

13,708

14,680

15,406

16,090

17,460

Kerosine

Jet Fuel -

Military

Refinery Loss
Chem.

Feedstock

Total Domestic

Exports
Total Demand

Source:
Oil and Gas Journal

Annual Forecast Numbers from 1963 to 1973.
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Table 4.7

Forecast of Finished Product
Imports 1963 - 1973
(Thousands of barrels daily)

Year

Imports

1963

940

1964

1,020

1965

1,123

1966

1,274

1967

1,394

1968

1,520

1969

1,602

1970

1,830

1971

2,304

1972

2,362

1973

2,901

Source:

Oil & Gas Journal, Annual
forecast numbers 1963-1973.
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Figure 4.5

Comparison of Forecast Demand Net of Refined
Imports with Refinery Capacity
Source:

Table 4.6
Table 4.8
Appendix A
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Table 4.8

Envisioned Demand - Forecast Demand
Less Forecast Finished
Products Imports

Year

Net Demand

1963

10,310

1964

9,968

1965

10,514

1966

10,780

1967

11,305

1968

11,445

1969

12,106

1970

12,850

1971

13,102

1972

13,728

1973

14,559

Source:

Oil and Gas Journal.
Tables 4.6, 4.7.
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construction activities on an intensive basis during 1967,

but the increases for subsequent years appear to be at a

declining rate.

The three to four-year time lag (1964-

1967) between the demand increase and the construction
increases is indicative of the lead time necessary to

construct refineries.

If normal market forces had been at work, prices
should have increased in 1965,

1966, and 1967.

They should

have fallen off slightly in 1968 and then moved upward at a

slower pace.

A reference to Figure 4.1 (price chart), page

79, will reveal that although prices were declining on a
seasonal basis in 1963 and 1964 (the result of the temporary

oversupply),

they never regained their former status;

rather, they were suppressed by the market-controlling

influence of the import program from the end of 1964 until
the early 1970's.

There is therefore a lag of five years

following the rapid demand increase which started in 1965.
This time lag was created because officials in the
refinery industry were optimistic.

During periods of

depressed prices of the mid-1960's the prevailing attitude

was "the price will get well," and, because of the lead
time required for refinery construction,

this attitude

sustained refinery expansion through a prolonged period of
depressed prices.

By 1969 and 1970, the industry had

received the message concerning prices and realistically

viewed price expectations to be low.

At the same time,

forces behind the ecology movement had gained strength and
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were presenting the industry with uncertainties.

If return

on investment had been greater the industry may have

proceeded with expansion despite the uncertainty.

However,

with return on refinery investment, particularly for a

totally new refinery, at a sustained low level, the risk of
uncertainty became the probability of loss because there
was little margin for error.

Responsible corporate officials who were interviewed

and questioned regarding investment decisions all indicated

that the return on investment for totally new facilities
was indeed marginal and those firms that proceeded to invest

did so for other compelling reasons,

not because the

investment proposal sold itself on a financial return
basis.12

The situation was so obvious to an astute observer

of the industry that one informed writer stated,
positive demand,

"Despite

there is indecision in the HPl{*}

today.

Decisions are being delayed because of many uncertainties,
particularly pollution control."13

Fisher and Phipps in a

subsequent article in the same series added,
The consequences of misjudgment are today being
amplified by: (a) a loss of flexibility in fuels
refining as lead restrictions are imposed, (b) the
outside influences on raw materials cost, and
(c) the assumption of control by legislative and
regulative bodies.
The chances that overbuilding

*Hydrocarbon Processing Industry.

12Names withheld by request.

13james N. Fisher, Jr., "Analyzing HPI Inter
mediates," Hydrocarbon Processing, L (February, 1971),

95.
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capacity will result in severe profit losses, for
example, are far higher today than in the past.
Losses in potential profit from underbuilding of
capacity are also higher today than in the past.-*-4
SUMMARY

The normal domestic competitive forces in the
petroleum refining industry were not allowed to work alone.

The dual pricing structure introduced in 1959 which
purported to uphold a higher domestic price for crude oil

set in motion numerous activities which ultimately

suppressed product prices.

Returns from the production of

crude oil thus appeared more attractive than the book losses
which frequently surfaced in the refining and marketing

Sectors.

Management eventually, after prolonged depressed

prices, shifted substantial investment to the production
phase when additional uncertainties caused by ecological

considerations indicated a high risk of loss on proposed

refinery investment.

If the return had been greater,

refineries could have been built and modified to meet

changing environmental restrictions.
During this same period government policy

pertaining to the importation and pricing of residual fuel

oil caused a great difference between actual demand and

envisioned demand.

Actual

demand reflected total potential

14James N. Fisher, Jr. and A. J. Phipps, "Quantifying
HPI Uncertainties," Hydrocarbon Processing, L (March, 1971),
70.
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consumption in the United States, and envisioned demand
represented this total,

less envisioned imports, under

existing government policy.

After foreign powers were

allowed to indirectly control substantial quantities of
domestic heating and power-generating fuel supplies, the

policies adopted by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries disrupted operational levels worldwide.

The

foreign countries supplying the United States with residual

fuel oil judiciously met their own needs first.

Government

policy thus created a significant portion of our "energy
crisis" in an attempt to prolong extreme "low-cost energy."
Numerous other regulatory policies,

as well as a

misapplication of marginal costing principles by the
industry,

contributed to suppressed product prices either by

a reduction of cost to selected refiners or by

discriminatory, artificially low competitive price both
outside and within the refining industry.

The rigidity with which policies were followed,
despite changing circumstances, contributed significantly to
the inflexibility of price.

These rigid policies were

especially significant when applied by government regulatory
agencies,

but were also noted within the industry.

Careful

examination of the empirical data presented in this chapter
strongly supports the hypothesis that prices have been

semirigid and that forces outside the petroleum industry

have played a significant role in producing this upward

rigidity.

A partial result of the rigidity, although not
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the main thrust of this study, was the recent crisis within
the industry.

Empirical data indicated the presence of

price-suppressive artificial activity in the price structure

of the petroleum-refining industry.

The effect of this

price-suppressive activity on investment decisions is

examined in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5

DECISION PROCESSES EXAMINED
Identification of causes of semirigid prices was not

too difficult when the actions of various interest groups
were overt and publicly defended.

were harder to detect and disclose.

The more subtle causes
The effects of price

rigidity on the refining industry were even more difficult

to measure.

Empirical data obtained during unstructured

interviews with key industry personnel assisted greatly in
obtaining the viewpoints of executives in the planning
areas of the petroleum-refining industry.

Some of the

questions considered while gathering and analyzing this

empirical data follow:

1.

Which companies should be contacted?

2.

How could a cross-section of the industry be
obtained?

3.

What were the impacts of price rigidities on
financial planning?

4.

What light would a postcompletion evaluation
shed on investment decisions made during the time
period under study?

5.

To what extent is traditional joint-cost
accounting allocation used in the investment
model?
A review of the methodology used in this study will

assist in the readers evaluation of the empirical data.
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The summarized results of each individual interview have
been presented in Appendix E, beginning on page 216.

As

promised during the interviews no disclosure was made of
either the names of the firms or the names of individuals
representing the firms being interviewed.

Without this

guarantee much of the detailed information discussed during
the interview would probably have been unavailable.

Post

completion audit evaluations, made available on a voluntary
basis by several of the companies interviewed, were

reviewed.

Once again sources were not disclosed.

METHODOLOGY
A detailed list of total refinery capacity by ■

company for the last decade is presented in Appendix A,
Since investment in new refinery

beginning on page 161.

construction is of primary concern,

the figures reflect

refinery capacity as controlled by the companies in 1973.

The figures,

include additions to capacity as

therefore,

though these additions were owned by the acquiring company
even prior to their acquisition.

This approach allows the

reader to determine growth by construction directly from the
tables in Appendix A.

The companies were ranked by size in

order of descending capacity.

The growth (by new con

struction) in refining capacity of the fifteen largest
companies for the last eleven years (1962 through 1973),

presented in Figure 5.1.

is

Every company in the industry was

Bbls. per calendar
day in 000's

Figure 5.1

Source:

Table A.l.
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1973 Refinery Capacity Controlled by the Fifteen Largest
Domestic Refiners in Descending Order

134

graphed during preliminary investigation to determine each

firm's relative growth pattern.
Preliminary investigation revealed the strong

probability of both a difference in management attitude and
a difference in return-on-investment for firms of different
size.

A random sample was rejected in favor of a judgment

sample to ensure that firms representing each different
stratum would be selected.

A stratified random sample was

also considered impractical because the confidential nature
of the interview might preclude cooperation by randomly

selected participants, thus defeating the random selection.
The companies contacted were specifically chosen as
representative of particular growth patterns or to represent
a particular size firm or both.

Originally, twenty-four firms were contacted and

together they represented over 5,000,000 barrels per day

of refinery capacity.

The firms ranged in size from those

in excess of 1,000,000 barrels per day to those with less
than 3,000 barrels per day.

One very large firm and one

small firm refused to cooperate in the project.

Another

small firm also declined but in revealing the reasons

answered in detail a portion of the information sought.
Another firm's president was cooperative but his firm had

acquired refining capacity so recently as to negate the
value of responses in an interview.

One firm which could

not be contacted in follow-up action was in the process of
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being acquired by another firm that had already cooperated.

Four other firms originally contacted to ensure an

alternative if some did not cooperate were of such similar
size and operating characteristics to those contacted that
no follow-up was initiated when no replies to the initial

inquiries were received.

allowed an interview.

All the remaining companies

The degree of cooperation was left

entirely to the discretion of the firm's representative and

ranged from cordial and open responses (which sometimes
included actual formal postaudit evaluation reviews) to
guarded, nonrevealing interviews.

Even in the latter

instances, however, specific answers were obtained to
carefully worded requests which revealed the trend or

management intention of those firms.

Initial contact with each firm was made by letter,

and thirty to sixty days later,

follow-up was made by a

telephone call to the presidents of those firms not

responding.

There were no rejections or lack of cooperation

once personal voice contact was made with a responsible

official.
The large firm that refused to cooperate was the
first one of that size contacted.

Although there were

indications that the rejection was a standard policy,

subsequent contacts with other firms suggested that
approaching the firm on too low a management level was a

poor policy.

The preferred approach proved to be a

written communication directed to the chief executive
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officer of the firm.

COST ALLOCATION METHODS IN USE
No uniform method for allocating costs among the

existing product mix was observed in the firms contacted.

Some firms strongly favored a volume-based allocation.
Others preferred a price-relative allocation for limited

purposes (inventories) but not for managerial product mix

decisions.

One firm was using a cost differential which was

essentially the cost of upgrading the last unit which had
been changed to a lighter fraction by the latest techniques

available.

This method ignores the "natural" yield of high-

revenue products when allocating a barrel of oil and would
substitute as a premium on the cost of gasoline the

differential involved in upgrading the last unit of the

distillates changed to gasoline.

This differential was then

applied to all the barrels of gasoline produced even though
no such costs were incurred in their production.

By the

same token no premium was associated with the gasoline

component of the crude-oil barrel other than this latest

differential.

Representatives of each firm contacted were asked to
identify the allocation method used for managerial

decisions involving product mix.

Without exception each

individual responded quickly that no profit could be

determined by product lines.

Those firms with computer

capacity suggested a total cost - total revenue approach to
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the problem.

This method utilized computer models of the

specific refinery to determine the impact of altering the

product mix within the limits of refinery configuration.
The pilot firm (see Company M in Appendix E, page 236)
determined that costs of three different products were

identical throughout the refinery's normal operating range

using this method.

Closer inspection disclosed a very heavy

bias in the computer model favoring a volume allocation of

the input crude-oil barrel.

This bias existed in all but

one of the intermediate and large-size firms contacted.

smaller firms'

managers indicated the same bias;

The

however,

without computer models the bias was not defended by them as

strongly as by representatives of the larger firms.

Under Phase IV Price Controls refiners were required
to identify profit by product lines.

Despite strong protest

that complying with this request was impossible,
had to respond.

the firms

The technique which evolved reflected the

bias in favor of volume,

and this method was later required.

Several small refiners seemed to find the government
reporting requirements and the controls on various products

such a problem that they sold out to intermediate-size
companies to avoid the headaches.

The firms that were

acquiring did so to reduce some of the product-mix balance
problems that government regulations had imposed on them.

Numerous additional items of individual interest are

located in the interview results reported in Appendix E on
page 216.

However, one of the specific reasons the firms
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were contacted was to conduct or examine the results of
postcompletion audits.

POSTAUDIT EVALUATIONS
The following analyses have been made by reviewing

postaudit evaluations or implemented proposals.
the anonymity of the companies involved,

To ensure

the postaudit

evaluations will be referred to by omitting any identifying

characteristics of either the company or the facilities
unless those facilities are in common use in the industry

and would not identify the firm.

Case I - A Totally New Petrochemical Plant

The first case is a decision to construct a new
facility in an attempt to retain a declining relative market
share.

The initial proposal indicated the competitor's

advantages to be:
1.
2.
3.
4.

market-oriented plant location.
more intense sales and service activity.
greater research and development efforts.
wider range of products.

This initial study indicated an average annual rate

of return on investment of 18.46 percent with payout to
occur in 4.8 years.

The personnel presenting the proposal

suggested that improved performance from existing locations
would result from construction of the new plant.

These

improvements were included in the projected return.

The

postaudit evaluation by company personnel cut right to the
heart of the problem.

The new plant did not live up to
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expectations in sales,

and incurred greater expenses than

planned, causing the audit personnel to observe:
The premises that a plant in ,., would enhance
market prices and volume in other areas (or that
unfavorable consequences would result without such
a plant) is, in our opinion, debatable and highly
speculative for use in project justification.[*]
In the original proposal this speculative improvement

amounted to 33 percent of the project income.

The postaudit

evaluation explained all significant deviations from

projected performance and revealed a reduction in the
average annual rate of return of 9.5 percent (more than

half) and an increase in the years to pay out from 4.81 to
8.5.

This was an expensive lesson in totally new

petrochemical-plant construction.
Case II - Refinery Modernization and Expansion
A dual proposal was made to upgrade the "bottom of

the barrel" (see Figure 2.1 on page 36) and to expand total
processing capabilities for an existing refinery.

Antici

pated new specifications for asphalt were expected to be
more restrictive.

Existing refinery configurations would

not permit production of the new asphalt and would require
the residual to be sold as fuel oil.

plant would prevent a loss of revenue.

A modernization of
In addition, a

planned 2,500-barrel-per-day increase in capacity (as first

considered) coupled with the revenue from asphalt retention,

*Audit group identity withheld by request.
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produced an average annual rate of return on investment in

the initial study of 17 percent with payout to occur in 5.2

years.

In the first six years differences in product prices

and increases in crude-oil prices and manufacturing expenses
reduced the average annual rate of return to 7.7 percent and

lengthened the payout period to 9.4 years.
Case III - Expansion To Meet Emission Requirements

An investment proposal was examined which was used

to implement an upgrading and expansion of refinery plant to

meet the new 1975 Federal emissions standards.

Built into

the calculations were figures reflecting opportunity costs

of not having product available for sale.

In addition,

it

was assumed that no-lead gasoline would command a premium

price.

There was also an assumption that number six fuel

oil would have a sustained high price.

assumptions,

With these

the project showed a return on investment in

excess of 25 percent and represented a proposal that would

carry its own weight on a financial-return basis.
The premium price on no-lead gasoline did not
materialize and return on investment dropped appreciably.

This expansion was recent and improvements in the number six

fuel-oil price coupled with general increases in other
product prices salvaged the investment,

The new equipment

added catalytic cracking and Platforming capabilities which
provided an enviable flexibility and increased the company's
overall capacity.
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Case IV - Major Expansion

The results of an expansion decision and a review of
the postcompletion effectiveness of that expansion were

discussed with the person responsible for the planning and

postaudit of the expansion.

The data given are considered

valid, but no written evidence was observed.

As a

consequence the results were reported in Appendix E under

Company R (beginning on page 229).

Case V - Construction of a Totally New Refinery
The review of a totally new refinery-construction

decision was made during an interview with the official

responsible for planning and monitoring the expansion.

The

specific facility was identified and some confidential
information pertaining to its unique features was presented.

The firm's representative was open and candid, had extensive

knowledge of the entire operation, and spoke rather freely.

He understood that the confidential portion of the material
would not be published nor the firm identified.
written matterial was examined,

Since no

the results of this

interview were presented in Appendix E under company T

(beginning on page 224).
Case VI - Small Upgrading of Facilities

The results of a brief verbal exploration of a post
completion evaluation is presented under Company H in
Appendix E (beginning on page 239).
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SUMMARY

The results of contacts with the firms in the
petroleum industry proved to be invaluable to the author.
In addition to a good response (sixteen out of nineteen

companies on which follow-up was initiated) the firms

contacted were for the most part very cooperative.
None of the firms could refute the logic of
government involvement and effective price ceilings for the

latter part of the decade 1962 through 1972 (the basic

content of Chapter 4).

Neither did they take issue with the

logic presented in Chapters 2 and 3.

The development of the

economic thrust of Chapter 3 was discussed with the members
of the economics departments of several large firms and with
the chief executive officers or planning officer of some

small and intermediate firms.
Seven actual investment cases were discussed or
studied.

Six of the seven cases were presented.

The

seventh case was a detailed written proposal which had not
been implemented.

This case was received as the result of a

direct request for a negative decision on an investment
proposal.

Together the proposals reviewed represent a fair

cross section of industry activity ranging from the
construction of a large, totally new refinery through major
refinery modification,

and included small additions and

technological upgrading to meet emissions requirements.

A

facility other than a refinery was included to indicate the
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coverage of very limited petrochemical analysis (limited to

a postaudit evaluation).

Of the firms contacted, those

which responded represent approximately 30 percent of the

total refinery capacity in the United States at the

beginning of 1973.
The interviews disclosed a basic trend.

Return on

investment for totally new refineries was so poor during the
latter portion of the decade (1967 through 1972) that the

few facilities actually built were constructed primarily
because they could not be avoided or because the

construction meshed with other critical decisions, and not
because projections indicated a favorable return on

investment.

Expansion in the intermediate-size firms was

more inclined to take the form of expanding sophisticated
equipment and balancing existing facilities to take

advantage of previously overdeveloped components.

This

attitude also spilled over into the large refineries when

expansion studies indicated that the return on totally new
refineries was inadequate.

The intermediate companies had

primarily adopted these policies because of capital

limitations.
Smaller companies continued the established trend of

making small

improvements from time to time with heavy

utilization of used equipment obtained from larger firms'

discarded facilities.

A few small firms were planning for

eventual upgrading to no-lead gasoline which involves heavy
capital expenditures for new equipment.

This upgrading of
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facilities is not mandatory for smaller firms until 1977.
There was, therefore, no general rush to costly upgrading and

the return on investment indicated by the small firms was

quite high.

No use was made in the investment model of
traditional joint cost-accounting allocation.

Instead,

there is a creeping movement toward a volume-oriented cost
allocator.

This attitude was most vocally represented by

the large firms with extensive computer models, but was

prevalent throughout the industry without regard to refinery
size.

Government regulation required the use of a volume

based cost allocator under Phase IV price controls.
Accounting systems have been modified extensively to meet

that requirement.

The academic world had little if any

knowledge of this forced change and less opportunity for
input into the transition to an allocation system based on

volume.

Chapter 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Petroleum refining has changed steadily since about

1906 from a processing to a manufacturing activity.

Among

other gradual changes, capital requirements for expansion

have increased dramatically as the optimum size of the
refinery has become larger.

The pace of the general

business environment has also increased markedly.

Government involvement in areas affecting the petroleum
refining industry has become more and more pronounced.
EFFECTS OF POLICIES
A combination of forces produced a period of semi

rigid prices in the industry.

An unyielding adherence to

policies when subtle changes in the business environment
produced a need for policy modification or abandonment

appears to be a primary cause of price rigidities.
Government Policy

Government officials vigorously pursued a low-cost-

energy policy which had a threefold effect.

First, the

price of natural gas was held extremely low by a regulatory
agency (the Federal Power Commission).

The commission was

not negligent in its duties nor did it intend to create a
145
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crisis.

The problem in retrospect seems to be in part one

of accounting.1

With whatever justification,

natural gas was held artificially low.

the price of

This produced

additional demand for the product both from areas pre
viously serviced by gas and also from electric-power-

generating facilities previously fueled by some ecologically
restricted source.

With no incentive for capital expansion

to meet the huge demands now being placed on the resource,
the natural gas industry simply could not keep pace.
The second phase of rigidity in governmental

policy administration occurred in fuel-oil handling.
Residual fuel oil was cleaned up through technology to meet

the standards imposed by the Environmental Protection Agency.
Consequently,

there was an increased demand for this fuel

to substitute for the less-expensive gas since the gas was

available in short supply.

Shortages were felt due to this

1The price of natural gas could be held low and

justified only by a rigid insistence on review of past cost
(the extremely low costs associated with the discovery of

yesterday's natural gas).

The theoretical reasons for

historic costs versus replacement costs have been discussed
by many persons with impressive credentials.

However, the

depreciable assets normally discussed during these

theoretical inquiries have risen only modestly when compared
to the tremendous increases involved in drilling in today's

deep-pool, high-cost drilling ventures.
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expanded use as much as three or four years ago and
newspaper headlines proclaimed a shortage of fuel oil.

These headlines caught the writer's attention and motivated

this study.

Careful inquiry revealed no absolute shortage of
residual fuel oil at that time but rather a shortage at the
existing price.

The price of heavier residual fuel oil has

been so low that most major refineries have processed the
residual into asphalt or coke.

Relatively cheap foreign

crude combined with lower foreign labor costs induced the
construction of refineries outside the United States as the
primary source of supply for United States residual-fuel-oil

requirements.

Government forces went to work when the

shortage was publicized.

Following rather rigid adherence

to their previous policies in an attempt to keep the price

low,

import restrictions were reduced and eventually
This action allowed foreign sources to meet

removed.

domestic requirements in an ever-increasing pattern.

Total

petroleum consumption was skyrocketing but the form of the

demand was in a relatively unprofitable product as far as
the existing policies of United States refineries were

concerned.

The policy of protective governmental agencies

would not allow the product to become more profitable.

The third major effect of rigid administrative
policy assumed a more subtle form.

At its inception the oil

import program was intended to ''protect” the industry from a

glut of foreign crude oil readily available at a low cost.
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This action seemed to be a major reversal of policy in that

low costs were being pursued in other areas.

The primary

intent appeared to be the preservation of employment in the

United States petroleum industry.

Government,

however,

is

large and the low-cost-energy pursuit continued.

No sooner had the import program become mandatory
than the program itself began to be used to suppress the

price of refined products,

particularly gasoline, which had

no natural competitive substitute.

At the same time crude

oil prices were held high,the price at the pump was being

attacked from two sources.

Marginal producers were armed

with a relatively low-cost product due to a reduced cost of

crude under discriminatory import quotas.

Smaller

refineries were allowed a greater percentage of import
quota compared to their total refinery capacity than were

larger refineries.

There is evidence that some marginal

refineries were acquired from major oil companies and the
resultant

improvement in import allowables in effect

provided an inexpensive acquisition.

The resultant savings

reduced the investment cost in these discounted, used

facilities even further and shortened payout.

This action

allowed a low-cost gasoline to meet the low return on

investment requirements.

Government policy which was

designed to keep the marginal producer competitive also

presented problems with respect to new construction.

The extreme discontinuities being required in

totally new refinery construction created,

for any single
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firm,

a problem in locating sufficient demand to satisfy the

output requirements of the large refineries.

Historically,

the gradual replacement of older facilities produced some of
that demand.

Since the older marginal facilities were being

operated with a subsidy,

the investment decision on the

larger new facilities became even more risky than they had

previously been.

Thus the indirect effect produced by the

government through the marginal refiner has all the outward
characteristics of natural competition from smaller

(purportedly less-efficient) operations.

The direct effect was even more devastating.

The

price of gasoline was driven down by complex combinations of

government policy interacting with a marginal-cost pricing
scheme which produced an unstable price-depressing effect in
the industry.

Once prices were depressed sufficiently, the

direct action of governmental low-cost energy policy went
into effect.

The government applied direct pressure on the

industry and on any natural leader of the oligopoly market

by threatening to roll back the price of crude oil through
complete removal of the import controls.

This action would

have produced the flood of inexpensive foreign oil that the
import controls were originally installed to safeguard

against.

This direct external pressure forced several

industry leaders to roll back announced price increases

during a period when cost to the industry (in all phases of

operation) were rising in keeping with the overall price
level.

In the author's opinion,

it appeared almost as if
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petroleum products and other energy sources were singled out

as exceptions to the inflationary spiral of this time period,
primarily because of the low-cost energy policy.

Other Policy Problems
In addition to the major effects of government

policy, a relatively minor but still significant effect was
felt in the competitive pressures brought by the electric

utilities against home furnace fuel through artificially
low, discriminatory,

"off season" pricing schemes which were

coupled with total-electric advertising.

The net effect of

this combination was to perpetuate justification for

artificially low heating rates.

The resultant increases in

the use of electric heating placed even further demands on
the petroleum industry,

but shifted the demand from the

distillate range which was produced domestically, to the
residual range which was imported.

The United States Government was not alone in policy
making.

Sources of crude oil and residual fuel oil were

suddenly removed when OPEC countries announced a reduction
in oil production and a ban on deliveries to certain

countries including the United States and some close allies
in an attempt to gain desired political results.

This

action not only produced restrictions on crude-oil imports,
but more significantly threatened to completely curtail
substantial quantities of required residual fuel oil.

The firms involved within the industry also
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persisted in rigid policies.

A misapplication of marginal

cost concepts induced the adoption of product-dumping
policies which added to the price-suppressing activities of

the previously mentioned government policies.
other policies complicated the picture.

Numerous

Measures adopted by

the automotive industry increased petroleum-refining

requirements, and new, hastily conceived policies of the
Environmental Protection Agency presented rigid requirements

which further heightened the capital intensity of the
industry.

All these interacting policies produced the

pricing pattern indicated in Chapter 4.

The effect of this

price-suppressing activity and the government's assumption

of price leadership in the oligopoly structure follow.
INTERVIEW RESULTS
The interview results and the postaudit evaluation

of the industry's activity following the adoption of the
mandatory import program as presented in Chapter 5 strongly
suggest:

1.

Return on investment during this period,

particularly from 1967 through 1972, was sufficiently
depressed to discourage construction of any totally new

refinery facilities for investment reasons.

facilities were constructed,

While some

reasons other than return on

investment were responsible.
2.

Uncertainty introduced by ecological considerations

(i.e., plant location,

and lack of knowledge regarding final
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fuel-emissions requirements) combined with low return on

investment temporarily halted construction.

3.

A general pattern developed.

Large companies

definitely slowed totally new refinery construction and

substituted a policy of balancing refinery facilities.

Certain refinery units, which were overbuilt
initially,

provided the opportunity to

expand total capacity

by raising

the capacity of the rest of

the refinery to the

level of these units.

Smaller firms continued to rely

heavily on

construction with used equipment to hold down

investment

costs.

This action enabled

them to show a

consistently higher return on investment during this period
than projects using totally new equipment.

Some of the

firms struggled with competitive pricing to the extent that

they relied exclusively on the value of the import quota for
their entire profit.

Ironically there was a suggestion,

after this price-suppressive time period ended,

that the

activities of the industry for the period 1967 through 1972

were normal conditions reflecting normal returns on
investment.

Several studies by the Chase Manhattan Bank

have indicated a need for expanded capital requirements in
petroleum refining.

In addition,

these studies also reported

that return on investment for petroleum companies during
this most seriously affected period of suppressed prices
fell below the national average for manufacturing.
the petroleum industry has,

tax benefits,

Since

or is supposed to have, certain

the return on investment should have been
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higher than the national average.

the price-suppressive rigidity,

In essence the effect of

in all its complexity,

surfaced as the energy crisis.
IMPLICATIONS

Several implications seem to present themselves
from these observations.

Accounting Implications
The rigidities which surfaced as the result of the

many policy interactions succeeded in holding prices fairly
constant at a low level for about five years.

Any

stickiness of price directly affects the price-relative cost

allocator;

however,

it was determined that the cost

allocator had no bearing on the decisions of this time
period since that cost allocator was not used in the

planning departments of the industry.

The effect of price

rigidities coupled with the use of the price-relative cost
allocator was presented in Chapter 2.

The discussion of

that chapter is still considered significant since planning
personnel indicated a strong bias in favor of volume
allocat ions.
Perhaps the real reason for the lack of a practical
solution to the complex problem of joint cost allocation is

the attempt by most persons to solve the problem in a single
step or with as little additional effort as possible.

Since

Phase IV price controls require a cost justification for

154

price increases, perhaps the time has come to try to agree

on a uniform method of allocating cost to refined products.
In a multifaceted problem,

seem unreasonable.

a multifaceted solution does not

Volume appears to be a good allocator

for processing costs.

The volumes are predictable and the

processing costs associated with basic refinery components

can be closely approximated if they are not already known.
The basic stumbling block has been and still is the

allocation of the cost of the crude input.

History has

exposed the danger of attempting to propose a solution to
this problem since any attempt invokes crossfire from
several sectors of the academic community.

All solutions

previously proposed have been accepted with cynicism at one
time or another by operating personnel.

Despite these

warnings the time has come to look more closely for a
solution which can be generally accepted because the

alternative has been a groping search by operating personnel

and planners for a better way to determine cost differences
for profit maximization.

The need becomes more urgent if,

as has been

suggested,

petroleum as an energy source for the United

States is,

and will be,

in short supply when demand and

demand potential are considered.

If the total quantity of

petroleum requested significantly exceeds the quantity
available,

some indicator is required to direct available

resources into the right ultimate product.

In the author's

opinion government has demonstrated a lack of ability to
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remain flexible in administering the needs and interests of
the public.

Policy rigidities have in large measure

contributed to the initial problem.

There is no current

indication of any greater ability to handle these problems
than the abilities demonstrated in the past when dealing

with much simpler problems.

In the author's opinion,

free

market forces could be capable of directing the resources
better than regulatory policies.

Industry accountants and

engineers should acquaint the academic community with the
specifics of the allocation problem in the refining industry.

The three groups should then try to discover a more accept

able and longer-lived solution to the problem than has been
presented historically.
Both the engineer and the accountant have

traditional viewpoints which contain logical observations

that can not be refuted.

There should exist an allocation

system which considers the different values of products

inherent in the barrel of crude oil,

the fact that

technology can and has changed this slate of products,
that time is the variable.

and

Time appears to be the critical

variable either with a free-market system or a governmentregulated one since it has been clearly demonstrated that

government policies can cause a doubling of price within a

relatively short time.
The industry was recently requested to provide the

government with figures representing the loss associated

with a change in production from gasoline to home-heating
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fuel.

The industry ostensibly complied with this request

despite repeated assurances by everyone that the cost of any
single product within the refinery product mix cannot be

separately determined.

determined.

Quite obviously it had to be

An adjustment in prices of furnace fuels

resulted from the figures presented to the government.

As mentioned previously in this chapter, there is

also another accounting problem which should be given
greater consideration.

When replacement costs drastically

exceed historic costs and large inventories of refined pro

ducts or raw materials in place in the ground are involved,

profit measurement is difficult.

If prices are based on

historic costs and no provision is made for the necessary

inventories which must be held to assure future production,
defense needs and delivery,

insufficient funds will be gen

erated to replace the inventory.

to consider this problem.

LIFO is clearly an attempt

However, there has never before

been a domestic problem of the magnitude which currently

exists in the production and refining of petroleum products.
Economic Implications

The economic models presented in the literature need
modification or they fail to explain the activities of an
industry with all the outward appearance of an oligopoly.

Because of government interference in the marketing
mechanism,

the oligopoly appears to be unable to set price,

to limit entry into the area,

to rid itself of nuisance
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factors, to prevent price competition over sustained periods

of time,

and generally to function as an oligopoly.

One

reason which suggests itself as a cause of this peculiar
situation is the extensive knowledge that economists have
concerning characteristics of an oligopoly and the fact that

so many economists are employed by the government.
observation may be pure conjecture.

however,

Such an

It is not conjecture,

that the interference has taken place.

A model was

presented in Chapter 3 (page 57) which attempted to explain
in an ex post fashion the activity of the industry during

the period under observation,
as a new factor in the model.

using government intervention
Another model which was

presented attempted to show the possible effects of

government intervention in a more conventional approach.
The activity of the industry during the period of study

definitely indicates strong outside interference.
author's opinion,

In the

the result of this interference has

unarguably been to place upward rigidities on price and
therefore seriously to diminish return on investment.

The

average return on investment for the industry has declined

and was,

at the end of this period, well below the national

average for all manufacturers.

There are logical explanations for the firm's
behavior prior to 1960, but the introduction of the import

program signaled the beginning of a change in trend.

The

nation has already reaped part of the harvest of this
arbitrary interference in a seemingly well-managed industry.
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Suggestions have been made that refineries should be

divorced from production and marketing facilities or that
the government should take over all refining operations.
Both of these suggestions appear unwarranted.

The

communication problems involved in the planning and control
of balanced production, refining, and marketing are so
complex that to further compound these problems seems at

the least an unnecessary addition to the burden of the

industry and at worst a potentially catastrophic event with
severely damaging consequences.

The assumption that the

government could do as well with the refineries as had been

done by the industry seems unwarranted from the facts.

The

nation can ill afford for the government to do worse.

The previously mentioned government interference in
the marketing mechanism (see pages 145-150),

attempted

application of poorly understood marginal-cost concepts,

and

overt actions by foreign powers combined to produce an
energy crisis.

The actions of the United States Government

regarding import policy and the government's assumption of
the leadership role in industry pricing prior to the

emergency by rather thinly veiled threats both

combined to weaken the ability of the industry to solve its

own problems.

Had prices of critical products been higher

and ecological restrictions and requirements been
reasonably applied and clearly understood by all parties,

there is every indication that the problem could have been

met with less undesirable impact on the public.

The
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industry now faces challenging problems of a planning

control nature.

In the future it will be faced with more

pressing problems regarding product mix and will require
better information for management decision-making purposes.

The suggested accounting studies should help to provide

that improved information.

APPENDIXES
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APPENDIX A

CONTROLLED REFINING CAPACITY ON JANUARY 1,
IN DESCENDING ORDER OF CAPACITY
1963 - 1973
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1973,
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Table A.1

Petroleum Companies Controlling at Least 200,000 Barrels
of Daily Refining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

Exxon Co.

1,156,000

1,180,000

1,087,000

1,078,000

1,021,000

985,000

861,000

846,000

861,900

885,700

887,500

Texaco Inc.

1,109,500

1,109,500

1,029,500

960,00

925,000

925,000

805,000

790,000

785,000

785,000

750,000

Shell Oil Co.

1,082,600

1,059,600

1,058,500

942,900

875,800

810,500

786,500

727,000

726,000

682,300

652,600

Amoco Oil Co

1,022,000

958,000

996,400

896,100

885,300

835,300

737,800

684,200

680,200

678,500

661,700

Union Oil Co. of Calif.

969,900

941,200

937,900

799,900

762,900

716,900

620,600

620,600

698,300

726,800

630,300

Mobil Oil Corp.

930,100

797,400

833,800*

856,400*

852,600*

736,200

680,700

693,000

669,300

674,900

665,300

Gulf Oil Co.

818,000

799,000

659,300

646,600

627,900

606,300

563,700

593,700

593,700

575,700

569,200

Atlantic Richfield Co.

772,800

768,000

670,000

703,000*

724,000

724,000

703,000

692,500

692,500

663,500

663,500

Sun Oil Co.

410,500

404,500

408,000

405,000

405,000

394,000

381,500

174,500

376,000*

385,000*

385,000*

Phillips Petroleum Co.

403,700

398,500

398,000

389,500

389,500

409,500

409,500

405,000

405,000

405,000

405,000

Ashland Oil, Inc.

350,300

344,300

316,500

289,500

261,500

260,500

245,500

219,500

204,000

197,000

192,200

Continental Oil Co.

285,000

283,000

272,500

276,300

273,300

276,300

240,800

253,500

249,000

245,900

216,950

Standard Oil Co. of Ohio

264,400

255,100

254,000

171,600

180,600

172,500

168,000

165,000

165,000

165,000

158,000

Cities Service Co.

240,000

281,000

281,000

261,000

241,000

241,000

241,000

255,300

255,300

255,300

255,300

Marathon Oil Co.

223,000

205,000

187,150

159,150

159,150

159,150

149,300

168,650

168,650

153,850

153,850

1963

+Figures represent refinery capacity as controlled on January 1, 1973, irrespective of transfers of ownership.
For
this reason the increases indicated are true increases in total refinery capacity.
Growth by individual firms through a
policy of acquisition rather than constrcution will not appear to be growth but a constant refinery capacity.

This total is a combination of barrels per calendar day and barrels per stream day since figures for just one
category were not available.

*Barrels per stream day rather than barrels per calendar day.
Source:

Annual refinery numbers of the Oil

and Gas Journal

for the years presented.
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Table A.2
Petroleum Companies Controlling Between 30,000 and 200,000 Barrels
of Daily Refining Capacity on January 1, 1973 +
1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

British Petroleum Co.

141,250

181,400

185,000

185,000

104,000

104,000

133,000

133,000

133,000

133,000

133,000

Getty Oil Co.

140,000

140,000

140,000

140,000

140,000

140,000

140,000

140,000

140,000

140,000

140,000

Champlin Petroleum Co.

138,750

133,767

129,200*

90,000

87,000

87,000

87,000

84,180

81,680

81,680

80,180

Coastal States Petro Chem

130,000

133,000

133,000

133,000

85,500

80,000*

44,000

29,500

29,500*

27,500

29,000

Murphy Oil Co.

118,000

67,000

68,000

56,000

53,500

50,000

47,000

44,000

43,000

43,000

40,000

Clark Oil & Refining Co.

104,000

102,500

100,000

100,000

100,000

92,000

83,500

83,500

70,500

65,000

64,500

Amerada—Hess Corp.

98,500

98,500

98,500

98,500

95,700

93,800

90,900

90,900

88,600

89,850

89,850

Koch Refining Co.

96,500

87,700

87,000

77,300

77,300

62,300

62,300

62,300

62,300

62,300

43,200

Crown Central Petro Corp.

93,000

85,000

85,000

84,000

37,500

40,000

40,000

40,000

40,000

40,000

40,000

Tenneco Oil Co.

88,200

87,000

84,000

81,000

76,000

76,000

57,000

54,000

51,000

47,000

44,000

Skelly Oil Co.

67,000

67,000

67,000

65,000

65,000

65,000

65,000

48,000

47,000

45,500

60,500

Charter Oil Co.

62,055

62,055

72,000

72,000

72,000

72,000

72,000

72,000

72,000

72,000

72,000

CRA Inc. - Kansas

60,000

55,000

55,000

54,000

50,000

49,000

45,500

43,300

40,800

40,300

40,300

Texas City Ref., Inc.

60,000

60,000

60,000

50,000

50,000

52,500

50,000

40,000

40,000

40,000

34,000

Cosden Oil & Chem., Inc.

58,000

58,000

58,000

68,500

45,000

43,000

42,100

42,100

42,100

42,100

42,100

Suntide Oil Co., Tex.

51,000

51,000

50,000

49,000

49,000

54,000

54,000

54,000

54,000

53,000

53,000

Southwest Oil & Ref. Tex.

50,000

50,000

52,000*

52,000*

46,000

46,000

46,000

50,000*

50,000*

47,000

47,000

National Cooperative
Refining Assoc. - Kan.

49,000

46,200

46,150

44,000

42,000

38,000

38,000

31.000

31,000

31,000

31,000

American Petrofina - Kan.

48,500

48,500

48,500

48,500

48,500

43,400

40,400

40,400

40,400

40,400

40,400

Chevron Asphalt Co.

46,900

39,200

35,900

35,900

35,900

33,600

33,600

32,300

30,800

30,800

30,800

Diamond Shamrock Co.

45,000

45,000

38,000

38,000

35,000

34,500

30,000

29,500

28,000

27,500

27,000

Douglas Oil Co. of Calif.

43,200

43,200

31,600

31,600

30,600

28,600

25,000

36,000

36,000

29,500

27,170

Tesoro Petro. Corp.
(incl. Alaska)

41,500

35,600

27,910

28,650*

10,500

10,000

9,700

9,700

10,000

10,000

10,000

Husky Oil Co.

40,350

40,350

40,350

39,750

36,350

37,750

36,750

34,100

34,100

37,100

37,090

Lion Oil Co.

37,000

37,000

37,000

37,000

37,000

36,000

35,000

35,000

35,000

35,000

35,000

Apco Oil Corp.

37,000

37,000

37,000

37,000

29,000

29,000

29,500

29,500

37,000

37,000

37,000

Leonard Inc.

36,950

NR

29,000

29,000

27,750

27,750

27,750

27,750

27,750

27,750

27,750

Pasco Oil Co.

32,000

32,000

32,000

32,800

26,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

26,000
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Table A.2

(continued)

Petroleum Companies Controlling Between 30,000 and 200,000 Barrels
of Daily Refining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

Farmer’s Union

30,000

30,000

26,000

26,000

26,000

26,000

26,000

26,000

26,000

26,000

Hawaiian Independent Ref.

30,000

—

+Figures represent refinery capacity as controlled on January 1,

1973,

irrespective of tranfers of ownership.

*Barrels per stream day rather than per calendar day.
Source:

Annual refinery numbers of the Oil and Gas Journal for the years presented.

1963
26,000
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Table A.3

Petroleum Companies Controlling Less Than 30,000 Barrels
of Daily Refining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

Vickers Petroleum Corp.

29,500*

29,500*

29,000*

27,000*

27,000*

27,000*

25,000*

25,000*

25,000*

25,000*

25,000*

Delta Refining Co.

29,000

29,000

28,500

28,500

28,500

25,000

22,000

22,000

20,000

21,185

19,885

United Refining Co.

29,000

25,000

25,000

19,000

19,700

16,500

16,500

15,000

15,000

15,000

15,000

Powerine Oil Co.

28,500

28,500

28,500

28,500

27,000

20,000

20,000

20,000

19,000

14,000

14,000

Kerr McGee Corp.

28,500

28,500

42,000

41,000

40,000

38,000

38,500

33,500

31,500

31,000

31,000

Rock Island Refining Co.

27,329

27,000*

22,600

22,600

22,600

22,600

22,600

22,000

22,000

22,000

22,000

Sequoia Refining Co.

27,000

26,000

26,000

25,000*

25,000*

25,000*

25,000*

25,000*

1,235

1,300

Toscopeto Corp.

26,500

25,500

25,500

22,000

22,000

22,000

22,000

22,000

20,000

20,000

16,000

Derby Refining Co.

25,500

25,500

25,300

24,800

23,800

23,400

21,500

21,500

21,500

21,500

21,500

Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp.

24,370

14,670

12,140

12,140

12,110

11,470

10,050

9,850

9,350

9,190

8,720

LaGloria Oil & Gas Co.

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

Atlas Processing Co.

23,250

18,500

18,500

18,500

18,500

18,500

18,500

18,500

18,500

17,500

17,500

Navajo Refining Co.

18,200

16,500

16,500

16,500

16,500

16,500

16,000

16,000

15,500

15,500

15,500

OKC Refining, Inc.

18,200

17,300

17,300

17,300

19,000

19,000

18,600

19,000

19,000

19,000

19,000

Midland Cooperatives

17,740

17,740

16,301

16,165

16,167

16,165

15,560

15,475

14,100

13.640

12,195

The Refinery Corp.

17,500

16,000*

12,000

11,500

11,500

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

10,000

Southland Oil Co .

17,400

15,100

13,200

8,000

8,000

8,500

8,500

8,500

8,500

8,300

8,300

Bay Refining Co.

17,000

17,000

17,000

15,000

15,000

15,000

15,000

22,000

22,000

23,000

22,000

Mohawk Petroleum Corp., Inc.

17,000

17,000

20,500

20,500

20,500

21,000

20,500

20,500

20,500

17,155

12,500

San Joaquin Refining Co.

17,000

10,000

Witco Chemical Co., Inc.

16,350

25,350

24,950

26,750

19550

19,550

26,450

26,450

26,450

26,450

23,300

U.S. Oil & Refining Co.

16,000

12,500

12,500

12,500

12,500

12,500

12,500

12,500

12,500

12,500

12,500

Fletcher Oil & Refining Co.

15,200

14,000

12,000

12,000

12,000

14,000

14,000

14,000

9,615

9,615

9,615

1,300*

—
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Table A.3

(continued)

Petroleum Companies Controlling Less Than 30,000 Barrels
of Daily Refining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

Edgington Oil Co.

15,000

15,000

15,000

15,000

16,000

16,000

Hunt Oil Co.

15,000

14,750

14,000

8,200

9,000

Indiana Farm Bureau

15,000*

12,500

12,500

12,500

Pennzoil Co.

15,000

15,000

14,000

Little America Refining Co.

14,500

14,500

Macmillan Ring-Free Oil Co.

14,500*

West Coast Oil Co,.

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

16,000*

16,000*

16,000*

8,425

8,200

9,000

9,000

9,000

9,000

9,000

8,000

12,500

12,800

12,500

12,500

12,200

12,200

12,200

14,000

14,000

14,000

14,000

14,000

14,000

14,000

14,000

13,500

13,500

13,500

15,000*

14,400

14,400

14,400

14,400

14,400

14,400

14,400

13,400

13,700

12,700

13,000

11,750

10,000

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

Alabama Refining Co.

12,600

12,500

13,000

13,000

12,500

10,000

—

Beacon Oil Co.

12,000

11,375

11,375

11,375

11,375

11,375

11,375

10,950

10,000

10,000

10,000

Fort Worth Refining Co.

12,000

12,000

12,000

12,000

12,000

12,000

10,500

10,500

Kern County Refining Co.

12,000

12,000

12,000

12,000

12,000

12,000

12,000

Oseceda Refining Co.

10,000*

8,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

8,600*

6,500

—

8,000*

—

—

—

5,000*

5,000*

5,000*

5,000

5,000

Good Hope Refining Co.

9,000

9,000

10,000*

Pride Refining Inc.

9,000*

8,500

8,500

5,500

5,500

5,500

5,300

5,000

3,230

3,230

2,900

Union Texas Petroleum

9,000

9,000

8,150

8,150

8,150

8,150

8,150

8,150

8,150

7,600

7,600

Sunland Refining Corp.

8,500

8,500

8,350

5,350

5,350

5,350

5,350

5,350

5,350

4,500

4,500

Carson Oil Co.

6,900

6,900

7,000*

Caribou’s Four Corners, Inc.

6,500

6,500

4,970

5,020

4,490

5,000

4,500*

3,200

3,000*

Newhall Refining Co., Inc.

6,500*

6,500*

6,500

6,500*

6,500*

6,500*

6,200

4,500

4,000

3,400

3,400

Cotton Valley Solvents

6,442

7,600

6,201

8,000*

8,000*

7,600

7,600

7,600

7,600

4,750

4,750

Crystal Refining Co.

6,200

6,200

6,200

6,200

3,300

6,200

6,200

6,200

6,200

6,200

6,200

Lajet, Inc.

6,000

6,000*

6,000

—

Tonkawa Refining Co.

6,000

6,000

6,000

6,000

6,000

7,500

—

—

—
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Table A.3

(coitinued)

Petroleum Companies Controlling less Than 30,000 Barrels
of Daily Refining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963
4,500

Laketon Asphalt Refining

5,500

6,000*

6,000*

6,000

6,000

5,500

5,000*

4,500

4,500

4,500

American Gilsonite Co.

5,450

5,450

5,450

5,600

5,400

5,400

6,050*

6,050*

6,050*

5,050*

Plateau Inc.

5,100

5,100

5,100

4,100

4,100

2,400

2,300

2,500

2,400

2,300

2,300

Adobe Refining Co.

5,000

5,500

5,500

5,500

5,000

5,000

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,500

3,000

Cross Oil & Refining Co.

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

3,350

3,830

3,600

3,500

3,600

3,800

Longview Refining Co.

5,000

5,000

5,000*

5,000*

5,500

4,500

—

Lunday-Thagard Oil Co.

5,000

5,000

3,600

2,600

4,000*

North American Petro. Corp.

5,000

5,000*

5,000

4,300

4,300

3,800

3,600

3,600

5,700

5,700

5,700

Seminole Asphalt Refining Co.

5,000

3,000

3,100

3,100

3,100

3,100

3,000

3,000

3,000

2,950

2,850

Westland Oil Co.

5,000*

3,300

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

2,500

2,500

2,400

2,500

Big West Oil Co.

4,827

4,384

6,000

5,700

5,700

2,850

2,850

2,850

2,850

2,700

2,850

Lakeside Refining Co.

4,750

4,000

4,000

4,000*

4,000

4,000*

4,000*

4,000*

4,000

4,275

4,275

Farmariss Oil Corp.

4,500*

4,420

4,420

4.420

4,420

4,420

1,970

1,675

1,675

1,675

1,675

Allied Materials Corp.

4,500

4,500

4,500

4,500

4,500

4,500

4,500

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

Sound Refining Co.

4,300

4,500

4,500

4,500

4,500

2,850

—

Evangeline Refining Co.

4,000

4,000*

4,500

3,600

4,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,315

2,000

Westro Refining Co.

3,982

3,500

3,900

3,800

3,800

3,800

3,800

3,800

3,800

3,800

3,800

Gladieux Refining, Inc.

3,500

3,000

6,500

3,000

3,500*

3,000*

3,000*

3,000*

3,500*

2,850

2,470

Bayou State Oil Corp.

3,500

3,250*

1,500*

1,000

1,000

800

800

800

Howell Hydrocarbons

3,000

3,300

3,300

3,300

3,300

3,500*

4,500*

3,500*

3,000

3,325

3,325

Mid American Refining Co.

3,000

3,000

3,000

3,200

2,900

3,000

2,950

2,950

2,800

2,850

2,850

Petroleum Refining Co.

3,000*

3,000*

3,000*

3,000*

3,000*

3,000

3,000

3,000

3,000

2,500

2,500

Vulcan Asphalt Refining Co.

3,000

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,200

2,200

2,200

—

—

920

800

800
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Table A.3

(continued)

Petroleum Companies Controlling Less Than 30,000 Barrels
of Daily Relining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

Canal Refining Co.

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,400

1,700

1,700

1,700

1,700

1,700

1,700

1,700

Spruce Oil Corp.

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,200

2,800

2,800

2,800

2,800

2,800

2,800

2,800

Calument Refining Co.

2,400

2,200

2,200

2,400*

2,400

2,000

1,900

1,900

1,900

1,900

1,900

Young Refining Co.

2,300

2,000

2,000*

4,000*

3,000*

2,500*

2,000

2,000

1,500

2,000

1,500

Edington Oxnard Refinery

2,500*

2,250

2,500

2,500

2,550*

2,500*

2,500

2,500

2,500

700

2,375

Warrier Asphalt Co.

2,200

2,200

1,770

1,770

1,770

1,770

1,770

1,770

1,770

1,770

1,600

Wolfshead Oil Refining Co.

2,050

2,050

2,500

2,020

2,020

2,020

2,020

2,020

2,020

2,150

2,150

Eddy Refining Co.

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

Texas Asphalt & Refining Co.

2,000

2,500

2,100

2,000

2,000

2,000*

4,750

4,750

4,750

4,750

4,750

Berry Petroleum Co.

1,530

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,500

3,300

2,830

3,300

3,300

3,300

3,325

Summerset Refinery, Inc.

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

2,925

2,850

2,850

2,850

2,850

2,850

Three Rivers Refining Co.

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

Wireback Oil Co.

1,500

1,500*

1,200

1,200

1,200

1,200*

1,200

1,200

1,200

1,200

1,200

Flint Chemical Co.

1,200

1,200

1,200

1,000

1,000

1,000

800

800

800

800

800

Thriftway Oil Co.

1,200

—

Jetfuel Refining Co.

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

Yetter Oil Co.

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

950

500*

500

500

500

500

—

300

200*

200*

—

Sage Creek Refining Co.

Mountaineer Refining Co.

200*
50

+Figures represent refinery capacity as controlled on January 1,

1973,

irrespective of transfers of ownership.

*Barrels per stream day rather than barrels per calendar day.

Source:

Annual

refinery numbers of the Oil

and Gas Journal

for the years presented.
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Table A.4
Relining Capacity No Longer Utilized
by January 1, 1973+
1973

American Oil Co. - Ark.

—

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

30,000

43,600

43,600

43,600

43,600

39,400

38,700

38,700

38,700

38,700

Pennsylvania Refining Co.

A

1,350

1,600

1,430

1,260

1,375

1,375

1,375

1,850

1,350

1,350

Diamond Asphalt Co.

A

1,100

1,500*

1,500*

1,500*

1,500*

2,500*

2,500*

2,500

1,000

1,000

Morrison Refining Co.

A

700

700

700

700

700

—

Utility Refining Co.

—

8,000

8,000

8,000

8,100

8,200

7,125

7,125

7,125

5,000

Monarch Refining Co.

—

3,500

3,500

3,300

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,900

4,000

4,000

Anderson Refining Corp.

—

2,400

2,400

2,400

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,250

1,200

Newton Petroleum Enterprise

—

500

800

—

American Oil Co. - Kan.

—

30,800

30,800

30,800

30,800

30,600

30,600

30,600

30,600

Golden Eagle Refining Inc.

—

9,500

9,500

9,500

9,000

9,000

9,000

9,500

8,000

Howell Refining Corp.

—

8,100

8,100

10,000

6,500*

4,000*

4,000*

4,750

4,750

Bayou Refining Co., Inc.

—

7,300

7,200

7,200

Southern Minerals Corp.

—

5,000*

5,000*

R. J. Oil & Refinery Co., Inc.

—

4,800

4,500

4,900

4,700

4,500

4,500

4,500

4,800

Ida Gasoline Co.

—

950

950

950

950

950

600

600

5,000

5,000

5,000

5,000

4,275

10,000

10,000

10,000

9,500

10,000

Empire State Oil Co.

—

5,000*

—

—

5,000*

600

Naph Sol Refinery

—

Nevada Refining, Inc.

—

1,500*

Pana Refining Co.

—

6,500

6,500

5,500

5,500

5,000

5,000

Lubio Oil & Refining Co.

—

5,000

5,000

3,500

—

1,500

1,500

Delta Terminal Co.

—

4,000*

4,000*

—

Tydall Co.

—

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

1,900

1,900

Rado Refining Co.

—

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,500

1,425

Lamar Refining

—

1,050

1,000

1,000

—

Petroleum Industries

—

2,000

2,000*

2,000

1,900

Refinery Sales

—

2,000

10,000

—

omitted

—

2,000
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Table A.4

(continued)

Refining Capacity No Longer Utilized
by January 1, 1973+
1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

Vickers Refinery

—

15,000

15,000

15,000

Premier Oil Co.

—

13,900

15,300

19,000

Berry Refining Co.

—

13,000

13,800

13,300

Petroleum Specialties

—

5,000

6,000

6,000

Oriental Refining

—

4,215

4,215

4,215

American Bitumals - Wash.

—

3,200

3,200

3,200

Danaho Refining Co.

—

9,500

9,500

Socal Oil & Refining Co:.

—

4,750

5,000

Wyandott Chemical

—

2,380

2,380

Bryson Pipeline

—

2,000

2,000

Waskom Natural Gas

—

2,000

2,000

North Star Refining Co.

—

700

—

& H. Refining Co.

—

200

200

Pontiac Eastern

—

16,500

Kent Distribution

—

3,500

Advance Refining Co.

—

3,000

Great Western

—

2,500

Trumball Asphalt Co.

—

2,000

C.

+Figures represent refinery capacity as controlled on January 1,

1973,

irrespective of transfers of ownership.

öRefinery shut down but operable.

*Barrels per stream day rather than barrels per calendar day.

Source:
Annual refinery numbers of the Oil and Gas Journal for the years presented.

APPENDIX B

APPLICATION OF A t TEST FOR SLOPES
OF REGRESSION LINES TO OKLAHOMA
REGULAR GASOLINE PRICES
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Part I of this appendix presents the formulas to be
utilized in the t tests,

and will develop modifications

which allow utilization of the regression table.

Part II is

devoted to testing the appropriateness of price-level

adjustments and Part III tests the original price data

before and after the introduction of the oil-import changes
in March,

1959.

Part I .

The following equations are used.1

B. 1

s2
s
2yxp -

B.2a

s2y1X =

B.2b

s2

s2 y2x

B. 3

t =

(n-2)s2y1x + ( n2- 2 ) s 2 y2 X

+ n2 - 4

n1
n1-

1

(sy12_b12sX12)

n2- 2
n2-1

n 2 -2 (sy22 - b22Sx22)
b1

Syxp

1

-

b2

(n1-1) sx12

+

1

(n2-1) sx22

Equation B.3 is designed to test the null hypothesis
H: B1 - B2 = 0.

This hypothesis should be rejected if t is

significantly different from zero (df = n1+ n2- 4).

The following table is utilized to provide
simplification of the computation when computer-generated

least-squares regression output is the input to the t test.2

1Wilfred J. Dixon and Frank J. Massey, Jr.,
Introduction to Statistical Analysis (3rd ed.; New York:
McGraw Hill, Inc., 1969), pp. 208-09.

2James E. Wert, Charles D. Neidt, and J. Stanley
Ahmann, Statistical Methods in Educational and Psychological
Research
(New York: Appleton - Century - Crofts , Inc., 1954)
p. 236.
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Table B.1

General Values on the Regression Table

Source of
Variation

Residuals

n-2

Σy2-

Totals

n-1

Σy2

Given b1 =

Σxy

(Σxy)2
Σx2

(Exy)2

Σx2

n-2

Σy2
n-1

(Exv)2 = S. S.
Σx2

regression

Σxy = S.

S.

regression

S.

S.

b1

Σy2 -

and (n - 1) sX12 = Σx12

Σx2

then :

(Σxy)2
Ex2

(Σxy)2
Σx2

1

Regression

Mean
Square

Sum of
Squares

Degrees of
Freedom

Σxy =
(Σxy)2 =

S.

(S.

regression
regression)2
b12

S.

(Ex.2) S. S.

Σx12 =

by substitution

b1

and:(Σx12) S.

Σx1 2 =

from table

(S.S.

regression = (Σxy)2

regression =
regr)2

b12

S.S.

b12

regr.

(S. S.

b12

1

S.S.

regr.

regr)2

by

substitution
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and:

by substitution

Given: the previous formulas and the Mean Square Residual
definition from the table, prove that the cross
variance
Mean Square Residual

formula B.2a

by
substitution

by substitution

(mean square residual),

by definition
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Given formula B.l:

Simplify if s2y1x = mean square residual

The following formulas are simplified versions of
previous formulas needed for the t test:
B.4

sx12 -

B.5

s2ysp =

Part II.

Two separate t tests must be applied to test

the appropriateness of price-level adjustments prior to the
analysis of price data when there is an indication of price
suppression.

Two tests are required since it is suspected

that a significant change has taken place between the two
sets of data.

The pre-1965 data sets (Tables B.2 and B.3

will be tested in section IIa and the post-1964 data sets

will be tested in section IIb.
IIa.

The tabulated results of the least-squares

regression for the pre-1965 data follows:
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Table B.2
Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices for Regular Grade Gasoline
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Price
Pre-1965 +
Jan .

1955
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s

1956
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s
1957
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s

1958
X
Origial Price
% of Base Month’s
1959
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s
1960
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s
1961
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s
1962
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s

Price

—

Feb .

Ma r .

—

—

Apr.

May

June

July

Aug .

—

—

—

—

—

Oct.

No v .

33
11.25
100.0

34
11.25
100.0

35
11.25
100.0

36
11.25
100.0

Sept .

Dec .

Price

37
11.25
100.0

38
11.25
100.0

39
11.33
100.7

40
11.38
101.2

41
11.73
104.3

42
11.88
105.6

43
11.88
105.6

44
11.88
105.6

45
11.88
105.6

46
11.76
104.5

47
11.63
103.4

48
11.63
103.4

Price

49
12.27
109.1

50
12.63
112.3

51
12.63
112.3

52
12.63
112.3

53
12.63
112.3

54
12.41
110.3

55
12.01
106.8

56
12.00
106.7

57
12.11
107.6

58
12.13
107.8

59
12.13
107.8

60
12.13
107.8

Price

61
12.38
110.0

62
12.28
109.2

63
12.15
108.0

64
12.00
106.7

65
12.00
106.7

66
12.25
108.9

67
12.57
111.7

68
12.88
114.5

69
12.88
114.5

70
12.76
113.4

71
12.50
111. 1

72
12.50
111.1

Price

73
12.48
110.9

74
12.38
110.0

75
12.57
111.7

76
12.75
113.3

77
12.63
112.3

78
12.32
109.5

79
12.08
107.4

80
12.62
112.2

81
12.55
111. 6

82
12.00
106.7

83
11.86
105.4

84
11.56
102.8

Price

85
11.15
99.1

86
11.34
100.8

87
11.82
105.1

88
12.00
106.7

89
11.60
103.1

90
12.17
108.2

91
12.73
113.2

92
13.30
118.2

93
13.38
118.9

94
13.38
118.9

95
13.38
118.9

96
13.38
118.9

Price

97
13.38
118.9

98
13.38
118.9

99
13.38
118.9

100
13.38
118.9

101
12.99
115.5

102
13.13
116.7

103
13.13
116.7

104
12.92
114.8

105
11.88
105.6

106
11.88
105.6

107
12.00
106.7

108
12.22
108.6

Price

109
12.34
109.7

110
11.26
100.1

111
10.84
96.4

112
12.64
112.4

113
12.91
114.8

114
13.00
115.6

115
13.00
115.6

116
13.00
115.6

117
13.00
115.6

118
13.00
115.6

119
13.00
115.6

120
12.77
113.5
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Table B.2

Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices for Regular-Grade Gasoline
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Price
Pre-1965 + (continued)

1963
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s

1964
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s

*September

Jan .

Feb .

Ma r .

Apr .

Price

121
12.10
107.6

122
11.64
103.5

123
12.00
106.7

124
12.48
110.9

Price

133
11.63
103.4

134
11.63
103.4

135
11.51
102.3

136
11.41
101.4

1955

+From September 1955 through November

1964

May

Nov .

Dec .

130
12.23
108.7

131
11.00
97.8

132
11.57
102.8

142
11.31
100.5

143
12.04
107.0

—

June

July

Aug .

Sept.

Oct.

125
12.75
113.3

126
13.06
116.1

127
12.94
115.0

128
12.19
108.4

129
11.8
104.9

137
11.63
103.4

138
11.63
103.4

139
11.63
103.4

140
11.63
103.4

141
10.83
96.3
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Table B.3

Wholesale Price Index (All Commodities) as Prepared by the United States Department
of Labor, as Adjusted to the 1947-49 Base Period, and Presented
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Index Value.
Pre-1965 +
Jan.

1955
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
Z of Base Month’s Index Value

—

Feb .

Mar .

—

Apr .

—
—

May

—

June

July

--

—

Aug .

—

Oct.

Nov.

Dec .

33
111. 7
111. 7
100.0

34
111. 6
111. 6
99.9

35
111. 2
111.2
99.6

36
111. 3
111.3
99.6

Sept .

1956
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
% of Base Month’s Index Value

37
111.9
111.9
100.2

38
112.4
112.4
100.6

39
112.8
112.8
101.0

40
113.6
113.6
101.7

41
114.4
114.4
102.4

42
114.2
114.2
102.2

43
114.0
114.0
102.1

44
114.7
114.7
102.7

45
115.5
115.5
103.4

46
115.6
115.6
103.5

47
115.9
115.9
103.8

48
116.3
116.3
104.1

1957
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
Z of Base Month’s Index Value

49
116.9
116.9
104.7

50
117.0
117.0
104.7

51
116.9
116.9
104.7

52
117.2
117.2
104.9

53
117.1
117.1
104.8

54
117.4
117.4
105.1

55
118.2
118.2
105.8

56
118.4
118.4
106.0

57
118.0
118.0
105.6

58
117.8
117.8
105.5

59
118.1
118.1
105.7

60
118.5
118.5
106.1

1958
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
Z of Base Month’s Index Value

61
118.9
118.9
106.4

62
119.0
119.0
106.5

63
119.7
119.7
107.2

64
119.3
119.3
106.8

65
119.5
119.5
107.0

66
119.2
119.2
106.7

67
119.2
119.2
106.7

68
119.1
119.1
106.6

69
119.1
119.1
106.6

70
119.0
119.0
106.5

71
119.2
119.2
106.7

72
119.2
119.2
106.7

1959
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
Z of Base Month’s Index Value

73
119.5
119.5
107.3

74
119.5
119.5
107.0

75
119.6
119.6
107.1

76
120.0
120.0
107.4

77
119.9
119.9
107.3

78
119.7
119.7
107.2

79
119.5
119.5
107.0

80
119.1
119.1
106.6

81
119.7
119.7
107.2

82
119.1
119.1
106.6

83
118.9
118.9
106.4

84
118.9
118.9
106.4

1960
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
Z of Base Month’s Index Value

85
119.3
119.3
106.8

86
119.3
119.3
106.8

87
120.0
120.0
107.4

88
120.0
120.0
107.4

89
119.7
119.7
107.2

90
119.5
119.5
107.0

91
119.7
119.7
107.2

92
119.2
119.2
106.7

93
119.2
119.2
106.7

94
119.6
119.6
107.1

95
119.6
119.6
107.1

96
119.5
119.5
107.0

1961
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
Z of Base Month’s Index Value

97
119.9
119.9
107.3

98
101.0
120.0
107.4

99
101.0
120.0
107.4

100
100.5
119.4
106.9

101
100.0
118.8
106.3

102
99.5
118.2
105.8

103
99.9
118.7
106.2

104
100.0
119.0
106.5

105
100.0
118.8
106.3

106
100.0
118.8
106.3

107
100.0
118.8
106.3

108
100.4
119.3
106.8
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Table B.3
Wholesale Price index (All Commodities) as Prepared by the United States Department
of Labor, as Adjusted to the 1947-49 Base Period, and Presented
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Index Value.
Pre—1965 + (continued)
Jan

Feb

Mar .

Apr .

May

June

July

Aug .

Sept.

Oct .

Nov.

Dec .

1962
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
% of Base Month’s Index Value

109
100.8
119.7
107.2

110
100.7
119.6
107.1

111
100.7
119.6
107.1

112
100.4
119.3
106.8

113
100.2
119.0
106.6

114
110.0
130.7
117.0

115
100.4
119.3
106.8

116
100.5
119.4
106.9

117
101.2
120.2
107.6

118
100.6
119.5
107.0

119
100.7
119.6
107.1

120
100.4
119.3
106.8

1963
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
% of Base Month’s Index Value

121
100.5
119.4
106.9

122
100.2
119.0
106.6

123
99.9
118.7
106.2

124
99.7
118.4
106.0

125
100.0
118.8
106.3

126
100.3
119.1
106.7

127
100.6
119.5
107.0

128
100.4
119.3
106.8

129
100.3
119.1
106.7

130
100.5
119.4
106.9

131
100.7
119.6
107.1

132
100.3
119.1
106.7

1964
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
% of Base Month’s Index Value

133
101.0
120.0
107.4

134
100.5
119.4
106.9

135
100.4
119.3
106.8

136
100.3
119.1
106.7

137
100.1
118.9
106.5

138
100.0
118.8
106.3

139
100.4
119.3
106.8

140
100.3
119.1
106.7

141
100.7
119.6
107.1

142
100.8
119.7
107.2

143
100.7
119.6
107.1

*September 1955
+From September 1955 through November 1964

——
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Table B.4
Regression Table for Wholesale Price Index
as a Percentage of the Base Month Index
September 1955 to October 1964
Degrees of
Freedom

Mean
Square

Source of
Variation

Sum of
Squares

Regression

207.945

1

Residual

324.055

109

2.97928

Totals

532

110

4.83636

F = 69.9449

Coefficient of Determination =

.390874

=

.625199

Coefficient of Correlation

Standard Error of Estimate

= 1.72423

n1= 111
When the volume of x is 33 then y is 103.661
When the volume of x is 143 then y is 108.36

Coefficients
B(0) = 102.251

B(1) =

.0427172

207.945
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Table B.5

Regression Table for Wholesale Gasoline Prices
as a Percentage of the Base Month Price
September 1955 to November 1964
Source of
Variation

Sum of
Squares

Regression

46.5005

Residual
Totals

Mean
Square

Degrees of
Freedom

1

46.5005

3744.5

109

34.3532

3741

110

34.4636

F = 1.3536
Coefficient of Determination =

Coefficient of Correlation =

.012266

.110752

Standard error of estimate 5.86116
n1= 111

When the value of x is 33 then y is 107.465

When the value of x is 143 then y is 109.687
Coefficients

B(0) = 106.798
B(1) =

.0202

sx12 = 1036.0109
sx22 = 1036.1073

s2yxp = 18.663096
Syxp = 4.32008
t = 1.241
With 218 degress of freedom t is not significantly

different from zero and therefore the slopes of the
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regression curves must be accepted as similar.

II b.

The tabulated results of the least-squares

regression for the post-1964 data (Tables B.8 and B.9)
covering the relative comparison of Oklahoma wholesale
gasoline prices with corresponding comparable percentages of

the wholesale price index (all commodities) follow:

Table B.6

Regression Table for Wholesale-Price-Level Indexes
as a Percentage of the Base Month Index
December 1964 to December 1972

Mean
Square

Source of
Variation

Sum of
Squares

Regression

6546.79

1

6546.79

Residual

285.215

95

3.00226

Totals

6832

96

71.16667

Degrees of
Freedom

F = 2180.62
Coefficient of Determination =

.958253

Coefficient of Correlation

=

.978904

Standard Error of Estimate

= 1.7327

n1 = 97

When the value of x is 144 then y is 105.463
When the value of x is 240 then y is 133.63

Coefficients

B(0) = 63.2124
B(1) =

.293407
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Table B.7

Regression Table for Oklahoma Wholesale Gasoline
Prices as a Percentage of the Base Month Price
December 1964 to December 1972
Source of
Variation

Sum of
Squares

Regression

406.647

1

406.647

Residual

734.353

95

7.73003

Totals

1141

96

11.88542

Degrees of
Freedom

Mean
Square

F = 52.6062

Coefficient of Determination =
Coefficient of Correlation =

.356396

.596989

n2 = 97

When the value of x is 144 then y is 106.903
When the value of x is 240 then y is 113.523
Coefficients

B(0) = 95.9733
B(0) =

.0731249

sX12 = 792.16669
sX22 = 792.17277
s2yxp = 5.3661473

Syxp = 2.31649
t = 18.572906
With 190 degrees of freedom t is definitely different

from zero at the 99 percent confidence level and therefore
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Table B.8
Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices for Regular-Grade Gasoline
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Price
Post-1964 +
Jan
1964
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s
1965
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s

1966
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s
1967
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s

1968
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s
1969
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s

1970
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s
1971
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s

—

Feb

Mar .

—

—

Price

Apr .

—

May

--

June

--

July

—

Aug .

Sept.

Oct.

—

__

—

Nov.

—

Dec .

144
12.25
108.9

Price

145
12.25
108.9

146
12.25
108.9

147
12.25
108.9

148
12.25
108.9

149
12.25
108.9

150
12.25
108.9

151
12.25
108.9

152
12.08
107.4

153
11.95
106.2

154
12.25
108.9

155
12.25
108.9

156
12.25
108.9

Price

157
12.25
108.9

158
12.25
108.9

159
12.25
108.9

160
12.25
108.9

161
12.25
108.9

162
12.25
108.9

163
12.25
108.9

164
12.25
108.9

165
12.25
108.9

166
12.25
108.9

167
12.25
108.9

168
12.25
108.9

Price

169
12.25
108.9

170
12.37
110.0

171
12.38
110.0

172
12.38
110.0

173
12.38
110.0

174
12.38
110.0

175
12.38
110.0

176
12.38
110.0

177
12.38
110.0

178
12.38
110.0

179
12.38
110.0

180
12.52
111.3

Price

181
11.33
100.7

182
11.59
103.0

183
11.90
105.8

184
11.99
106.6

185
11.62
103.3

186
11.88
105.6

187
11.88
105.6

188
11.88
105.6

189
11.88
105.6

190
11.69
103.9

191
11.63
103.4

192
11.64
103.5

Price

193
11.77
104.6

194
11.75
104.4

195
12.48
110.9

196
12.44
110.6

197
12.29
109.2

198
12.22
108.6

199
12.09
107.5

200
12.28
109.2

201
12.18
108.3

202
12.17
108.2

203
12.25
108.9

204
12.29
109.2

Price

205
12.10
107.6

206
12.09
107.5

207
12.00
106.7

208
12.69
112.8

209
12.67
112.6

210
12.54
111 . 5

211
12.70
112.9

212
12.71
113.0

213
12.66
112.5

214
12.66
112.5

215
12.73
113.2

216
13.24
117.7

Price

217
13.16
117.0

218
12.95
115.1

219
12.80
113.8

220
12.49
111.9

221
13.13
116.7

222
12.98
115.4

223
12.88
114.5

224
12.88
114.5

225
12.81
113.9

226
12.75
113.3

227
12.75
113.3

228
12.75
113.3
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Table B.8
Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices for Regular-Grade Gasoline
as a Percentage of the Base Month’s* Prices
Post-1964 + (continued)

1972
X
Original Price
% of Base Month’s

*September

Price

Jan.

Feb .

Mar .

Apr .

229
12.73
113.2

230
12.62
112.2

231
12.67
112.6

232
12.88
114.5

1955

+From December

1964

through December

1972

May

233
12.88
114.5

June

July

Aug .

234
12.88
114.5

235
12.88
114.5

236
12.88
114.5

Sept.
237
12.88
114.5

Oct .

Nov.

Dec .

238
12.88
114.5

239
12.88
114.5

240
12.88
114.5
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Table B.9

Wholesale Price Index (All Commodities) as Prepared by the United States Department
of Labor, as Adjusted to the 1947-49 Base Period, and Presented
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Index Value
Post-1964 +

Jan.

1964
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
% of Base Month’s Index Value

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

Feb.

Mar.

—

—

—

Apr.

—

May

June

—

,—

July

—

Aug.

—

Sept.

Oct.

—

—

Nov.

—

Dec.

144
100.7
119.6
107.1

X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
% of Base Month’s Index Value

145
101.0
120.0
107.4

146
101.2
120.2
107.6

147
101.3
120.3
107.7

148
101.7
120.8
108.2

149
102.1
121.3
108.6

150
102,8
122.1
109.3

151
102.9
122.2
109.4

152
102.9
122.2
109.4

153
103.0
122.4
109.5

154
103.1
122.5
109.6

155
103.5
122.9
110.1

156
104.1
123.7
110.7

X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
7, of Base Month’s Index Value

157
104.6
124.3
111.2

158
105.4
125.2
112.1

159
105.4
125.2
112.1

160
105.5
125.3
112.2

161
105.6
125.4
112.3

162
105.7
125.6
112.4

163
106.4
126.4
113.2

164
106.1
126.0
112.8

165
106.8
126.9
113.6

166
106.2
126.2
112.9

167
105.9
125.8
112.6

168
105.9
125.8
112.6

X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
% of Base Month’s Index Value

169
106.2
126.2
112.9

170
106.0
125.9
112.7

171
105.7
125.6
112.4

172
105.3
125.1
112.0

173
105.8
125.7
112.5

174
106.3
126.3
113.0

175
106.5
126.5
113.3

176
106.1
126.0
112.8

177
106.2
126.2
112.9

178
106.1
126.0
112.8

179
106.2
126.2
112.9

180
106.8
126.9
113.6

X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
% of Base Month’s Index Value

181
107.2
127.3
114.0

182
108.0
128.3
114.9

183
108.2
128.5
115.1

184
108.3
128.6
115.2

185
108.5
128.9
115.4

186
108.7
129.1
115.6

187
109.1
129.6
116.0

188
108.7
129.1
115.6

189
109.1
129.6
116.0

190
109.1
129.6
116.0

191
109.6
130.2
116.6

192
109.8
130.4
116.8

X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-40 Base
% of Base Month’s Index Value

193
110.7
131.5
117.7

194
111.1
132.0
118.1

195
111.7
132.7
118.8

196
111.9
132.9
119.0

197
112.8
134.0
120.0

198
113,2
134.5
120.4

199
113.3
134.6
120.5

200
113.4
134.7
120.6

201
113.6
134.9
120.8

202
114.0
135.4
121.2

203
114.7
136.2
122.0

204
108.5
136.7
122.4

X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-40 Base
% of Base Month’s Index Value

205
109.3
137.7

206
109.7
138.2

207
109.9
138.5

208
109.9
138.5

209
110.1
138.7

210
110.3
139.0

211
110.9
139.7

212
110.5
139.2

213
111.0
139.9

214
111.0
139.9

215
110.9
139.7

216
111.0
139.9

123.3

123.8

124.0

124.0

124.2

124.4

125.1

124.7

125.2

125.2

125.1

125.2
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Table B.9
Wholesale Price Index All Commodities) as Prepared by the United States Department
of Labor, as Adjusted to the 1947-49 Base Period and presented
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Index Value
Post-1964 (continued)

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct

Nov.

Dec.

1971
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
% of Base Month's Index Value

217
111.8
140.9
126.1

218
112.8
142.1
127.3

219
113.0
142.4
127.5

220
113.3
142.8
127.8

221
113.8
143.4
128.4

222
114.3
144.0
128.9

223
114.6
144.4
129.3

224
114.9
144.8
129.6

225
114.5
144.3
129.2

226
114.4
144.2
129.1

227
114.5
144.3
129.2

228
115.4
145.4
130.2

1972
X
Original Index Value
Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base
% of Base Month's Index Value

229
116.3
146.6
131.2

230
117.3
147.8
132.3

231
117.4
147.9
132.4

232
117.5
148.1
132.6

233
118.2
148.9
133.3

234
118.8
149.7
134.0

235
119.7
150.8
135.0

236
119.9
151.1
135.3

237
120.2
151.5
135.6

238
120.0
151.2
135.4

239
120.7
152.1
136.2

240
122.9
154.9
138.6

*September 1955

+From December 1964 through December 1972
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the slopes of the regression curves are not similar.

The

conclusion must be accepted that the wholesale price index

is inappropriate for this period.
Part III.

The tabulated results of the t test applied

to the comparison of the slopes of regression lines for
wholesale gasoline prices before and after the change in the

oil import program follow:

Table B.10
Regression Table for Oklahoma Wholesale Gasoline
Prices as a Percentage of the Base Month Price
September 1955 to August 1959

Mean
Square

Source of
Variation

Sum of
Squares

Regression

7,13256

1

7,13256

Residual

4,28932

46

.093246

47

.243019

Degrees of
Freedom

11,4219

Totals
F = 76.4918

Coefficient of Determination =

.624465

Coefficient of Correlation

=

.790231

Standard Error of Estimate

=

.305362

When the value of x is 78 then y is 12,706

n1 = 48

Coefficients

B(0) = 10.5355
B(1) =

.0278263
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Table B.11

Regression Table for Oklahoma Wholesale Gasoline
Prices as a Percentage of the Base Month Price
September 1960 to August 1964

Mean
Square

Degrees of
Freedom

Source of
Variation

Sum of
Squares

Regression

11.7411

1

Residual

14.8019

46

.32178

Total

26.543

47

.5547446

11.7411

F = 36.4879

Coefficient of Determination =

.442342

Coefficient of Correlation

=

.665088

Standard Error of Estimate

=

.567257

When the value of x is 93 then y is 13.2642

When the value of x is 140 then y is 11.5862
n2 = 48

Coefficients:

B(0) = 16.5643
B(1) = 3.57007

sX12 = 195.99198
sx22 = 196.00677
s2yxp =

Syxp =

.2075132

.455537

t = 9.46102
With 92 degrees of freedom, t is definitely from

zero at the 99 percent confidence level,

This fact implies

that the data are not from the same population even though
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it is known that the firms in the market place have not
changed appreciably and demand has increased over this time

interval.

APPENDIX C
IMPACT OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES' DISCRIMINATORY
PRICING ON PETROLEUM-REFINERY
PRODUCT PRICING
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192
Winter has historically been a slack season for the

electric utilities.

As a consequence,

their marketing

personnel have developed a successful promotional campaign

designed to induce homeowners to heat with electricity.
Coupled with this campaign was a materially reduced cost

based upon the marginal cost to the electric company.

In

addition to the rate reduction during the winter months,
those who heat with electricity have also received a

reduction in rate throughout the rest of the year.

The

author assumed that this reduction was justified on the

grounds of increased consumption at a single facility,
on the grounds of lower distribution costs.

i.e.,

Such an

assumption does not seem to hold true for commercial

deliveries of electrical power.

Although the average

commercial user consumes more electrical energy than the
average residential consumer,

the national average cost per

kilowatt-hour is more for the commercial user than for the

residential user.
Until a careful study is made of the current

situation,

these reasons for price discrimination all appear

logical applications of sound economic theory.

To study

the matter further it becomes necessary to examine both

sales to ultimate consumers and average revenue by type of

consumer.

In December,

1972,

the average revenue per

kilowatt-hour for the three natural divisions of ultimate
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consumers was as follows:1

1.
2.
3.

Residential users 1.73₡ per kwh.
Commercial users 1.95¢ per kwh.
Industrial users . 96¢ per kwh.
The reason for the favorable rate to industry is

made more clear when considered in the light of the
regulations imposed on electric utilities.

Since return on

investment is carefully controlled by regulatory agencies,

there are three ways to increase profit, considering only

revenue:

1.
2.
3.

Keep high-revenue projects out of the rate base.
Maintain low-revenue products in the rate base.
Increase the size of the rate base.

The telephone company has been rather successful in the
manipulation of methods 1 and 2 above,

i.e., setting up

subsidiaries and selling "special services" outside the
rate base.

Subsidiaries of American Telephone and Telegraph

control patents on touchtone phones, princess phones and
other special options available to subscribers outside the
rate base.

The electric utilities have not been successful in
this area of discriminatory pricing and as a consequence
have looked to an expanding rate base for their increases in

profit.

This constant attempt to expand the rate base has

produced repeated regular blackouts and brownouts in certain
areas of the country where total electric-generating

1Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics,
December, 1972.
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facilities have been overtaxed due to oversubscription of
customers.

In this context the action of the electric

utilities in reducing off-season rate, rather than
penalizing peak-load users,

is logical (to the industry)

because it will allow an expansion of the revenue base

rather than force a fight for higher returns on an existing
base.

Figure C.1 and Tables C.1 - C.4 present sales of

electrical energy to ultimate consumers during the last
seven years of the period under observation by months.

For

several consecutive years each winter's peak for

residential users exceeded the previous summer's high.

To get a clearer picture of what actually causes the

extreme summer consumption, Figure C.2 and Tables C.5 C.6 show total sales, total sales less residential sales,

and total sales less commercial sales.

This graph clearly

demonstrates that it is commercial sales that cause our high

summer consumption while the total sales less commercial
sales shows that the winter brownouts are due to residential

users' demands for heating.

The energy crisis as it

pertains to the generation of electrical energy is real and
has been caused in part by this frantic rush to sign up more

subscribers.

The current advertising (in effect for the

last several years) coupled with the discriminating rate for

home-heating purposes has added to the problem.

Logically, advertising for total-electric homes
should not be allowed if it is the utilization of the slack
season's idle capacity which allows the favorable rate since
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Figure C.1

Residential, Commercial, and Industrial Sales
of Electrical Energy 1966-1972

Source:
Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics.
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Table C.1

Electrical Consumption of Residential Users
1966 to 1972, in 000's of kwh
Month

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

January

28,333,064

31,245,157

34,640,452

39,034,709

42,543,533

February

28,481,154

29,326,152

33,024,336

36,281,014

March

26,709,969

28,892,683

32,119,489

April

24,390,597

26,400,500

May

22,979,361

June

1971

1972

44,554,043

46,250,689

40,035,784

43,166,376

45,592,560

35,152,272

37,303.178

40,654,399

43,537,422

28,428,208

31,856,319

34,920,695

37,476,533

40,427,733

25,363,327

26,690,874

28,916,852

32,896,086

34,671,705

38,057,805

24,013,471

26,608,040

29,065,310

31,737,003

35,165,414

34,493,566

• • • •

July

28,300,319

29,845,426

33,242,276

39,653,187

41,993,068

46,999,722

47,762,635

August

29,760,336

30,608,987

36,250,866

41,862,885

44,852,093

46,413,295

51,068,318

September

27,840,214

28,867,483

34,919,271

39,492,681

44,786,776

46,245,415

51,068,318

October

24,690,912

26,287,099

29,481,353

33,367,337

38,610,580

40,972,422

• . • •

November

24,511,883

26,669,604

29,154,495

32,275,506

34,730,517

38,017,401

41,667,137

December

27,602,394

30,217,486

33,443,250

36,629,282

39,160,586

41,950,273

47,049,438

Source:

Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics,

1966 to 1972.

.
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Table C.2

Electrical Consumption of Commerical Users
1966 to 1972, in 000,s of kwh
Month

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

January

16,733,145

18,371,584

20,220,517

22,091,419

24,128,646

25,881,162

27,888,043

February

16,721,017

17,941,450

19,906,518

21,579,076

23,753,326

25,683,107

27,929,036

March

16,736,551

18,187,108

19,828,646

21,394,201

23,419,890

25,276,675

27,846,161

April

16,633,207

17,934,138

19,338,266

21,060,966

23,237,928

24,888,597

27,750,530

May

16,966,155

17,976,926

19,955,537

21,540,677

24,110,730

24,915,553

27,981,038

June

18,648,654

19,777,118

21,675,517

23,781,204

26,125,928

27,561,982

• • • •

July

20,822,197

21,396,778

23,617,598

26,046,352

28,085,755

30,727,002

32,099,712

August

21,266,123

22,246,611

24,879,619

26,928,046

29,051,264

30,422,309

33,516,438

September

20,510,651

21,421,950

23,994,077

26,505,780

28,929,424

30,710,095

33,446,565

October

18,363,100

19,955,001

22,073,617

23,952,703

26,702,944

28,734,949

• • • •

November

17,490,169

18,953,507

20,835,718

22,619,679

24,338,757

27,099,684

29,365,704

December

17,912,834

19,307,562

21,079,286

23,040,283

24,776,338

27,005,474

29,668,956

Source:

Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics,

1966 to 1972.
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Table C.3
Electrical Consumption of Industrial Users
1966 to 1972 in 000's of kwh
Month

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

January

36,998,928

39,692,110

42,088,360

44,648,534

46,440,222

47,500,985

50,162,990

February

36,074,581

38,315,613

41,500,540

43,948,452

45,749,257

47,420,641

50,150,584

March

37,421,308

39,633,517

42,014,317

45,103,510

47,313,220

48,844,114

51,474,043

April

37,506,296

39,307,017

42,396,050

45,494,362

47,002,851

48,792,613

51,405,564

May

38,562,280

40,339,437

43,609,996

46,544,901

48,153,436

49,333,816

52,955,700

June

38,933,543

40,862,265

43,336,785

47,319,968

49,226,033

50,201,951

....

July

38,854,799

40,434,934

43,123,673

47,062,212

48,432,928

49,310,460

52,495,100

August

40,130,093

42,024,352

44,175,294

48,223,324

49,077,462

49,261,610

54,610,524

September

40,121,578

41,584,017

44,234,667

48,417,587

49,176,215

50,214,451

55,218,337

October

39,774,275

41,703,720

44,603,808

48,537,852

48,505,796

50,130,185

....

November

39,420,903

41,290,069

44,030,828

47,140,837

46,952,092

49,637,676

54,937,992

December

39,212,577

41,088,638

44,030,680

47,266,028

47,275,000

49,062,172

53,428,350

Source:

Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics,

1966 to 1972.
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Table C.4

Electrical Consumption of Total Ultimate Users
1966 to 1972, in 000's of kwh
Month

1966

1967

January

85,012,597

92,556,023

100,556,289

109,657,803

117,190,102

122,223,769

128,765,777

February

84,192,415

88,759,465

97,928,371

105,501,135

113,487,517

120,439,052

128,210,323

March

83,861,060

89,969,331

97,402,912

105,457,004

111,930,210

118,956,243

127,366,172

April

81,359,769

86,742,394

93,435,047

102,044,741

109,022,580

115,212,262

123,946,619

May

81,411,260

86,845,565

95,591,462

100,663,436

109,073,700

112,985,153

123,388,545

June

84,489,453

90,397,635

97,445,983

106,551,866

114,474,146

120,446,565

July

90,975,986

94,831,711

103,460,504

116,604,550

122,583,939

131,365,887

136,851,456

August

94,192,287

98,179,987

108,929,546

120,927,486

127,133,870

130,423,574

144,504,249

September

91,469,018

95,128,870

106,687,747

118,326,489

127,067,428

131,569,336

144,452,003

October

85,840,748

91,277,083

99,775,574

109,765,641

117,945,906

124,180,032

November

84,479,225

90,234,184

97,613,702

105,920,489

110,124,366

119,053,597

130,690,021

December

87,870,368

94,124,259

102,316,190

110,980,206

115,434,029

122,450,264

135,012,831

1968

1969

Source:

Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics,

1966 to 1972.

1970

1971

1972

• • * •

....
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Figure C.2
Selected Combinations of Electrical Consumption
1966 to 1972, in Billions of kwh

Source:
Tables C.1,

C.2,

and C.4.
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Table C.5

Total Electrical Consumption Less Commerical Use
1966 to 1972, in 000’s of kwh

Month

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

January

68,279,452

74,184,439

80,335,772

87,566,284

93,061,366

96,342,607

100,877,734

February

67,471,398

70,818,015

78,021,853

83,922,059

89,734,191

94,755,945

100,281,287

March

67,124,509

71,782,223

77,576,266

84,002,803

88,560,320

93,679,588

99,520,011

April

64,326,562

68,808,256

74,096,781

80,983,775

85,784,642

90,323,665

96,196,089

May

64,445,105

68,868,639

75,635,925

79,122,809

84,962,970

88,069,600

95,407,507

June

65,840,799

70,620,517

75,770,466

82,770,662

88,348,218

92,884,583

....

July

70,153,789

73,434,923

79,842,906

90,558,198

94,498,184

100,638,885

104,751,744

August

72,926,164

75,933,306

84,049,927

93,999,440

98,082,606

100,001,265

110,957,744

September

70,958,367

73,706,920

79,693,670

91,820,709

98,138,004

100,859,241

111,005,438

October

67,477,648

71,322,082

77,701,957

86,812,938

91,239,962

95,445,083

November

66,989,056

71,370,677

76,777,984

83,300,810

85,785,616

91,953,913

101,324,317

December

69,957,534

74,816,697

81,236,904

87,939,923

90,657,691

95,444,790

105,343,875

Source:
Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics,

1966 to 1972.

1972

....
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Table C.6

Total Electrical Consumption Less Residential Use
1966 to 1972, in 000's of kwh
Month

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

January

56,679,533

61,310,866

65,915,837

70,622,994

74,646,569

77,669,726

82,515,088

February

55,711,261

59,433,313

64,904,035

69,220,121

73,451,733

77,322,676

82,617,783

March

57,151,091

61,076,948

65,283,423

70,304,732

74,677,032

78,301,844

83,828,750

April

56,969,172

60,341,894

65,006,847

70,188,422

74,101,885

77,735,729

83,518,886

May

58,431,899

61,482,238

68,900,588

71,751,628

76,177,614

78,313,448

85,330,740

June

60,475,982

63,789,595

68,380,673

74,814,863

79,308,732

81,952,999

....

July

62,675,667

64,986,285

70,218,328

76,951,363

80,590,871

91,563,834

89,088,821

August

64,431,951

67,571,000

72,678,680

79,064,601

82,281,777

84,010,276

92,752,006

September

63,628,804

66,261,387

71,768,476

78,833,808

82,280,652

85,323,921

93,383,685

Octob er

61,149,836

64,989,984

70,294,221

76,398,304

79,335,326

83,207,610

• • • •

November

59,967,342

63,654,580

68,459,207

73,644,983

75,393,849

81,036,196

89,022,884

December

60,267,974

63,906,773

68,872,940

74,350,924

81,273,443

80,499,991

87,963,393

Source :
Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics,

1966 to 1972.
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the subscription of the same customer in the new home to
total electric consumption to further increase the summer

peak load clearly sets up a self-perpetuating slack period.
The illustrations demonstrate that in 1971 and 1972 the
residential sales considered alone reversed a previously

existing trend to balance the summer and winter peaks which
had almost been achieved (compare the summer of 1971 and
the winter of 1971).

APPENDIX D

BASIC PHASE IV PRICING FORMULA AND
COMPUTATION INSTRUCTION SHEETS
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BASIC PHASE IV. PRICING FORMULA
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Figure D.1
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Table D.1
COMPUTATION INSTRUCTION SHEET - APPLICATION OF FORMULA PER § 150.356
(A)
LINE
NO

1

(B)
MATH NOTATION
PER § 150.356

ck

(C)

DESCRIPTION

(F)

COMPUTATION

DOMESTIC
K= 1

IMPORTED
K=2

CRUDE PURCHASES
COST/BBL - PD OF
MEASUREMENT

COST/BBL BASE PERIOD

Qtk

BBLS - PERIOD
OF MEASUREMENT

4

Q°k

BBLS - BASE
PERIOD

5

ctk Qtk

6

Ck°Q°k

3

(E)

LINE NO.

Ck°

2

(D)

IN S - PERIOD
OF MEASUREMENT

1 X 3

IN $ - BASE
PERIOD

2X4

INCREASE
(DECREASE)

Ctk Qtk -

7

8

9

Ck
° Qk°

IN $
PURCHASES

5-6

Qkt-Q
°k

IN BBLS PURCHASED

3-4

AVERAGE COST/
BBL BASE PERIOD

6 / 4

VOLUME ADJUSTMENT
BASE PERIOD

9X8

7-10

x°

10

x °(Ok t -o k °)

11

A

NET CRUDE COST
PASS THROUGH

12

sn

TOTAL S SALES
PRIOR YR QTR.

(G)

TOTAL
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Table D.1 (continued)
(A)

LINE
NO

IB)

(C)

MATH NOTATION
PER § 150.356

DESCRIPTION

13

sin

S SALES BY
PRODUCT CLASS

14

Sin / sn

PRODUCT CLASS
ALLOCATORS

15

A

Sin

/sn

ALLOCATED CRUDE
PASS THROUGH

(D)

(E)

(F)

(G)

(HI

COMPU-

1 = 1
No. 2
HEATING OIL

1 = 2
GASOLINE

i = 3
No. 2 0
DIESEL
FUEL

i = 4
OTHER

TATION
LINE NO.

13 / 12

11 X 14

DOMESTIC
PURCHASES

16

17

18

19

20

21

Piit

COST/UNIT
PERIOD OF
MEASUREMENT

qiit

UNIT PERIOD
OF MEASUREMENT

S PERIOD OF
MEASUREMENT

pi t

Piio

qii°

Piio qiio

16 X 17

COST/UNIT
BASE PERIOD

UNIT BASE
PERIOD

$ BASE PERIOD

19 X 20
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Table D.1 (continued)
(B)

(C)

MATH NOTATION
PER § 150 356

DESCRIPTION

(a )

LINE
NO

(D)
COMPU

TATION
LINE NO.

(E)

(F)

(G)

(H)

1 = 1
No. 2
HEATING OIL

1 = 2
GASOLINE

1 = 3
No. 2 D
DIESEL
FUEL

1 = 4
OTHER

IMPORTED
purcha ses

22

Pi2t

COST/UNIT
PERIOD OF
MEASUREMENT

23

qi2t

UNITS PERIOD OF
MEASUREMENT

24

Pi2t qi2t

25

26

27

S PERIOD OF
MEASUREMENT

Pi2o

COST/UNIT
BASE PERIOD

qi2°

UNITS BASE
PERIOD

pi2o qi2o
pi2oqi2o

S BASE PERIOD

22 X 23

25 X 26

INCREASE
(DECREASE)

28

p il t

q12t -

pil°il°q

pi2t qi2t29

Pi2oqi2o

30

pit-pioqio)

31

qiit-q°

IN S PURCHASED
DOMESTIC

18 - 21

IN S PURCHASED
IMPORTED

24 - 27

IN S PURCHASED
TOTAL

28 + 29

IN QTY PURCHASED
DOMESTIC

17-20

32

qi2t-qi2o

IN QTY PURCHASED
IMPORTED

23 - 26

33

qit - qio

IN QTY PURCHASED
TOTAL

31 + 32

JU
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Table D.1 (continued)
(A)

LINE
NO.

(C)

(B)

MATH NOTATION
PER § 150.356

DESCRIPTION

(D)

(E)

(F)

(G)

<H)

COMPU

i = 1
No. 2
HEATING OIL

i = 2
GASOLINE

i- 3
No. 2 D
DIESEL
• FUEL

i- 4
OTHER

TATION

LINE NO.

BASE PD. PROD. SALES:

pij°

34

J=1

UNITS SOLDCONSUMERS

35

36

pijoqij° j=1

37

pijo j=2

38

j=2

39

p°ijqij°

j =2

40

P°

j =3

41

q°

j =3

44

45

S SOLD CONSUMERS

PRICE/UNIT

34 X 35

- RETAILERS

UNITS SOLO-RETAILERS

S SOLO-RETAILERS

Σ(Pijoqijo)

UNIT SOLD—WHOLESALERS

TOTAL S SALES

j

J

37 X 38

PRICE/UNIT—
WHOLESALERS

S SOLOWHOLESALERS

42

43

PRICE/UNITCONSUMERS

TOTAL UNITS SOLD

WEIGHTED AVERAGE
SELLING PRICE

40 X 41

36 + 39
+ 42

35 + 38
+ 41

43 - 44
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■
(A)

LINE
NO.

Table D.1 (continued)
(8)

(C)

MATH NOTATION
PER § 150 356

DESCRIPTION

COMPU

CONSUMERS;
WHOLESALERS

34 - 40

A

48

LINE NO.

(A):

WEIGHTED /\

47

TATION

PRICE DIFFERENTAILS

A

46

(D)

RETAILERS
WHOLESALERS

(G)

(H)

i = 1
No. 2
HEATING OIL

i - 2
GASOLINE

i- 3
No. 2 D
DIESEL
FUEL

i- 4
OTHER

37 - 40

WEIGHTED

50

TOTAL WEIGHTED A

47 + 49

51

TOTAL SALES—
CONSUMER + RETAIL

36 + 39

52

WEIGHTED RETAIL
PRICE ADJUSTMENT

50 / 51

NET WHOLESALE
PRICE ADJUSTMENT
FACTOR

45 - 52

54

WHOLESALE PRICE
ADJUSTMENT
DOMESTIC

53 X 31

55

WHOLESALE PRICE
ADJUSTMENT
IMPORTED

53 X 32

56

COST PASS THRU
DOMESTIC

28-54

Y°

(f)

36 X 46

49

53

(E)

39 X 48

•
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Table D.1 (continued)
(Al

LINE
NO.

MATH NOTATION
PER § 150.356

57

58

(C)

(B)

8

DESCRIPTION

(D)
COMPU
TATION
LINE NO.

COST PASS THRU
IMPORTED

29 - 55

TOTAL PURCHASED
PRODUCT PASS THRU

56 + 57

59

ALLOCATED CRUDE
PASS THRU

60

TOTAL COST
PASS THRU

. 15

58 + 59

S SALES TYPE OF
PRODUCT W/l LEVEL
OF DISTRIBUTION

61

CONSUMERS

62

RETAILERS

63

WHOLESALERS

PRODUCT TYPE W/l
LEVELS OF DISTRIBUTION
ALLOCATION %'s

64

CONSUMERS

61

65

RETAILERS

62 / 13

66

WHOLESALERS

63 / 13

67

% DISTRIBUTION TO
OTHER THAN SPECIAL
PRODUCTS

13

COL H
LINE 14

(E)

(F)

i = 1
No. 2
HEATING OIL

i = 2
GASOLINE

(H)
i = 3
No. 2 D
DIESEL
FUEL

i =4
OTHER
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Table D.1 (continued)
(A)

LINE
NO

(B)

MATH NOTATION
PER § 150.356

(C)

DESCRIPTION

(D)

COMPU
TATION
LINE NO.

CURRENT ALLOWABLE COST
PASS THROUGHS PRODUCTS
W/L LEVEL OF DISTRIBUTION
SPECIAL PRODUCTS

68

CONSUMERS

60 X 64

69

RETAILERS

60 X 65

70

WHOLESALERS

60 X 66

71

OTHER THAN SPECIAL
PRODUCTS

60 X 67

AVAILABLE S COST PASS
THROUGH FROM PREVIOUS
MONTH

PREVIOUS
MONTH

SPECIAL PRODUCTS

72

73

CONSUMERS

RETAILERS

LINE
88

LINE
89

-4-

74

WHOLESALERS

LINE
90

75

OTHER THAN SPECIAL
PRODUCTS

LINE
91

(E)

(F)

(G)

(H)

i = 1
No. 2
HEATING OIL

i = 2
GASOLINE

i = 3
No. 2 D
DIESEL
FUEL

i=4
OTHER
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Table D.1 (continued)
(A)
LINE
NO.

(B)
MATH NOTATION
PER § 150 356

IC>

DESCRIPTION

(D)
COMPU
TATION
LINE NO.

ACTUAL COST PASS
THROUGH TAKEN PREVIOUS
MONTH
SPECIAL PRODUCTS

76

CONSUMERS

77

RETAILERS

78

WHOLESALERS

79

OTHER THAN
SPECIAL PRODUCTS

MAXIMIM CURRENT
ALLOWABLE
PASS THROUGH

SPECIAL PRODUCTS

80

CONSUMERS

80 =
68 + 72
- 76

81

RETAILERS

81 =
69 + 73
- 77

82

WHOLESALERS

82 =
70 + 74
- 78

83

OTHER THAN SPECIAL
PRODUCTS

83 =
71 + 75
-79

(E)

(F)

(G)

(H)

i = 1
No. 2
HEATING OIL

i = 2
GASOLINE

i = 3
No. 2 D
DIESEL
FUEL

i = 4
OTHER
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Table D.1 (continued)
(A)
LINE
NO

(B)
MATH NOTATION
PER § 150.356

(C)

DESCRIPTION

(D)
COMPU
TATION
LINE NO.

CURRENT AMOUNT ASSIGNED
TO OTHER PRODUCTS

SPECIAL PRODUCTS

84

CONSUMERS

84-80

85

RETAILERS

85 - 81

86

WHOLESALERS

86<82

CURRENT TOTAL AMT.
ASSIGNED TO OTHER
PRODUCTS

87

87

83

CURRENT ALLOWABLE
COST PASS THROUGH
SPECIAL PRODUCERS

80 — 84

88

CONSUMERS

89

RETAILERS

81 - 85

90

WHOLESALERS

82 - 86

91

OTHER THAN SPECIAL
PRODUCTS

83 + 87

ESTIMATED UNIT SALESCURRENT MONTH

SPECIAL PRODUCTS

92

CONSUMERS

93

RETAILERS

94

WHOLESALERS

(E)

(F)

(C)

(H)

i =1
No. 2
HEATING OIL

i = 2
GASOLINE

i = 3
No. 2 D
DIESEL
FUEL

i = 4
OTHER
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Table D.1 (continued)
(A)

LINE
NO

(B)

MATH NOTATION
PER § 150.356

(C)
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TATION
LINE NO.
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PRICE INCREASE
SPECIAL PRODUCTS
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96
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du
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■

ACTUAL UNIT
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SPECIAL PRODUCTS
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A
du
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i2

RETAILERS

48 96

100
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49 <=
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■
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(H)

i = 1
No. 2
HEATING OIL

i = 2
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t = 3
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The results of interviews reported were purposely
divided into three size groupings.

The groupings do not

conform to any normal division of size but were selected for
the primary purpose of revealing an indication of size while

concealing specific identity.

The groupings will be

reported as follows:
1.

A large company - 200,000 barrels per day.

2.

An intermediate company - between 30,000 and
200,000 barrels per day.

3.

A small company - less than 30,000 barrels per day

Company Z
The interview with Company Z, a larger company, was

conducted with the manager of planning and economics.
Refinery investment decisions were under

consideration by Company Z at various intervals throughout

the period 1963 to 1973.

Return on investment for totally

new construction was considered submarginal.

Primary

expansion during the period was limited to existing
facilities.

Capacity was added in bottlenecked areas by

rounding out capacity to the maximum output of existing,

previously overbuilt, operations.

This approach has

produced an acceptable but not extremely gratifying return
on investment.

A more progressive approach was abandoned

because the return forecast did not meet minimum acceptable
requirements.
A representative of Company Z answered all questions
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but was very reluctant to volunteer any additional

information on his own company.

He did not have the same

reluctance in commenting about other companies' operations
and labeled one of the other firms contacted by this writer
as a maverick.

The reason expansion was possible for

existing refineries was stated to be overcapacity of
catalysts when they were first introduced in refineries.

When considering the construction of totally new refineries
this firm normally planned to close small, older, existing
facilities and to contract a portion of the new refineries

temporary excess production to other firms.

Any plans for

totally new construction are subject to availability of
crude oil and therefore are not current.

During the period

under study Company Z reported investment costs on specific

proposed projects which were more than 50 percent higher

than when projects were first considered.
The interview disclosed a very strong need for
greater flexibility in accounting to allow this company to

conform more rapidly to the requirements of government

regulations, specifically Phase IV controls.

There was no

opportunity to examine the results of postaudit evaluations

of this firm.

In fact, there was a specific firm statement

to the contrary in the invitation to conduct the interview.

This firm favored a relative-value cost allocator under
Phase IV.
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Company Y
The interview with Company Y, a small company, was

conducted with the president.

Company Y had been content to

remain about the same size for most of the period

considered.

It is the subsidiary of another small company

as far as refinery capacity is concerned.

However,

the

parent has production facilities which assist both itself
and the subsidiary of an intermediate-size refinery for a

portion of its product distribution.

The firm is somewhat

unusual in its operation but those unusual features can not
be mentioned without revealing identity.
The firm made several expansions in recent years

and has realized a good return on its investments.

The

expansions were not construction of totally new facilities,

but additions to existing plants, sometimes utilizing used
equipment.

Payout has been as brief as three years on

pipeline investment and the company is assured a relatively
steady availability of crude oil from that source.

The firm

has remained small even after expanding its processing of

crude several times.

The president was most cooperative and

provided additional published information concerning general

conditions in the industry.

There was a review of specific

investment proposals but only to the extent that brief notes

were taken.
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Company X
The interview with Company X, a small company, was

conducted with two different individuals.

Company X had

been acquired by another firm shortly prior to the
interview.

The initial contact was with the vice-president

of marketing who explained the current operating
characteristics of the new firm.

The intense problems of

the acquisition prevented a discussion with the current

president, but the former president of Company X was located

and was most cooperative in advising concerning operations
of that company during the period under consideration.
Company X was under severe competition in a limited

geographical area with declining crude-oil availability and
had to ship crude oil in by tank car.

This firm was the

subsidiary of another firm for most of the period under
It had relatively heavy production of

consideration.

asphalt and suffered when in the words of its former

president, "a competitor broke the asphalt price in 1968."
Company X's operation was a declining operation in a
dying field.

The new firm was rapidly expanding by

acquiring small producing and refining companies in a rather

intense pattern,

two years.

having acquired at least five in less than

The strengths of some subsidiaries would offset

the weaknesses of others and produced a rather sound
structure.

Had Company X not been acquired it probably

would have ceased to exist.
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Company W

No interview was conducted with Company W, a small
The specific reason given by the president was:

company.

The title of your dissertation does sound
interesting, and we appreciate your thinking of
us to work with you in preparing your needed
information.
Due to the tremendous amount of
paper work that is being generated through the
various governmental control programs it would
not be possible for us to devote the time to
contribute to your efforts, and it would be wise
for us to decline at this time.1

Company V
The interview with Company V, an intermediate-size

company, was conducted with the vice-president of planning.
The firm experienced two refinery expansions during the
period of this study and obtained a minimal return on
investment for both.

Reasons other than return on invest

ment prompted management to expand.

In one instance the

expansion involved a pipeline decision and in another
instance the expansion involved upgrading to meet the new

emissions requirements.
its product,

The firm has a growing market for

a definite crude-oil deficiency, and follows a

basic independent pricing approach to marketing.

In a few

areas the company marketed at major oil-company prices but
in most areas it acted as an independent, pricing one or two
cents below the major, with a firm policy of meeting the

lowest price in the area.

1Name withheld by request.
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Although the normal tendency was for intermediate

firms to experience modest returns on investment,

this

firm's minimal return is probably related to the type of
expansion.

Upgrading of the product usually requires new

equipment but most firms of this size would normally
consider used equipment for their other expansions.

Company U

The interview with Company U,

a large company, was

arranged by the public affairs department and conducted with
a member of the controller's staff who was in charge of a

special group monitoring Phase IV operations.

The firm's

representative had previous experience in refinery
management and also in the corporate planning department.
In addition,

there was also a discussion with the

head of the economics department relative to the views

expressed in Chapter 3.

Company U was extremely cooperative.

After disclosing requested information,

the company

permitted perusal of the correspondence files between its

firm and the cost-of-living council and also Mr.

energy group.

Simon's

The firm followed the general pattern for

large companies and disclosed minimal returns on investment
on totally new refinery facilities.

The return on

investment was better for expansion of existing facilities
and the company indicated that reasons other than return on

investment were primarily responsible for the final
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refinery-investment decisions.

The merger of two large

companies (for which no antitrust action was initiated)

forced a shutdown of one of this firm's refineries.

The qualifications of the firm's representatives
prompted some questions involving his personal opinion
regarding economies of scale and a comparison of a large
firm with a small firm.

He listed the following advantages

for a small firm:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

An independent can move faster.
Can give better service.
Can tailor size to specific location and
circumstances.
Has transportation economies.
Can build to merely meet state codes.
Is not troubled with hardening of the arteries
(rigid policies restricting freedom of movement)
and may consider unique solutions to short-run
problems.
Government favoritism existed.
The company can be an individualist.
The small firm will not encounter severe competitive
pressures unless it is engaged in overgrowth
(expands to some other firm's envisioned market).

In response to a direct question this representative stated

that if he wished to he could start and successfully operate
a small refinery in competition with the major company that

is his present employer.
A study was prepared by this firm which compared the

domestic integration balance with cumulative dealer tank

wagon increases in cents per gallon.

The results of this

study provide data showing the extreme difference in

competitive prices available to firms with very high

domestic production and those with extremely low domestic

production, particularly old production which is severely
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limited in crude-oil price compared to new produced oil and

imported oil.
This firm did not engage in any product dumping
during the period under observation and seemed to be rather

unique in that regard.

A specific cost method used for

internal product-mix evaluation assigned a cost differential

to the components of the product mix based on the latest
cost to upgrade products by the latest techniques available.
Company U favored a volume-oriented cost allocation under

Phase IV controls and appeared to be instrumental in
assisting in the adoption of this policy by the government.

Although cooperating fully with the questions
asked and volunteering additional information of both a

current and a historical development nature, the company did
not allow a direct postaudit evaluation.

Company T

The interview with Company T, a large company, was
conducted with the former head of forward planning (the

operating head of forward planning at the time the
decisions discussed were made) and a current member of the

planning department.

Brief contact was also made with the

current vice-president in charge of forward planning.
Company T has established a pattern of marketing

expansion which deliberately caused sales to exceed refinery
capacity until a critical point was reached.

At this time

a refinery would be constructed which would somewhat exceed
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this company's total market demand so that for a short
time excess refinery capacity would exist for the firm.

The

company found itself needing expansion in refinery capacity
in the late 1960's and began a study which resulted in a
refinery-investment decision.

The study of return on

investment was conducted merely as a precaution against a
losing operation since the decision was largely based upon
the firm's market demand.

Was it more economical to buy

product with which to meet this demand or to manufacture it?
The price of products during this period was

depressed and the resultant financial analysis indicated

that the refinery-investment decision would generate no

large return on investment but rather would barely exceed
the minimum requirement.

The firm concluded that the

alternative, purchasing their products from outsiders, was
potentially the more expensive approach with even less
potential return.

An overriding consideration which seemed

to be the deciding factor was the cost of construction
itself.

Company management decided that the time had come

to construct a refinery because other companies were not

constructing and favorable construction contracts were
available.

Throughout the interview company representatives

emphasized the important role of competition for both price

and product-mix determination.

They could not refute the

argument that government regulatory agencies had exerted
considerable influence in the price area, but they were
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reluctant to emphasize this approach.

The company is using the equivalent of incremental
costing techniques to determine refinery product mixes and

production runs.

Manufacturing or processing costs are

fairly well established on different products, but no
attempt is made to allocate the cost of raw material input
by product for decision purposes.

The company has been

analyzing marketing costs in a similar fashion with the in

tention of "backing up realized prices to the refinery gate."
Company T is just beginning to use Monte Carlo

techniques for probability determination and is adopting

extensive use of discounted cash flow.

The firm has been

developing incremental cost techniques assisted by the
computer and appears to have manufacturing costs isolated

with practical accuracy.

Forward-planning personnel have

little regard for any attempt to allocate the cost of crude

oil among the various products and are reluctant to concede
its desirability under any circumstance.

Company personnel

indicated the decision to build the refinery was indeed

fortunate since present circumstances caused the project to
exceed all expectations.

Prices had recovered and the

excess capacity planned prior to construction was

immediately utilized upon completion of the refinery.

This

accelerated utilization of planned expansion capacity caused
all projections at the time of the decisions to be surpassed
by considerable margins.

For these reasons and also due to

a lack of operating performance time, management decided
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against an outsider conducting a postaudit evaluation.

The

cooperation of Company T greatly exceeded expections in

two areas:
1.

The decision reviewed was extremely current.

2.

The company made available the person actually
involved in the original decision, and he was
quite open and candid in his comments.

Company S

This intermediate-size company, Company S, was

represented in the interview by its president.

At the time

of the interview the firm's refining capacity exceeded daily
production by 10,000 barrels and was only slightly over half
of the firm's market for products.

The firm acquired two

refineries at relatively close intervals.

One acquisition

was in substance a financial transaction; however,

it

became unexpectedly profitable to operate both refineries
for a while.

Later,

the refinery investment was developed

at one location and the other location was abandoned.

The president of this firm was quite cooperative

and spent much time on background information.

In the

1930's the Interstate Oil Compact established allowable
production for many producing states.

The allowables were

at a high of 100 percent during World War II and ranged down

to as low as 20 percent at one time.

These allowables

provided a strong inducement for United States companies to
go to foreign countries for exploration.

The allowables

were primarily a price-protecting device which kept marginal
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producing wells in existence.
The president discussed Truman's standby reserve

capacity requested following the Korean conflict, the impact
of the Suez Canal blockage, and the threat of cheap foreign
oil which ushered in the import program.

The oil-import

program was first introduced as a voluntary measure.
However, several firms immediately took steps to defeat its
intent.

Commonwealth and Phillips were successful in

installing refineries in Puerto Rico with almost 100 percent
imported crude oil.

Hess succeeded in the Virgin Islands

with a similar program and it was not until an attempt was
made to install a refinery in Maine utilizing imports
exclusively that the pattern was broken.

Occidental's

efforts to thwart the oil import program were defeated.
Following this defeat, the import program became mandatory

in 1959.

This import program with its import quotas kept

marginal refineries in existence as explained in Chapter 3.

Firms were mentioned that existed solely on the value of the
import tickets.
Additional insights into marketing problems were
revealed to be due to loosely worded long-term contracts,

originally negotiated between friendly firms.

Personnel

changes and time caused one firm to seek to take

advantage of the poorly worded contract.

These contracts

took the form of guaranteed margin and provided an advantage
to the purchaser whenever the prices were depressed, since

the seller bore all the loss.
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This firm provided some very factual information
concerning the increase in both the size and cost of a
totally new refinery.

Each of the following proposals was

considered and rejected due to inadequate return on invest
ment coupled with high investment costs:

Year

Size
in barrels
per day

Cost
in million
dollars

1.

66-67

90,000

80 to 90

2.

69-70

100,000

100 plus

3.

71

130,000

175 plus

4.

72

150,000 to
200,000

400

Company S was one of the few intermediate-size firms
considering totally new refinery investments.

Management

could not be convinced on the financial data.

The firm even

considered partnership with a major oil company but without

success.
In addition to the information presented, this firm's
representative reviewed the basic material in Chapters 2 and
3,

making appropriate comments but not refuting the logic.

This firm later acquired Company K.

Company R

A large firm, Company R was represented in the
interview by its planning coordinator.

The firm decided

to expand capacity 35,000 barrels per day by retiring some

units and making a major addition to an existing refinery.

This company followed a regular pattern of expansion at a
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rapid pace, buying product to fulfill growing demand and

building refineries only when there was assured demand for
company product.

During the late 1960's while normal

market expansion for most companies was between 7 and 7 1/2
percent, this firm experienced almost a 9 percent growth
rate in gasoline market demand.

At the time of the

investment decision, refinery capacity was clearly behind
market expansion; yet, the acquisition of market share was
so favorable that the marketing department received approval

for additional expansion.

The study took a discounted

cash-flow projection form and the return on investment,

stated in the interview but not reported here for obvious

reasons, was very disappointing to the firm's management.
Historically the company did not allow capacity to exceed

sales.

Even after this decision, refinery capacity was

15,000 barrels per day less than sales and production was
considerably less than that.

Other firms were not constructing refineries during

this period.

Company R was forced into a decision by a

deadline for deciding its participation in a pipeline
project.

Dwindling productive capacity in the area coupled

with a fear of insufficient crude supplies at a later date
propelled the firm into an early study.

The firm thus took

positive action while ecological problems were causing

others to defer action.

The off-cycle timing for refinery

expansion created a considerable saving in refinery
construction costs.
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This firm was interviewed twice.

When the first

contact was made the large expansion appeared to be a

mistake due to the tremendous downward pressure on product
However, patience proved the investment decision

prices.

to be wise.

The planning coordinator, somewhat reluctant

to disclose internal errors to outside personnel, changed
his thought and cooperated fully when the decision proved to
be favorable (as his initial study had indicated it should).

In this particular instance the planning coordinator had
reviewed (in the form of a postaudit evaluation) the

original investment decision for management at the time of
the first contact.

He took the time to reacquaint himself

with the decision and the evaluation and discussed both

quite freely, even mentioning in confidence figures that
were not for publication.

More than a year elasped between

the first and the second visits to this firm.

Company Q
Company Q was represented by both the vice-president

of planning and a member of his department.

It is a fully

integrated oil company with two major refineries.

The

accounting department of this intermediate-size company has

gone through several accounting methods, including an
adjusted Group Three price less discount, a commission-base
operation, and a transfer price system.

Currently, all

refinery operations are handled as one profit center with no

attempt to define profit for any segment.

The company
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uses a standard cost system with variance analysis.

The

firm is basically a cut-rate marketer of petroleum products.

At one point in the existence of Company Q the firm

Discriminatory

tried to move up to a major marketing style.

prices were inadvertently attempted with no discrimination
in product name.

Large, modern, multibay stations were

built in areas where the company's discount stations were
still located.

The new stations had major pricing and the

old stations discount pricing.

As might be expected, the

customers viewed the new stations as peddlers of cut-rate

The company returned to cut-rate

gasoline at high prices.

marketing policy exclusively.

This firm has a flexible

pricing policy, evaluating each situation and establishing
price based on appearance.

Poor stations with poor

appearance could cut price by two cents without causing
concern but one that appeared competitive would be allowed
no price differential.

This company did not favor either

import quotas or the entire import program.
A specific refinery-investment decision was examined

and was reported in Chapter 5 on page 140.

The firm is a

net purchaser of crude oil and experienced extreme
difficulty in obtaining crude-oil requirements.

The

pressure of current shortages forces a closing of many
stations including most of the new stations recently built.
The firm is in a fairly competitive position after these

closings.

The planning department emphasized its opposition

to any breakdown of costs in its product mix.
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Company P
Company P, a small company, was represented in the

interview by both the refining manager and vice president of
marketing.

There were no expansion plans considered during

the period under study.

The stated objectives of this

refinery was "to survive," and the pricing policy was "the
price required to move the product."
Other sources, outside this firm, add somewhat to

the picture of Company P’s operations.

Originally held by a

major oil company, this refinery was sold to a firm outside
the industry.

The increase in import allowables resulting

from the refinery size reduction (see Table 4.7, page 123)

facilitated payout and improved the economics of this
acquisition.

The operation of the refinery was controlled

by the same manager,

i.e., he was acquired from the major

with the refinery.

Company O

The views of Company 0, a large company, were
presented during the interview by a director of operations

analysis in the planning division.

Repeated studies

convinced the planning personnel that the return on

investment from totally new refinery construction did not
come close to meeting their lowest acceptable return on

investment.

The appropriate expansion pattern therefore

appeared to be expansion of existing facilities and

acquisition of any major facilities that could be purchased.
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The firm carefully pursued this course of action and

represents an exception to the rule for large firms.

All

large firms have indicated poor returns on investment from

totally new refinery facilities.

However, Company 0 has not

constructed totally new refineries for any reason, including
nonfinancial.

The Company 0 representative explained several

pricing schemes which appeared to be generally used by the
industry.

These included the crude-replacement-value method

and particularly the incremental barrel which he maintained

has been sold over the last ten years.

A detailed

discussion of the inherent flaw in this approach is

presented in Chapter 3, beginning on page 63.
The basic conflict between the engineering and the

accounting viewpoints on cost allocation first appeared

during this interview.

An inadequacy in reporting for

planning purposes was resolved by methods not involving
the accounting department.

The firm is currently using

computer output for cost allocation and makes only the final

year-end adjustment with a price-relative cost allocator.

Hostility existed at one time between the accounting and
planning departments and there is evidence that this

relationship has not fully returned to a spirit of
cooperative mutual assistance.

In addition to the director of operations analysis,
brief discussions were held with the manager of the planning

division and the vice president of refining.
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Company N

The interview with Company N, a small company, was
conducted with its president.

during the period under study.

Two expansions were completed
Specific discussions

centered on the second expansion.

The president indicated

that the depressed prices for petroleum products hit such a

low that refinery construction had to end before the project
was fully completed.

The refinery was completed to a stage

which allowed it to go on stream but many of the auxiliary
facilities planned had to be postponed.

The return on investment during this period was
characterized as "bad."

Additional facts are required to

fully understand the implications of this response.

Company

N has constructed its entire refinery from used equipment.
Most of this equipment was purchased at very favorable
prices but is in excellent condition.

Some was acquired for

as little as 10 percent of new-equipment cost.

The firm is

not content with its present size and has expansions planned
for the future.

During the depressed price periods this

firm made less than the value of the import allowables to

which it was entitled; without the allowables it would have
lost money.
Although the firm is very conscious of ecological

problems and has instituted many improvements in its
refinery operation, there was no intention of constructing

facilities to meet no-lead-gasoline-production capability.
The president indicated a loss of approximately one dollar
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a barrel before administrative costs on a rather substantial
volume of residual fuel.

He also stated that any time

government decision makers sit down and control the market

there is going to be trouble.

To support his statement he

referred to a cargo of diesel fuel in a market close to his

refinery which sold for sixty-two cents a gallon before tax.

At the same time the same product at this terminal was about
half that price.

Quite simply,

if his product could have

been transported to the market mentioned and sold at the
price of the other shipment, a twenty-five-cent-per-gallon

profit would have resulted.

He further stated that similar

things have happened to gasoline prices.
Company M

Company M, of intermediate size, was the first firm

contacted and as such represented a pilot project.

The

senior representative of the economics department provided
the basic contact.

Company M had engaged in an unusual

study of cost over normal operating ranges using the
incremental approach.

Computer output revealed a similarity

of costs for each of three products in the distillate

range.

Although operating personnel seemed pleased with

this study and management implemented changes based on it,

reservations are held concerning its validity.
The initial product mix of a refinery is determined

only after a series of multiple comparisons involving types
of crude oils available, product demands in the geographical
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area, and the effect of competitive forces upon the firm's
products.

These interacting forces are so complex that

computer models and professional consultants are often
needed to arrive at some semblance of an optimum mix.

The

particular study in question proposed the introduction of an
additional volume of crude oil to be made entirely into each

of three separate products in the distillate range under
three hypothetical cases, each case dealing with a separate
product.

To accomplish this it was necessary to modify the

normal refinery output slightly for each barrel of crude

input, moving away from a previously determined optimum mix
to an inefficient position.

The amount of this change was

controlled by flexibility available.

The distillates involved seemed to affect the same
blending stocks.

Although the writer was not familiar with

the stocks involved,
computer run.

they had the same variable names on the

Therefore under normal circumstances each

computer output was determining the result of a move away

from optimum under which all competitive forces and

available supplies had been considered and was instead

substituting the consideration of the result of only one
product change.

Under normal conditions such a move would

not be advantageous.
this study was denied.

A request to look at the price side of
Repeated assurances were given that

company personnel had examined these prices and that they

were not depressed by the additional output.

These sustained

prices despite increased output could only mean that the
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firm had either discovered a hole in the market or a flaw in

its original estimation of product demand.
The logical result of a discovery that costs were

constant throughout an operating range was a move to the

highest-revenue product since the products had different

revenue potential.

Accordingly, a major plant modification

was made which maximized the output of that product.

A

postaudit evaluation of this management decision was

prepared and indicated a good return on the investment.

This printed evaluation and the computer runs evaluating
cost were made available to the author during the interview.

Company L

Company L was a small company and declined the

interview for the following reasons:

I regret to advise that the only project we
have that would require new investment has been
deferred due to the fact that cost factors in
our business are practically changing daily and
in fact fluctuating to such an extent that there
is no way to develop economic studies at this
time.1
This firm doubled capacity during later years of
the period under study.

Company K
Numerous attempts were made to interview the
president of company K, an intermediate-size firm, until it

was learned that the reason he was so occupied was that

1-Name withheld by request.
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company K was being acquired by company S.

Since the

management of company S's opinions had already been obtained,

neither company was approached further.
Company J
Company J was one of the first large companies to be

contacted by correspondence.

An indirect route through

local management was attempted and this approach proved to

The firm declined for the following reason:

be poor.

As I am sure you will understand, ... receives
a great number of requests both from governmental
and nongovernmental sources.
The burden of
responding to these becomes such that in the
interests of stockholders and from the standpoint
of good business practice it has been necessary to
restrict our participation in activities such as
yours principally to those legally required.
Company I

The president of company I was most cooperative,
but he had controlled this small company for such a short
time that he had neither studied nor instituted any
increases in size.

He was relatively new to the business

and had nothing to contribute to the material already
acquired.

Company H
Company H, a small company, is a subsidiary of a firm

that is not in the petroleum industry.

The interview was

conducted with the manager of the planning and economics

2Name withheld by request.
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department.

The basic facilities have existed for some time

and have been improved at regular intervals.

A recent

investment decision involving a Platformer (equipment which

combines lighter fractions into gasoline) increased
production of gasoline from 35 to 55 percent.

The decision

had to be "sold" to a tough-minded management on a returnon-investment basis.

A postcompletion review of the

operation disclosed it had met or exceeded expectations.

The firm has attempted to keep labor and operating
costs below the industry average and to excel in station

location and efficient station format.

The basic marketing

policy during the period under study has been to emphasize

volume with a basic two-cent differential in price.

One

objective of this firm is to maximize the profit of the

refining department.

To accomplish this goal required a

flexible computer-assisted evaluation of possible input and
output combinations.

This firm indicated a strong tendency

toward short-short run product-mix flexibility.
Company G

The interview with Company G, a small company, was

conducted with its president.

The firm was formerly owned

by another oil company and moved from a branded to an

unbranded marketing position.

It relied quite heavily on

the small-business set-aside program to allow it to exist

under the extreme pressure of recent years.

Its pricing

policy has been one cent under tank-wagon price and is
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exclusively wholesale except for the jet-fuel operation.

The only expansion considered by this firm increased its

capacity by 25 percent.

Idle equipment was used to rework

the units, and therefore an excellent return on investment
resulted.

This firm appears quite content to remain small.
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The premise of this study is that certain policies

within and without the petroleum industry have interacted
to produce semirigid industry prices.

One effect of this

price rigidity is the inflexibility that is passed on to
costs whenever the traditional joint-cost-accounting

allocation (based on relative market value) is used in

conjunction with these prices.
In studying the problem, activities and policies
which combined to cause artificial price restraints in the

petroleum-refining industry from 1963 to 1972 were

reviewed.

The accounting and economic implications and the

effect on refinery investment of the resulting semirigid
prices were investigated.

Published wholesale gasoline prices were compared

with the wholesale price indexes from 1963 to 1972.

The

gasoline price trend was significantly different from the

intense inflationary trend which began in 1964.

A test of

regression line slopes covering the inflationary period
resulted in a rejection of the null hypothesis of slope
similarity.

Therefore,

no adjustment for price-level

changes was necessary.
A major reversal in the wholesale gasoline price

trend was found to be centered on 1959, and appears to be
caused by the Oil Import Program.

1

Marginal cost pricing

2

when discontinuities existed, coupled with industry policy
rigidities, added to the undesirable effect of government

involvement in the refined-products marketing picture.
This involvement was further complicated by rigid policies

and biases of other nonindustry groups.
Unyielding adherence by each group to policies that

needed modification appeared to cause the price rigidities.
Government officials pursued a low-cost-energy policy with

a threefold effect:

(1) A low-price natural-gas policy

encouraged consumption and held competing product prices

low.

(2) Import restrictions on residual fuel oil were

frequently reduced to maintain low prices, increasing

import dependency.

(3) The wholesale gasoline price was

attacked from the two following sources when a dispro

portionate percentage of crude oil was allowed to marginal
producers:

(A) Government policies interacted with a

marginal-cost pricing scheme to produce an unstable price
depressing effect in the industry.

(B) The government

then forced a rollback in price advances of refined pro

ducts by threatening complete removal of import controls.
These external interferences placed upward rigidities on

price and drove the average return on investment for the

industry below the national average for all manufacturers.
Uncertainties introduced by ecological consid
erations,

along with the low return on investment,

temporarily halted most new construction.

Large companies

changed from a policy favoring totally new refinery

3
construction to one which balanced refinery facilities.

Smaller firms continued to rely heavily on construction
with used equipment to hold down investment costs.

Without modification, the economic models presented
in the literature failed to explain the activities of an
industry with all the outward appearance of an oligopoly.

The refining industry appeared (for a limited time) to be

unable to function as an oligopoly.

The writer attempted

to show the possible effects of government intervention by

presenting two modified economic models.

Both the

conventional kinked-demand-curve approach and one designed
to provide for external as well as internal constraints

were considered.

A review of the price-relative joint-cost allocator
disclosed a time interval during which this accounting
allocator proved invalid.

Inquiry revealed an industry

trend toward the managerial use of a volume allocator
rather than the price-relative cost allocator.

The

industry, now faced with extensive planning and control
problems, will face even more pressing requirements for

detailed accounting information.

Thus it seems essential

for the industrialist and the academicians to work

together in striving for a more realistic solution to the

cost-allocation problem, a solution which may be multi

staged .

